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This dissertation studies tax evasion as a phenomenon tied to psychological and 
moral costs. It starts from a theoretical formulation of the tax payer's decisional problem 
which incorporates two psychological elements into the usual expected utility 
maximisation approach. The first of these components is based on the assumption that 
people "dislike" being discovered guilty of evasion, while the second one is founded on 
the hypothesis that tax payers feel their awareness that they are stealing their 
contribution to the tax yield from the other citizens as a moral cost. 
The theoretical model was tested by carrying out seven experiments involving 274 
experimental subjects. The results of the experiments seemingly confirm the importance 
of the role played by the second of the psychological elements considered by the 
theoretical model, while the first one is of only marginal importance. 
Another important finding to emerge from the experiments is that the traditional 
theoretical treatment of uncertainty and risk could not be used to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the experimental subjects' behaviour when faced by the uncertain choice 
of evasion. When the experimental subjects had to cope with a repeated choice problem, 
they developed a sort of learning strategy, using a trial and error process to explore the 
space of alternatives. They thus produced a personal "style" in solving the uncertainty 
problem. The dissertation shows that is possible to produce a concise taxonomy of these 
game styles which could be used as the basis for further theoretical analysis. 
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Preface 
In the first edition of Administrative Behaviour Herbert Simon, citing the story of a 
statistician who had found a very close correlation between the number of old maids and 
the size of the clover crop in different English counties, wrote: 
"... After puzzling over this relation for some time, he (the statistician) was able to trace what appeared 
to him to be the causal chain. Old maids, it appeared, kept cats; and cats ate mice. Field mice, however, 
were natural enemies of bumble-bees, and the latter were, in turn, the chief agents in fertilising the 
flowers of the clover plants. This implication, of course, is that the British Parliament should never 
legislate on the subject of marriage bonuses without first evaluating the effect upon the clover crop of 
reducing the spinster population. " (Simon, 1976, p. 82). 
Simon used this anecdote to stress that it is virtually impossible to take serious 
account of all the possible factors explaining a given phenomenon, but it can also 
usefully introduce the potential complexity of the theme treated in this work: that is, 
analysis of the micro-economic reasons that may determine the decision to evade taxes. 
Inspection of the applied literature shows that the number of the elements able to 
influence the decision process of a tax payer is very large, and that it can easily be 
enlarged even further. The purpose of exploring these factors is similar to that 
exemplified by Simon's anecdote: that is to say, it is normative in nature. To produce a 
good fiscal system, it is necessary to induce people to pay taxes. Every fiscal law should 
therefore comprise the best possible constraints on tax evasion. The aim of this work is 
to explore the role played by some psychological, moral constraints on tax evasion, and 
to verify their effect when they are combined with other more traditional deterrents, like 
those embodied in the punishment system. 
Although the topic treated here is studied both theoretically and empirically, it is the 
latter perspective that receives the closest attention. More precisely, I have used the 
experimental approach to check a set of hypotheses formulated in the opening 
theoretical chapter on the role played by certain psychological elements: a Kantian 
moral constraint, a social moral constraint, and a tax fairness effect. ' My decision to 
give priority to empirical inquiry over theory is due to the substantial formal soundness 
' The nature of these factors will be described at the beginning of the theoretical part 
12 
Preface 
In the first edition of Administrative Behaviour Herbert Simon, citing the story of a 
statistician who had found a very close correlation between the number of old maids and 
the size of the clover crop in different English counties, wrote: 
"... After puzzling over this relation for some time, he (the stalislician) was able to trace what appeared 
to him to be the causal chain. Old maids, it appeared, kept cats; and cats ate mice. Field mice, however, 
were natural enemies of bumble-bees, and the latter were, in turn, the chief agents in fertilising the 
flowers of the clover plants. This implication, of course, is that the British Parliament should never 
legislate on the subject of marriage bonuses without first evaluating the effect upon the clover crop of 
reducing the spinster population. " (Simon, 1976, p. 82). 
Simon used this anecdote to stress that it is virtually impossible to take serious 
account of all the possible factors explaining a given phenomenon, but it can also 
usefully introduce the potential complexity of the theme treated in this work: that is, 
analysis of the micro-economic reasons that may determine the decision to evade taxes. 
Inspection of the applied literature shows that the number of the elements able to 
influence the decision process of a tax payer is very large, and that it can easily be 
enlarged even further. The purpose of exploring these factors is similar to that 
exemplified by Simons anecdote: that is to say, it is normative in nature. To produce a 
good fiscal system, it is necessary to induce people to pay, taxes. Every fiscal law should 
therefore comprise the best possible constraints on tax evasion. The aim of this work is 
to explore the role played by some psychological, moral constraints on tax evasion, and 
to verify their effect when they are combined with other more traditional deterrents, like 
those embodied in the punishment system. 
Although the topic treated here is studied both theoretically and empirically, it is the 
latter perspective that receives the closest attention. More precisely, I have used the 
experimental approach to check a set of hypotheses formulated in the opening 
theoretical chapter on the role played by certain psychological elements: a Kantian 
moral constraint, a social moral constraint, and a tax fairness effect. ' My decision to 
give priority to empirical inquiry over theory is due to the substantial formal soundness 
' The nature of these factors will be described at the beginning of the theoretical part. 
12 
of tax evasion theory, which largely prevents any radically new development of the 
topic. 2 By contrast, new insights can be obtained by testing the theory in the field, and 
for this purpose one of the most powerful tools available is economic experimentation. 
The reason of this predominance is well known, namely the fact that evading taxes is a 
crime, and for this reason people have powerful incentives to conceal information about 
their true behaviour. 
The work is divided into three main parts. Part One is devoted to analysis of two 
correlated literatures: the first concerning theoretical approaches to tax evasion, the 
second concerning experiments on tax evasion. The second part of the dissertation 
describes the theoretical framework adopted to design the experiments. Finally, the last 
part outlines the experiments and the results obtained therefrom. 
The experiments here discussed have been carried out at the Computational and 
Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Trento Italy. For this reason in 
the following section I have given some predominance to the data concerning tax 
evasion in Italy. 
1 Introduction 
Tax evasion is one of the most widespread forms of criminal behaviour in the world, 
and it is probably the one that is the most culturally `accepted'. Indeed, under certain 
conditions, citizens may perceive tax evasion as constituting a legitimate defence 
against an unjust and oppressive state. The close connection between the decision to 
evade taxes and the moral justifications cited by evaders to absolve their consciences 
closely influence taxpayers' decision-making, and renders it of particular interest to the 
economic researcher. This short introduction sets out some data from studies of tax 
evasion in Italy and other Western countries. The chapter is purely introductory in 
purpose and lays no claim to exhaustive treatment of the subject. 
Z Many interesting theoretical contributions to the original Allingham and Sadmo's model of tax evasion 
have been developed in the last three decades, for a survey see Cowell (1990). 
I. I. Tax evasion in Italy and in some Western countries 
Studies aimed at quantifying tax evasion have been conducted in almost all the 
Western countries. The estimates available for Italy and for the European countries 
mainly concern indirect indices, i. e. the tax base that escapes the revenue system, while 
measures of the amount of revenue evaded are almost entirely lacking (Bernasconi, 
1995). As well known the chief reason of this fact is that the information available on 
tax evasion is limited and unreliable because tax evasion is a crime and therefore it falls 
into the category of phenomena that feed the so called hidden economy. It should be 
stressed that here I am interested only in tax evasion. Consequently, I shall'ignore other 
kinds of `legal' behaviour, like tax avoidance, which may reduce the individual tax 
burden without exposing the tax payer to the risk of punishment. 
There are two ways to evade taxes: the first is to conceal the activities related to the 
fiscal burden; the second is simply to underreport the amount of the tax burden. 
According to many authors (e. g. Alesina and Mare, 1996), there are two approaches 
available in investigation of these forms of tax evasion : the direct approach and the 
indirect one. Direct methods are used mainly to estimate the tax burden underreported, 
while indirect methods are used when the object of the investigation is tax evasion 
consequent on the hidden economy. 
Direct methods are all based on the auditing of samples of taxpayers. Two techniques 
are used: the compulsory and the voluntary. A compulsory audit can only be carried out 
by the revenue authorities, and it consists of a fiscal inspection of a sample of taxpayers 
who are investigated from many perspectives (with data collected not only on fiscal 
aspects but also on their economic and social profiles). On the assumption that the 
sample selected is statistically representative of the entire population of taxpayers, this 
method should yield a very good assessment of tax evasion. The problem, however, is 
that this kind of investigation is mainly carried out on specific categories of taxpayers, 
because the revenue authorities are primarily interested in detecting tax evasion as a 
crime and must therefore concentrate their resources only on those taxpayers whose 
income declarations already contain some circumstantial evidence of likely tax evasion. 
Another drawback to this method of enquiry is that the revenue authorities can only 
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detect taxpayers who are in some way known to their offices, while they have great 
difficulty in detecting total evaders (O'Higgins, 1980,1981). 
Voluntary audits are interviews conducted with a sample of taxpayers who agree to 
reply to a set of questions designed to reveal forms of black economy. The drawback to 
this second method of direct enquiry is obvious: people who are concealing their 
activities have very little reason to report honestly to the interviewers. 
Indirect methods can be divided into three main groups (Alesina and Mare, 1996): 
a) the macroeconomic approach, which is mainly based on calculation of the difference 
between the taxable income declared and that deducible from the national accounting 
data; 
b) the monetary approach, which is based on the assumption that subjects wishing to 
hide their activities tend to conduct their transactions in cash; therefore, the growth of 
currency should reflect the size of the black economy (many different methods make 
partial use of this approach); 
c) estimate of the ratio of participation in the job market. 
The monetary approach is the one most widely used, despite the fact that it suffers 
from a methodological limitation, namely the difficulty of drawing a precise distinction 
between the currency excess due to the hidden economy and the amount of currency 
`physiologically' required by the economic system. Similarly, the macroeconomic 
approach also suffers from a major weakness, namely the high likelihood of 
measurement errors due to the data-collecting methods used (Cowell, 1990). On the 
other hand, it should be pointed out that this problem is common to all indirect methods. 
Consequently, the lack of a totally problem-free method often suggests that several 
sources and approaches should be used. 
When looking for data on the size of the hidden economy in Europe, one finds that a 
quite large body of research has produced quantitative estimates of the phenomenon. 
Unfortunately, the data are highly heterogeneous, and moreover they do not always refer 
to the same years. A comparison among authors who have used the monetary approach 
is provided by Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 The hidden economy in some Western countries (% of GNP) 
Country method used 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1991 
USA Feige (1989) 17 29-33 27 
Gutmann (1985) 10 11 11.7 12.4 13.1 14.3 
Tanzi (1982) 5 5.5 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 
Frey (1983) 8.3 
Canada Frey 8.7 
UK Feige 14 14 15 14 14.5 
Frey 8 
Germany Feige 16 I8 23 24 24 27 
Tanzi 4.3-6.5 8.1-13 
Frey 8.6 
Ireland Gutmann 8.7 9.4 5.8 4.3 92 10 11.8 14.2 15.1 
Frey 7.2 
Tanzi 2.8 4.4 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.3 6.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 




France Frey 9.4 
Barthelemy (1988) 6.3 
Norway Frey 9.2 
Tanzi-Klovland 2.6 4.3 4.7 6.3 
Spain Frey 7.6 
1 Japan Frey 4.11 1 
Source: Alesina and Mare, 1996, p. 93 
Table 1.1 highlights the wide variability of the estimates produced by different 
authors for the same country. For example, the estimated size of the American hidden 
economy in 1978 varies from a minimum of 5.3% of GNP (Tanzi) to a maximum of 
33% (Feige). A similar wide discrepancy can be seen for several years in the case of 
Ireland, whose hidden economy Tanzi estimates as a phenomenon which grows 
constantly from an initial value of 2.8% in 1975 to a maximum of 8.2% of GNP in 
16 
1991, while Gutmann considers it to be some sort of cyclical process fluctuating 
between a minimum of 4.3% (1978) and a maximum of 15.1% of GNP (1983). 
In spite of these marked discrepancies among estimates, interesting information is 
yielded by Table 1.1 if we look at the estimates suggested by Frey for all the countries 
considered in the table, even if only for one year. According to Frey, the country with 
the largest hidden economy in 1978 was Italy (11.4% of GNP), while the country with 
the smallest hidden economy was Japan (4.1%). Assuming that Frey's estimates are 
correct, at least as regards the relative distance between these two countries, we may 
hypothesise that in 1978 the amount of tax evasion due to the hidden economy in Japan 
was about 120% lower than in Italy. 
Confirmation of the magnitude of tax*evasion due to the hidden economy in Italy has 
been provided by Alesina and Mare (1996), whose estimates are reported in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 Tax evasion and the hidden economy in some Western countries 
(% of GNP) 
Country method used 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
Belgium Monetary 11-15 3.8-20 17-18 
Macroeconomic 11 11 
Italy Monetary 13.9-18 20-30 20 15 
Macroeconomic 8.5 14.2 
Ireland Monetary 1.3-8.7 3.3-10 8.1-13.6 7.9-9.5 
Macroeconomic 0.5-5 
France Monetary 6.3-6.7 
Macroeconomic 
Germany Monetary 3.1-16 3.4-12.1 3.7-14 
Macroeconomic 5-8.9 4.8 
USA Monetary 3-14 4.5-14 10-15 
Macroeconomic 1.5-4 4.5 
UK Monetary 11 2.9-13 2.9-14 14.5-15.9 
Macroeconomic 1.5 1-4 2.5-5.5 3.5 
source: Aiesina ana mare, 1996, p. 9) 
Inspection of Table 2.1 once again evidences the importance of the hidden economy 
in Italy compared with other countries. Again following Alesina e Mare, if tax evaders 
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in Italy had evaded taxes in 1970 to an amount equal to that evaded by American tax 
evaders, then in 1992 the national debt would have been about 30% lower. 
Therefore, if we restrict the analysis only to Italy, which seems to be the country in 
which tax evasion has assumed the greatest economic importance, and if we look at the 
two main forms of levy (i. e. indirect and direct taxes), we can gain better understanding 
of the phenomenon. 
With respect to Italy (Bernasconi, 1995), indirect indices of evasion are available for 
IVA (value added tax), for social security contributions, and for IRPEF (taxation on 
personal incomes). The first estimates of IVA evasion refer to the years 1977-84. 
During this period, according to Bernardi and Buratti (1986), about 20% of the tax base 
in industry and 30% in the commercial sector was evaded. More recently, for fiscal data 
relative to 1986, Cerea (1992) has confirmed the 30% figure for evasion in the 
commercial sector but stresses that this figure errs on the side of caution (Table 1.3). 
Table 1.3 Estimates of tax evasion relative to IVA 
INDUSTRY COMMERCE 
Bernardi (1986) 20% 30% 
Cerea (1992) t2) 
1 
30% 
(1) figures for 1977-84 
(2) figures for 1986 
Source: Gaburri, 1996 
While Bernardi's estimates are based on a quite traditional macroeconomic approach 
(the difference between the taxable income declared and that deducible from the 
national accounting data), Cerea's method is essentially a presumptive approach and 
estimates evasion on a regional basis (Cerea 1992, p. 165). A significant finding of 
Cerea's study is the heterogeneity of IVA evasion in various parts of the country: in 
fact, the aggregate figure of 30% is an average of values of around 23% in the central- 
northern regions of the country and 32% in the south. 
A larger number of studies have examined the evasion of IRPEF (Bernasconi, 1995). 
Various estimates are set out in Table 1.4, where the evasion indices refer to the ratio 
between evaded income and the effective tax base. 
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Table 1.4 Estimates of the evasion of direct taxes by category of income 
Authors Year Dependent employment Other incomes Total tax base 
Vitaletti (1979) 11% 58% 26% 
Visco (1983) 10% 44% 26% 
Bernardi (1984) 6% 55% 24% 
Vitaletti (1984) 9% 56% 28% 
Militello (1986) 10% 32% 19% 
Visco (1987) 11% 56% 46% 
Fossati (1989) 21% 52% 33% 
(1) old accounting system 
Source: Gaburri, 1996 
Table 1.4 highlights two significant features. The first I have already pointed out 
when commenting on previous tables: the differences among the estimates made by 
different authors for the same year, or for years very close to one another. The second 
concerns the values relative to the two forms of income (from dependent employment 
and from self-employment) considered. Bernardi (1989) and Vitaletti (1986) give 
almost identical figures for the 1984 item `other incomes', whereas only two years later 
Militello (1986) and Visco (1987) provide extremely diverse estimates, thereby creating 
a marked difference in the overall estimate of tax evasion. As regards evasion in the two 
forms of income, all the authors agree that evasion is more evident in `other incomes', 
where the average is around 45%-50%. 
The most recent estimates of tax evasion in Italy refer to 1991. They were made by 
the Ministry of Finance and published in the Relazione tecnica attached to government 
bill no. 45 presented to Parliament in 1994. According to this report (Table 1.5), the 
revenues uncollected due to the evasion of direct and indirect taxation amounted to c. 
100 thousand billion lire, to which sum should be added the c. 26 thousand billion 
evaded in the area of social security contributions. The method used belongs to the 
macroeconomic approach, the main particularity being that evasion has been calculated 
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with reference to the private sector of the economy alone, on the assumption that public- 
sector operators do not evade taxes. 
The figures set out in Table 1.5 allow one to state, albeit with some approximation, 
that of the 126 thousand billion lire of tax revenue lost in Italy, 93 thousand billion was 
due to the evasion of income taxes (including social security contributions), equal to c. 
24% of the expected yield, and 33 thousand billion to IVA evasion, equal to c. 34% of 
the yield. In addition to this evasion, a further 40 thousand billion lire of revenue was 
lost as a result of exemptions, exceptions and loopholes. 
Table 1.5 Estimates of tax evasion in Italy for 1991 
Revenues lost on incomes in 1991 (billion of It. liras) 
Value added in the private sector taxable as personal or business income "_ . 980,000 
Revenue predicted on the basis of an average tax rate of 45% (income 
taxes + social security contributions) 440,000 
Effective revenue (income taxes + social security contributions) 292,000 
Lost revenue on incomes 148,000 
Revenues lost on IVA in 1991 
Consumption by households net of IVA 830,000 
Revenue predicted on the basis of an average rate of 11,4% 95,000 
Effective IVA 62,000 
Lost revenue from IVA 33,000 
revenue lost on incomes adjusted by revenue lost on IVA 15,000 
total revenue lost 166,000 
estimate of revenue lost because of allowances, reliefs and loopholes 40,000 
estimated evasion of taxation on incomes and IVA 100,000 
estimated evasion of social security contributions 26,000 
evasion projected for 1989-1990-1991-1992-1993 on the basis of 
evasion in 1992 
500,000 
Source: Corriere Tribulario (1994) 
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1.2 Some lessons from the data 
This brief analysis of the data on tax evasion highlights two features in particular. 
The first is that tax evasion is a critical phenomenon in many countries, and that in some 
of them, like Italy, it greatly influences the national budget. The second is that 
macroeconomic data yield only weak information on the microeconomic factors that 
influence tax evasion. Finally, a third lesson to be drawn is that income tax evasion 
creates the greatest loss for the national budget. 
The microeconomic determinants of tax evasion revealed by the data just discussed 
are mainly circumscribed to the fact that tax evasion is more frequent when the tax 
burden is made up of incomes from activities different from dependent employment 
(Table 1.4) and that tax evasion is more likely in some geographical areas (like the 
South of Italy) than in others (Table 1.5). Nothing can be said about more complex 
determinants like, for example, the existence of a relationship between the type of the 
punishment system used in a given country and the amount of tax evasion. This kind of 
analysis is almost impossible using macroeconomic data because it is very difficult to 
isolate a specific influencing factor from the others. 
Macroeconomic data are even more difficult to use in investigation of the 
relationship between tax evasion and individual factors like psychological or moral 
constraints. These elements can be more easily analysed if the following approaches are 
used: 
- the theoretical approach, whose increasingly complex hypotheses and models now 
enable sufficiently thorough account to be given of the factors that determine tax 
evasion; 
- the experimental approach based on simulation-games and which mainly seeks to 
verify the results of theoretical inquiry. 
As already anticipated in the preface, I shall ignore the macroeconomic applied 
approach, concentrating only on the theoretical and experimental ones. My decision to 
neglect the traditional macroeconomic approach and to focus instead on experimental 
aspects is not due to any rejection on my part of the usefulness of this approach. It is 
instead prompted by the nature itself of the phenomenon of tax evasion. I believe that 
tax evasion as unlawful behaviour lends itself well to the abstraction from the real 
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context which the experimental approach makes possible. Those who decide to evade 
taxes know that they are liable to punishment and therefore have reason to conceal their 
behaviour. The experimental approach has instead the advantage of distancing subjects 
from the real context. It therefore does not elicit self-defence by the subject examined 
and as a consequence is useful from this point of view and for this type of analysis. The 
advantages of the approach can be summarised as follows: 
- it allows closer control to be exerted when new explanatory variables are introduced, 
thus yielding clearer understanding of the causal relations among the various factors 
considered; 
- it circumvents the problem of ensuring that people give truthful information about 
illegal behaviour; 
- it generates a considerable quantity of data at a relatively low cost. 
Of course there are drawbacks to the approach. These should be borne in mind 
because they may influence assessment of both the results of the experiments presented 
below and those set out in the experimental literature. The most serious of these 
drawbacks are the following: 
- the risk that the experiment will be excessively abstract and therefore 
unrepresentative of the phenomenon; 
- the risk of excessive complication, and therefore of distortion in interpretation of the 
results due to the subjects' scant attention to the task, and to the application of 
behavioural models and decision-making rules partially or wholly different from 
those normally employed in reality. 
Before directly analysing the experiments carried out on tax evasion, brief discussion 
is required of theoretical and experimental contributions to this topic. 
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2 The theoretical and experimental study of tax evasion 
In this chapter I shall examine theoretical approaches to tax evasion while also 
surveying the main experiments carried out on the phenomenon. The analysis of 
theoretical studies that follows will serve solely for discussion of the results obtained 
from the experiments described in the next section. More precisely, I shall set out the 
theoretical models that have prompted the experiments that have been conducted to 
date. For this reason the survey of the theoretical literature will only be partial: it will 
omit, for example, studies like that produced by Cowell (1990). The three strands of 
theoretical analysis considered here are those of microeconomic theory, prospect theory, 
and attribution theory. 
2.1 Theoretical models of microeconomic derivation 
The various economic models of taxpayer behaviour are analysed using, for the sake of 
convenience, two types of evasion: that by the free-rider taxpayer, and that by the 
disgruntled taxpayer. The former category comprises individuals who seek wholly or 
partially to avoid paying taxes because other individuals already pay them. The latter 
category comprises individuals who regard evasion either as a means of self-protection 
against an unfair tax system, or as a means to perform a certain activity which otherwise 
would be subject to an excessively heavy tax burden (Cassone and Cogno 1987). 
2.1.1 Free-rider models 
The overall approach of this first group of theoretical studies has been inspired by the 
economic analysis of crime and unlawful activity developed principally by Becker 
(1968). The cornerstone of this approach has been well summarised by Becker himself: 
"Some persons become `criminals', therefore, not because their basic motivation differs 
from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ" (Becker, 1968 p. 
9). More specifically, Becker's proposal is to devise a criterion for calculating the 
optimum level of punishment, given the costs of running the system of identification 
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and application of penalties, and given the reaction of individuals to these penalties. 
This entails multi-disciplinary analysis which in some way ties themes from 
criminology and jurisprudence to economic evaluation (Cassone and Cogno 1987). 
The legacy bequeathed to the economic theory of taxpayer behaviour by the 
economics of crime is the relation between the likelihood of punishment and the 
advantage deriving from evasion. In other words, microeconomic theory applied to tax 
payment bases itself on the principle that the decision whether or not to declare income - 
so that the revenue system can calculate the amount of tax payable on it - is essentially a 
decision taken in conditions of uncertainty. Taxpayers can truthfully declare their 
taxable income and pay the corresponding amount of tax to the revenue office according 
to the law, thus establishing with certainty their net income. Or they can choose to 
declare an income lower than their taxable income in an attempt to evade taxes partly or 
wholly, but in doing so expose themselves to the risk of a punishment which will reduce 
their income to a level much lower than it would have been had they paid the tax. The 
decision `whether' to pay tax and `how much' is therefore taken in conditions of risk 
because the taxpayer cannot know a priori what the outcome of evasion would be. As 
well known in microeconomic theory, the problem of choice in conditions of 
uncertainty was first addressed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, who solved it using 
the maximisation of expected subjective utility. 
There follows a brief survey (Gaburri, 1996) of the models of microeconomic 
derivation applied to taxpayer behaviour. I shall discuss Alligham and Sandmo's model 
(1972), Yitzhaki's model (1974), Srinivasan's model (1973), Fishbum's model (1979), 
and Yaniv's model (1994). All these models start from a shared description of the 
taxpayer problem. That is to say, they hypothesise that only two possible states of the 
world can ensue from the taxpayer's income declaration, viz.: 
- non-assessment by the tax authorities of the taxpayer's effective taxable income; in 
this case, if the taxpayer has not declared an income equal to his/her actual income, s/he 
has a higher disposable income; 
- assessment by the tax authorities of the taxpayer's effective taxable income; in this 
case, and on the assumption that the taxpayer has not declared his/her actual income, the 
evader will not only be compelled to pay the entire taxation due on his/her actual 
taxable income, but s/he will also have to pay the fine provided by the law. The taxpayer 
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will therefore be left with a disposable income lower than what it would be if s/he had 
made a truthful declaration. The final value of the expected utility function is calculated 
as the sum of the two possible levels of utility, which depend on the two possible 
disposable incomes, weighted with their respective probabilities of occurring. 
In the next sections the following symbols will be used: 
E(U) = expected utility function; 
Y=a person's taxable income; 
X= declared income; 
k= (Y-X)Y; 
Z= ex-post income if assessment is made; 
H= ex-post income if assessment is not made; 
t= tax rate; 
P= penalty applied to evasion; 
p= penalty-rate on undeclared income 
m= penalty-rate on the total of unpaid taxes; 
n= likelihood of assessment. 
All the models analysed here consider the static case, with the sole exception of 
Alligham and Sandmo's model, which deals with the dynamic case as well. Given that 
all studies subsequent to Alligham and Sandmo's (henceforth AS) start from the static 
case analysed by these authors, it is advisable to begin with the static models and then 
examine the dynamic version of the original model. 
Static models 
These models analyse the situation in which the taxpayer makes only one tax 
declaration, which does not depend on past declarations and does not condition future 
ones. As already said, the base model is contained in Allingham and Sandmo's study 
(1972). It is based on the following assumptions: 
- HAS1: the taxpayer's behaviour conforms with von Neumann and Morgenstern's 
axioms for behaviour in conditions of uncertainty: i. e. it seeks to maximise expected 
utility; 
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- HAS2: the only argument of the taxpayer's utility is income, and it is twice 
differentiable; 
- HAS3: the taxpayer is risk-averse; consequently his/her utility function is positive, 
increasing and strictly concave for a positive income; therefore the marginal utility 
function is positive and strictly decreasing; 
- HAS4: when compiling his/her tax return, the taxpayer chooses, in conditions of 
uncertainty, to declare the fraction of income that will maximise the expected utility of 
the disposable income remaining after payment of taxes and possible fines; 
- HAS5: the sanction is proportional to the undeclared income. 
The taxpayer maximises expected utility defined as a linear combination of 
individual concave utility functions: 
E(U) = (1-it)U(H) + nU(Z) 
with H= Y-tX ex-post income in the case of non-assessment; 
Z= Y-tX-p(Y-X) ex-post income in the case of assessment. 
E(U) = (1-ir)U(Y-tX) + nU[Y-tX-p(Y-X)] 
Given income Y, and with the tax corresponding to each level of income and the fine 
payable on undeclared income [P(Y-X)] being known, as well as the relative probability 
of assessment, the utility function depends on the decision about the amount of income 
to declare, the level of which lies between 0 and Y. 
The first order condition for maximising the function is: 
aEU/ax =- tai -n)v'(H) + (p-t)i U'(Z) = 0; 
The second-order condition is: 
D= t2(1-ir)U"(H) - (t-p)2nU"(t) <0 
which is satisfied hypothesising the concavity of the utility function. 
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The conditions required for O<D<Y are: 
D<Y if ztp<t implies that the taxpayer will declare a taxable income lower than his/her 
real income if the expected marginal cost of evasion is lower than the marginal tax rate. 
D>O if 7tp>t[n+(1-7E)U'(Y)/U'(Y-tY)], where the factor in square brackets is positive 
and <1. This implies that the taxpayer will declare a taxable income higher than zero if 
the expected marginal cost of evasion is greater than the marginal tax-rate. 
The results of the comparative static are evaluated using the measures of absolute and 
relative risk-aversion defined by Arrow (1970) as the second derivative of the utility 
function normalised to the first derivative: 
YA(H) = -U"(H)/U'(H) 
Yy(H) = _[U"(H)IU'(H)}H 
It can be shown that concavity of the utility function implies risk-aversion: 
corresponding to an increase in concavity, therefore, is a higher degree of risk-aversion. 
One must now establish how the income declared depends on the parameters of the 
model, Y, t, p, n: 
aX/aY, i. e. how declared income varies according to a change in real income. When real 
income changes, the fraction of income declared does not have a particular sign except 
under certain restrictions: 
aX/aY>0 if 
1) p_l confiscatory sanction, i. e. with an absolute value greater than the amount of tax 
evaded; 
2) absolute risk-aversion decreasing in ratio to income (in that a wealthier individual is 
deemed better able to sustain the negative consequences of assuming risk). 
a(X/Y)/aY, i. e. how the fraction of income declared varies with a change in taxable 
income. When real taxable income varies, the fraction declared increases, remains 
constant or decreases according to whether risk-aversion is an increasing, constant or 
decreasing function of income. 
- ax/ac, i. e. how declared income varies with a change in the tax rate. If the tax rate 
increases, the taxpayer is influenced by two conflicting considerations: 
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-a negative substitution effect because an increase in the tax rate makes evasion more 
economically convenient. 
-a positive income effect: an increase in the tax rate pushes the taxpayer towards lower 
income levels, and given that absolute risk-aversion decreases with an increase in 
income, the evasion diminishes. 
Therefore, when the tax rate increases, evasion increases or decreases according to 
whether the income effect or the substitution effect prevails. 
- aX/ap, i. e. how declared income varies with a change in the penalty tax-rate. An 
increase in this rate always pushes declared income up and therefore has a deterrent 
effect on evasion. 
- Wan, i. e. how declared income varies with the probability of audits being made. An 
increase in this probability will induce the taxpayer to increase the amount of income 
declared and therefore has a deterrent effect on evasion. 
Variations in the penalty tax-rate (p) and in the likelihood of assessment (n) are 
highly effective in curbing tax evasion. The former is a parameter over which the tax 
authorities exert direct control, whereas the latter is indirectly controlled by the tax 
authorities via the amount and efficiency of the resources spent on detecting tax evasion. 
Variations in real income and increases in the tax rate do not have a significant effect 
on the fraction of income declared. In Alligham and Sandmo's model, evaluation of the 
influence of an increase in the tax rate is indeterminate because two effects of opposite 
sign operate: a positive income effect and a negative substitution effect. In order to 
overcome this indeterminacy, Yitzhaki (1974) introduces the following hypothesis into 
Alligham and Sandmo's model: 
- (Hyl) the sanction is commensurate with the unpaid taxes and not to the undeclared 
income as in Alligham and Sandmo's model. 
The utility function that the taxpayer maximises is therefore the following: 
E(U) = (1-7r)U(Y-tX) + nU[(Y-tX-m[t(Y-X)]] 
On the basis of the first- and second-order conditions for the existence of a 
maximum, it can be shown that if the evasion assessed is punished with a fine equal to 
m[a(Y-X)], with m>1, the substitution effect disappears because if the tax rate increases, 
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so too does the price of a true declaration, but also that of evasion. Therefore, even if 
m=p/t, i. e. even if the sanction is equal to that in Alligham and Sandmo's model, one 
obtains aX/avo. The taxpayer finds that the additional benefits produced by the 
decision to evade are annulled. There remain only the effects produced by the taxpayer's 
changed attitude to risk: a heavier fiscal burden induces the taxpayer to increase the 
amount declared because, now that s/he has a lower disposable income, s/he is less 
willing to accept the risks of assessment. 
Yitzhaki also shows that, retaining the hypothesis of decreasing risk-aversion, 
aX/aY<1, i. e. declared income changes more slowly than taxable income. Individuals 
with higher incomes tend to evade to a proportionally lesser extent. As taxable income 
increases, in fact, the sanction commensurate to the evasion diminishes the tendency of 
the wealthy to reduce the absolute value of the sum not declared to the tax authorities. 
Once again starting from Alligham and Sandmo's model, Srinivasan (1973) has 
developed a third model, the distinctive feature of which is that it introduces risk- 
neutrality. Specifically, the hypotheses of the model are: 
- (HS1), a progressive tax function [t=t(X)]; 
- (H52), a sanction for evasion equal to [t(Y-X)+P] (with P p(k)), i. e. an increasing 
positive function of the amount of undeclared income); 
- (HS3), risk-neutrality (which makes use of the expected utility function superfluous, 
and the expected income function E(Y) more appropriate). 
In formal terms the income function that the taxpayer maximises is the following: 
E(Y) = (1-n)H + n(Z) 
E(Y) _ (1-n)[Y-t(X)X] + n[Y-t(Y)Y-p(k)kY] 
Differentiating this function with respect to the percentage of undeclared income 
yields: 
öE(Y)/ak = -n[p(k)Y + kYp'(k)] + (1-n)[t'(X)XY+t(X)Y] = f(k, Y, 7t) 
It can be shown that: f(O, Y, n) > 0, f(I, Y, n) < 0; that is, there exists an optimum 
value of k, between 0 and 1, which maximises the E(Y), denoted by V. 
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The relations between this value of k° and the parameters Y and it are the following: 
- äk°/öY > 0, i. e. the wealthier the taxpayer, the greater the percentage of income 
undeclared. This result cannot be obtained with a decreasing positive income utility 
function, i. e. with risk-aversion. 
- äk°/o-n <0, i. e. the likelihood of assessment has a deterrent effect on evasion. 
Note that in this model the fine does not vary according to the amount of unpaid tax. 
Therefore two evaders with different incomes but with the same amounts of undeclared 
income, if discovered, will be treated in the same way. 
Fishburn (1979) re-elaborates the three previous models to explore one particular 
feature: the penalty threshold above which taxpayers will maintain evasion at a 
minimum level. For this purpose, and starting from the first-order conditions of the 
expected utility maximisation function of Alligham and Sandmo's model, Fishman 
expresses the value of s as a function of it, Y, k: that is, as a function of the likelihood of 
assessment, of income, and of the percentage of income undeclared: 
p(n, Y, k) = [7ttU'(Z) + t(1-7t)U'(H)]/nU'(Z) 
Setting the desired value of k, it is possible to find the corresponding value of p, i. e. 
p*. 
The same operation is performed with the first-order condition of Yitzhaki's utility 
maximisation function and with Srinivasan's income maximisation function. It can be 
shown that in all three functions: 
- given k and Y, p* decreases with respect to n; 
- given it and Y, p* decreases with respect to k; 
- given it, with k=0, p* increases with respect to Y if the tax is progressive. 
Comparing the three prohibitive levels, one finds that, it, Y, k remaining equal, the 
value of .* in Srinivasan's model is lower than the corresponding value in Alligham 
and Sandmo's model, and that the latter is lower than the value of p* in Yitzhaki's. 
Thus the deterrent effect of a sanction that is an increasing function of the percentage 
of income not declared is greater than that of sanctions proportional to undeclared 
income or to evaded tax. 
On the basis of Alligham and Sandmo's model, Yaniv (1994) conducts further 
analysis of the effects on declared income of a variation in the tax rate. For this purpose 
he introduces the following hypotheses: 
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- (HyAI): the worst thing that can happen to a discovered evader is the confiscation of 
his/her entire undeclared income; 
- (HYA2): the taxpayer's relative risk-aversion is constant and its upper limit is the 
inverse of the penalty tax-rate. 
We saw in Alligham and Sandmo's model that the taxpayer's reaction to a variation 
in the tax rate (a) is given by: 
8X/8p=-1 /D(1-n)U'(H) i aX[RA(Z)-YA(H)]-(P/P-t) }' (*) 
where D is the second-order condition for maximisation of the expected utility function 
and RA(I) = -U"(I)/U'(I) >0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion, with 
I=H, Z. 
As already shown by Alligham and Sandmo, in the presence of decreasing absolute 
risk-aversion [YA(Z) > YA(H)], the significance of (*) is ambiguous. Introducing the 
hypothesis of constant relative risk-aversion [YA(I)I = cl, one obtains that: 
Mat >< 0 if ct(H-ZIHZ) >< (pip-t), 
3X/&><O if c >< «[i+(ßY/X)], 
where a= (Y-tX)/t(Y-X); and ß= (1-p)/(p-t), with a >1 e ß#0 if p# 1. 
Therefore p<_1 ensures that a(1+ß)>1, with MX/at <0 if c51. 
Since ß varies inversely to p, the following restrictions must be imposed on p and on c: 
If p51 and c51/p then aX/ot < 0, i. e. there is a significant and negative relation between 
declared income and the tax rate. 
Allingham and Sandmo's Dynamic model 
In the second part of their article, Alligham and Sandmo hypothesise that the tax 
authorities conduct their assessments randomly, as in the above models; but if they 
discover an untruthful declaration they will check the taxpayer's past behaviour until 
they find a truthful declaration. A taxpayer who has successfully evaded for a first time, 
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will be subject in later periods to a fine commensurate with any undeclared income in 
those periods and in previous ones. 
To formalise the model the following hypotheses are made: 
- (HDAS1), in any period (t) an individual possesses a fixed income which for 
convenience is normalised to one; 
- (HDAS2), let 7t be the fixed probability that s/he will be investigated in period T; 
- (HDAS3), if in period i it is discovered that s/he has undeclared his/her income, then 
his/her past declarations are checked until a truthful one is found; 
- (HDAS4), in every period r the amount of income (Xt) that s/he can declare lies within 
the interval 0< Xc: 51. 
At timer two situations may arise: 
1) the individual is not investigated and his/her income after payment of taxes is H, =1 - 
tXt; 
2) the individual is investigated and his/her income after payment of taxes is ZT=1- tX, - 
nE(1-XJ. 
In formal terms the taxpayer maximises the definite expected utility as: 
E(U, )=(1-7t)U(H., )+nU(Z ) 
On the basis of the first- and second-order conditions for the existence of a 
maximum, the taxpayer may behave in two different ways: 
- The taxpayer evades as long as oE(U3)/8(1-X, ) > 0, i. e. as long as the loss of expected 
utility due to the sanction is less than the increase due to the tax evaded. However, in 
order to prevent the sanction from increasing because previous evasion has gone 
unpunished, the evader will evade progressively less and Xt will increase over time. 
When öE(U. )/ö(1-Xt) < 0, his/her declaration becomes truthful. In the following period 
it will still be convenient for the taxpayer to evade, because any checks on his/her 
declarations will go no further back than the period in which Xt = 1. 
- The taxpayer will seek to maximise the amount of expected utility across a certain 
time-span. In this case too, the taxpayer will evade increasingly less over time and there 
will be periods in which X, = 1. 
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Declared income XT will always be higher if the taxpayer adopts the latter form of 
behaviour than if s/he adopts the former. Moreover, there are two features to be stressed 
here: 
a) the likelihood of checks being made is assumed to be constant over time; the 
taxpayer is therefore indifferent to whether the evasion is discovered in the current 
period or in following ones; 
b) the presence of inflation reduces the real amount of the penalty over time, because no 
efficient mechanism exists for indexing the penalty for past evasion. 
2.1.2 Models of the discontented taxpayer 
This second group of theoretical contributions to the study of tax evasion introduces 
an important novelty, in that they examine the psychological or moral factors that may 
have an effect on taxpayer behaviour. The reasons for taxpayer discontent can be listed 
as follows: 
- the taxpayer believes the tax laws to be unfair or applied unfairly; 
- the taxpayer believes that the ratio between the sacrifice required of him/her in paying 
taxes and the benefit received in return from the government is too high, or s/he wants 
public services different from those actually delivered; 
- the taxpayer regards his/her tax burden to be excessive, 
- the taxpayer views the tax laws to be too complex, badly formulated, obscure, difficult 
to obey, uncertain and changeable. 
I shall now examine how discontent may lead to tax evasion in terms of models 
which concentrate on subjective elements in taxpayer behaviour. The first model was 
developed by Strumpel (1969), who maintained that willingness to cooperate with the 
tax authorities is a variable which determines the taxpayer's behaviour. It exerts a 
positive influence on the declaration of incomes and depends on various factors: 
1) rigidity of the tax system (severity of the laws, efficacy of sanctions, methods of 
assessing the tax base) which influences the application of tax laws positively but has 
a negative influence on the willingness to cooperate with the tax authorities; 
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2) the gap between the tax laws and reality (the inequitable application of the laws) 
negatively influences both the application of the tax laws and willingness to 
cooperate with the tax authorities; 
3) difficulty of formal compliance with the tax laws, which has a positive influence on 
their application because the taxpayer is obliged to cooperate with the tax authorities 
in order to cope with the uncertainty or complexity of the laws. 
A second model has been proposed by Chung (1976), who bases his analysis on the 
following proposition: "an individual is not only interested in his/her own welfare, but 
also in the welfare of society as a whole. " Chung proposes a model in which an 
individual attributes a positive value to whatever may increase the welfare of society 
(for example the transfer of income to the less well-off). But the discovery of wastage, 
abuses or inefficiencies in the use of public money progressively decreases the optimum 
burden that the taxpayer finds tolerable. 
Given the individual's concern for the welfare of the entire system, in formal terms 
the welfare function can be written as follows: 
W=W (x, t) (2. i) 
where W is welfare, x is the amount of income deducted from an individual and £ is the 
amount of income transferred to society to enhance social well-being. 
Expanding the equation in a Taylor series and retaining the linear terms, one obtains: 
W(x, t)-W(xo, 4o)=WX(x-xo)+We(t-eo) [2.2] 
where x0, to respectively denote the income deducted and transferred prior to the 
transfer (40=0); W,, is the marginal utility of the income deducted and We is the 
marginal utility of the income transferred to the government; W, >0 represents an 
individual's concern for the welfare of the system. 
Equation [2.2] shows that a transfer of income to society for the enhancement of 
social well-being improves individual welfare if. 
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W(x,. Q)-W(xo. Qo)>0 [2.31 
Equation [2.3] is valid if We > W , 
i. e. if the utility of the income transferred is 
greater than the utility of the income deducted. Assuming that one dollar transferred to 
society is spent on social welfare, an individual's budget function is the following: 
Z =Z(x, ¬) = x+Q [2.4] 
with slope £'(x) = -1. Equation [2.4] is represented by the straight line AB in figure 2.1. 
The combination of x and £ that maximises equation [2.1] is obtained from the first- 
order condition: 
wx/Wt =I 
This is represented by the point of tangency E between the indifference curve W, W1 
and the budget straight line AB (OM, OR). The optimal level of transfers is OR, where 
an individual's marginal benefit obtained from enhanced social welfare is equal to the 
marginal benefit obtained from his/her consumption/saving of the income deducted. In 
this situation an individual can tolerate transfers of income up to OQ. In fact, point L 
corresponding to the transfer OQ lies on the same level-curve as point A, which is the 
point at which the income transferred is equal to zero. Therefore, when transfers lie 
between OR and OQ, the individual is satisfied. That is to say, at these points the benefit 
obtained by the individual from the realisation of social welfare is the same as the 
benefit that s/he receives from consuming/saving the same amount of income. 
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Source: Chung P. (1976) p. 127 
Government institutions organise the levying of transfers from individuals and their 
allocation to society. This may lead to wastage and the onset of abuses, corruption, poor 
administration, etc. This wastage engenders the following variation in the individual's 
budget function: 
Z= x+t+q(. Q) 
with a slope equal to: y'(x) = -1/[l+q'(. Q)] 
where q is the level of waste, which is an increasing function of the income transferred 
to society, q= q(e), q'(e)>O. 
Since q'(e) >0 then £'(x) = -1/[1+q'(. Q)] > -1, i. e. the budget straight line is no longer 
represented by the line AB but by the line AC, in that a proportion of the money 
transferred to society is wasted. 
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Given that the individual is concerned to enhance social welfare, the presence of 
wastage also alters his/her social welfare function, which becomes: 
W= W[x, Q, 9(Q)] 
where Wq <0 represents the marginal disutility of waste. 
The presence of q(e) shifts the indifference curve towards the right (W*W*), which 
is a situation in which the individual is less willing to abandon x for £. The optimum 
level of transfers in the presence of waste is OH, of which OK goes on social welfare 
and KH on wastage. The upper limit on the level of tolerance also reduces, from OQ to 
OS. The periodic discovery of widespread and serious squandering of public money 
progressively reduces the optimum acceptable tax burden. 
The Chung model designs a taxpayer that takes her/his decisions by remaining within 
a strict individualistic dimension. The decision to evade is actually built on a selfish 
calculus that relates the tax payer's utility from private consumption to utility, always 
measured on a individual basis, derived from some form of not very clearly defined 
"social well-being". Put in this way the theoretical framework is less innovative that it 
might seem because it becomes a problem of choice between two different kind of 
goods: "private consumption" versus "social well-being". 
Nevertheless, Chung's analysis teaches some interesting lessons, not only from a 
theoretical perspective but also as regards experiments on tax evasion. The most 
important lesson concerns the delicate relationship between a taxpayer's behaviour and 
his/her perception of the `good' use made of public money. A badly designed 
experiment can produce distortions due to uncontrolled expectations made by the 
experimental subjects about the use of the money paid for taxes. Unless the experiment 
has the explicit objective of investigating this phenomenon, the best way to avoid 
uncontrolled reactions is to inform subjects in the clearest possible way about the use 
that will be made of the money collected through taxes. What really matters is not 
finding a fair use of the money, but giving explicit information about its destination. 
This is to ensure the interpretation of results from unknown subjective assumptions 
made by the experimental subjects about this important part of the experiment. 
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Becker and Spicer (1980) have proposed a further model, which analyses the 
exchange relation between the taxpayer and the government. The taxpayer/government 
relationship is viewed as an exchange relation in which the taxpayer relinquishes part of 
his/her purchasing power in the private market in exchange for the benefits that s/he 
obtains from the goods and services furnished by the government. 
Research in social psychology suggests that an important factor determining personal 
satisfaction with an exchange relation is the reaching of parity or equity in the exchange. 
The socio-psychological theory of equity developed by Adams (1965) contends that an 
unequal relation may produce tension or a sense of disquiet such to induce the person 
concerned to eliminate it. If this theory is extended to the taxpayer/government relation, 
tax evasion can be viewed as a means whereby the taxpayer seeks to restore equity to 
his/her exchange with the state. In particular, taxpayers (victims) who believe that they 
are treated unfairly will change the amount paid to the revenue system, increasing the 
amount of income evaded, while taxpayers (beneficiaries) who believe that the presence 
of inequalities is beneficial to them will not resort to tax evasion. 
2.2 Prospect theory 
As said earlier, for many years the economic analysis of decisions in conditions of 
uncertainty was based on the theory of expected utility originally formulated by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). In recent years, however, numerous authors have 
pointed out the shortcomings of this theory, both as a prescriptive model of optimising 
behaviour in situations of uncertainty, and as a descriptive model claiming to represent 
how individuals take decisions in reality. In particular, the majority of the empirical 
studies that have set out to verify whether individuals actually behave in the manner 
hypothesised by the theory have shown that they act in ways that conflict with its 
axioms. 
The empirical evidence shows that these axioms are systematically violated in certain 
classes of choice problem, and that certain choice phenomena contrast with the theory of 
expected utility: 
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1. composition effect. The theory of expected utility presumes that the description is 
invariant, which implies that equivalent formulations of a choice problem will yield 
the same order of preferences. 
2. Conflicting with this assumption is the evidence that variations in the composition of 
choices systematically produces different preferences. It has been shown that the 
formulation of the same problem in terms of gains or in terms of losses predictably 
leads to different choices being made. In fact , depending on whether a problem is 
described in terms of gain or loss, risk-aversion or risk-search will ensue. 
3. Non-linearity of preferences. The theory of expected utility presumes that the utility 
of a risky prospect is linear with the likelihood of its consequences' x;: U(xl, 7t,; 
x2i7r2,....... 9 X,,, n) = n1u(xi)+n2u(x2)+.......... iu(x), 
i. e. the utility of a prospect is 
equal to the expected utility of its consequences. 
4. The evidence shows that the utility of a risky prospect depends not only on the 
probability of its occurrence but also on the desirability of its consequences: the 
difference between a gain of £50 and £100 has greater subjective value than the 
difference between a gain of £1050 and £1100. 
5. Source dependence. The readiness of people to gamble on an uncertain event does 
not depend only on the degree of uncertainty; it also depends on its source. People 
prefer to gamble on a prospect whose characteristics are known to them. The 
evidence suggests that people often prefer to gamble on a prospect within their area 
of competence even if its probability is unclear. 
6. Risk-search. An important assumption of the theory of expected utility is that the 
decision-maker is risk-averse. There is evidence, however, that decision-makers may 
seek out risk in two classes of decision problems: 
- when the decision-maker must choose between a certain loss and the 
substantial probability of a greater loss; 
- when the decision-maker must choose between the low probability of obtaining 
a large reward and the expected value of the prospect. 
7. Loss aversion. One of the phenomena at the basis of choice in conditions of 
uncertainty is that losses generally appear at a distance to be greater than the 
corresponding gains. Thus a loss of X pounds is more undesirable than a gain of X 
pounds is attractive, i. e. u(fX)<-u(-fX). 
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In the light of these observations at odds with the theory of expected utility, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1979) have proposed an alternative theory of choice in conditions of 
uncertainty. Known as prospect theory, this approach has been developed for simple 
prospects with monetary consequences and specific probabilities, but it can be extended 
to more complex choices. The theory envisages two stages in the decision-making 
process: 
a) editing, which consists in preliminary analysis of the prospects offered and often 
produces a simpler representation of them. Various operations are performed which 
transform the consequences and probabilities associated with the prospects offered. 
b) evaluation: the decision-maker evaluates each of the prospects and chooses the one of 
greater value. 
The overall value of a prospect, denoted by V, is expressed in terms of two scales, cp 
and v. 
- cp - associates with each probability it a decision weight cp(n) which reflects the 
impact of n on the overall value of the prospect.. It is not a measure of probability: in 
fact, cp(n) + 9(1- n) is a value lower than 1, but the decision-weight which measures 
the impact of events on the desirability of the prospect, and not just the perceived 
probability of these events. 
- V- assigns to each consequence x; a number v(x) which reflects the subjective value 
of the consequence. Consequences are defined in terms of deviation from point zero 
on the value scale. Thus v measures the value of deviation from this point; that is, it 
measures gains and losses. 
Consider a simple prospect of the form (x, a; y) where x is received with probability 
it; y with probability q, and nothing with probability (1- it -q), where it +q S 1. 
This prospect may be of three types: 
1. strictly positive if its consequences are all positive, i. e. x, y>O and n+q = 1; 
2. strictly negative if its consequences are all negative, i. e. x, y<O and it +q = 1; 
3. regular when it is neither strictly positive nor strictly negative, i. e. x >_ 0? y or x5 0 
<_ y and it+q<1. 
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If (x, zt; y, q) is a regular prospect, then its evaluation is described by the following 
equation: 
V(x, (P; Y, 9)=it((P)v(x)+ n(9)v(Y) 
where v(0) = 0,7E(0) = 0, lt(1) = 1. 
[2.. s] 
V is definite on the prospects and v on the consequences. The two scales coincide for 
certain prospects, where V(x, 1) = V(x) = v(x). 
V is definite on the prospects and v on the consequences. The two scales coincide for 
certain prospects, where V(x, 1) = V(x) = v(x). 
Equation [2.5] generalises the theory of expected utility by attenuating the 
expectation principle. 
- If (x, n; y, q) is a strictly positive or strictly negative prospect, then its evaluation is 
described by the following equation. 
If n+q =1 and x>y>O or x<y<O, then 
V(x, n; y, q)=v(y) + y(n)[v(x) - v(y)] [2.6] 
The value of the strictly positive or strictly negative prospect is equal to the sum of 
the following two components: 
1. the lesser risk component, i. e. the minimum gain or minimum loss that will be 
obtained or suffered with certainty; 
2. the risk component: the difference-value between the consequences multiplied by the 
weight associated with the riskier consequence. The additional gain and the 
additional loss at stake. 
Example V(400,0,25; 100,0,75) = v(100) + p(0,25)[v(400) - v(100)]. 
The weight of the decision is applied to the difference-value which represents the 
riskier component. 
Note that the left-hand side of [2.6] corresponds to p(n)v(x)+[l-cp(n)]v(y), and 
therefore equation [2.6] converts into equation [2.5] if cp cp(n) + cp(1-n)=1. 
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Now let us assume that the function of the value for wealth changes is normal 
concave for values above the reference point, i. e. for gains (v"(x)<O for x>=) and often 
convex for values below the point of reference, i. e. for losses (v"(x)>O for x<O). That is 
to say, the marginal value of both gains and losses decreases with their amount. Let us 
also introduce the principle of loss aversion, which states that losses appear at a distance 
greater than gains. The negative experience of losing a sum of money is greater that the 
pleasant experience of gaining the same amount. Hence, if x>y>O then (y, 0.50; -y, 0.50) 
is preferred to (x, 0.50; -x, 0.50). 
In accordance with equation [2.5] 
v(y) + v(-y)> v(x) + v(-x) and v(-y) - v(-x)> v(x) - v(y). 
Setting y=0, one obtains: 
v(x) < -v(-x) and v'(x) < v'(-x) 
In this way, the function of the value for losses is steeper than that for gains. 
By way of summary, according to prospect theory the function of the value has the 
following three features: 
1. It is definite in terms of positive deviations (gains) or negative deviations (losses) 
from a certain reference point and not in terms of total wealth, this means that the 
choice of a given reference point is independent from the utility level; 
2. Its slope is greater in the quadrant of losses than in the quadrant of gains: it is steeper 
for losses than for gains. This property, known as loss-aversion, implies that the loss 
of utility associated with forfeiture of a good in our possession is generally much 
greater than the gain in utility associated with obtaining that good. More generally, 
loss aversion involves a strong tendency to maintain the previous situation (status 
quo) because the disadvantages of relinquishing it seem greater than the advantages 
of the alternative option. 
3. It is concave for gains (above the reference point) and convex for losses (below the 
reference point). This property, known as non-linearity of the function, implies that 
in the domain of gains there is risk aversion (u"(x)<O), i. e. the certain prospect (x) is 
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preferred to a risky prospect with expected value x, while in the domain of losses 
there is a search for risks (u"(x)>O). One function of the value which satisfies these 
three characteristics is represented in figure 2.2. 
Fig. 2.2 Prospect theory 
Value 
Losses 
Source: E. Shafir, A. Tversky, (1980) 
Gains 
Prospect theory can be used to explain tax evasion - more specifically to examine the 
taxpayer's attitude to risk. In fact, paying taxes may be perceived either as a reduction of 
profit or as a loss. From the standpoint of prospect theory, it is hypothesised that if 
payment of taxes is perceived as a reduction of profit then the taxpayer's utility function 
assumes a concave shape. By contrast, if payment of taxes is perceived as a loss, then 
the taxpayer's utility function assumes a convex shape. 
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2.3 Attribution theory 
Attribution theory is a psychological approach to the study of social behaviour 
(Hewstone, 1991). It seeks to identify the causes of the behaviour observed, and it is 
particularly concerned with how people explain their own behaviour and that of others, 
and more in general the events of the social world. By `causal attribution' is meant the 
psychological process by which, in everyday situations, a person comes to believe that a 
certain form of behaviour - his/her own behaviour or that of others (hetero- or self- 
attribution) - is the consequence of particular causes. The concern, therefore, is not the 
behaviour of others but its causes. 
Heider (1958), the first psychologist to study these problems, maintained that the task 
of so-called common-sense psychology is to understand the way in which people 
interpret the events of their social world. According to Heider, the fundamental criterion 
in interpretation of a person's behaviour is whether the cause of the phenomenon lies in 
the person (inner or dispositional cause), in the environment (external or situational 
cause), or in both. Heider goes on to stress the importance of the concept of 
intentionality, arguing that behaviour should be attributed to personal causes only if its 
consequences are perceived as resulting from the actor's intentions. A compromise is 
thus reached between the influence of personal and impersonal factors, so that 
attributions to a person's characteristics are less probable when the behaviour is 
perceived as governed by external constraints. Personal features (attitudes, needs, 
beliefs, personality structures) are thus used to explain behaviour that cannot be clearly 
attributed to external conditions. 
This basic approach was systematised and developed by Jones and Davis (1965), by 
Kelley (1967), and by Jones and Nesbitt (1971), and more recently it has been applied to 
a variety of economic phenomena, and in particular to tax evasion by Kaplan, Reckers 
and Reynolds (1986) and by Hite (1987). Kelley investigates what information is used 
by a person to make a causal attribution and how this information is used. The basic 
assumption is that individuals tend to weight the various explanations available to 
explain behaviour by looking for co-variations between presumed causes and effects. 
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More specifically, in seeking the causes of events that s/he observes, an individual 
applies three types of information: 
1. consensus information, whereby others respond in the same way as individual A to 
the same entity if placed in the same situation; 
2. information on the distinctive character of the effect or behaviour observed, whereby 
individual A's response to a given entity (B or the environment) is different from 
his/her response to other entities (C, D); 
3. information on coherence, constancy, whereby the behaviour observed is constant 
over time and from one situation to another. 
Specific combinations of these types of information determine whether the behaviour 
should be attributed to the person, to the circumstances, or to a combination of them. 
The three criteria regulate the internal/external character of the attribution in the 
following way: 
a) if the behaviour observed is distinctive, constant and consensual, the attribution is 
external (the behaviour depends on the environment); 
b) if the behaviour observed is neither distinctive nor consensual but is constant, the 
attribution is internal, in that the cause of a person's behaviour lies within 
him/herself. 
Jones and Nisbett concentrate on the so-called divergent perspectives in the 
attributional activity of observer and agent. Whereas internal attribution is typical of the 
observer, the agent will have a much more marked tendency to attribute external causes 
to his/her behaviour. There are various explanations for this: 
- motivational explanations, whereby the agent is more concerned than the observer to 
present a `de-responsibilized' version of his/her behaviour. This hypothesis is 
adequate only in negative cases (of failure or of reprehensible behaviour by the 
actor), while in positive cases it should be reversed; 
- more `cognitive' explanations deriving from examination of the different information 
on which the observer and agent base their attributions. The agent will presumably 
have better knowledge of him/herself and of his/her reactions to similar 
circumstances, whereas the observer tends more towards internal attribution, 
generalising and typifying the specific behaviour of the agent. 
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Drawing on the work of these authors, Kaplan, Reckers and Reynolds (1986) and 
Hite (1987) have applied these theories to tax evasion. Kaplan, Reckers and Reynolds 
argue that the various principles of attribution theory can be usefully applied in 
formulating hypotheses on tax evasion and base their discussion on the work of Heider, 
Davis and Jones, and Kelley. The causes of tax evasion can accordingly be identified as 
follows: 
1. dispositional causes (internal): the taxpayer's lack of social responsibility: 
2. situational causes (external): unfairness of the tax system. 
The more a person is deemed responsible for his/her actions, the more observers 
believe that personal characteristics determine behaviour. Kelley's principle of co- 
variance can be applied in order to establish which type of cause should be attributed to 
tax evasion. In doing so, authors have analysed the types of information that can be used 
to predict tax evasion and to suggest punishment for such behaviour: 
Hypothesis 1: information on consensus. This provides knowledge about the rule 
governing a particular form of behaviour. It thus describes whether the behaviour of 
one taxpayer is similar to or different from the behaviour of other taxpayers under 
similar conditions. In this case authors have tried to identify the social rule and to 
measure its influence on opinions concerning the percentage of taxpayers who evade. 
It is expected that a person will be held less responsible if in the same circumstances 
his/her behaviour is similar to that of other taxpayers, and more responsible when 
his/her behaviour is different from that of other taxpayers in the same situation. 
Hypothesis 2: information on salience. This is a summary description of the relations 
among different situations and their corresponding effects. During their lifetimes, 
individuals have frequent opportunities to engage in illegal or immoral activities, one 
of which is tax evasion. High salience emerges when the immoral or illegal 
behaviour occurs only when the individual has had an opportunity to evade taxes. In 
this case tax evasion will be attributed mainly to situational causes. Low salience 
denotes a situation in which the immoral or illegal behaviour always occurs. In this 
case the tax evasion will be attributed to dispositional causes. 
Hypothesis 3: information on the taxpayer's financial situation. Severe financial need 
by the taxpayer can be considered a situational cause, while low financial need can 
be considered a dispositional cause. 
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Hypothesis 4: information on the needs of society. When society has severe needs, tax 
evasion appears more abnormal and indicative of the dispositional features of the 
taxpayer. 
Hypothesis 5: information on the taxpayer's intention. A pronounced intention to evade 
will be associated with high external environmental attributions. 
Hypothesis 6: the belief that tax evasion is not immoral will be associated with a high 
intention to evade. 
By combining these various forms of information, the following results as regards 
tax evasion can be obtained: 
- attributions made regarding the tax evasion of others will be associated with the 
individual's tax evasion; 
- if an individual believes that tax evasion by someone else has been induced and is 
justified by situational causes, then it is probable that this individual place in the same 
circumstances will cite these situational factors in justification of his/her tax evasion. 
Hypothesis 5 states that the attributions made for the actions of others will be directly 
associated with the person's own actions. Authors have concluded that taxpayers believe 
that it is more acceptable to cheat in situations where persons with high standards have 
cheated than to follow the behaviour of morally corrupt persons. The apparent 
implication for attribution theory is that critical external factors act as a morally 
powerful inducement to cheat. 
Hite has based his study on a different aspect of attribution theory, that of the 
actor/observer difference whereby actors tend to attribute their actions to external 
situational causes while observers tend to attribute the actions of others to dispositional 
causes. Applied to tax evasion, this difference implies that individuals believe that their 
own evasion is caused by too high tax rates while other people's evasion depends on 
dispositional causes. 
2.4 Survey of the experimental literature: a taxonomy 
In previous sections of this chapter I have shown how the problem of tax evasion has 




series of theories which frame taxpayer behaviour in both economic and psychological 
terms. The robustness of the theories here described should be tested by using empirical 
data. As anticipated in the preface good data about fiscal evasion are difficult to collect 
because to evade taxes is a crime; therefore, the experimental approach is probably the 
best way to verify theories about fiscal evasion. 
A number of researchers have insisted that consideration should be made not only of 
economic factors, like the tax rate and the probability of assessment and punishment, 
but also of non-economic factors, in order to orient research towards a more general and 
more realistic theory of taxpayer behaviour. These non-economic factors (age, income, 
moral beliefs, the equity of the tax system, etc. ) are analysed using an experimental 
approach based on artificial simulations. The general idea behind laboratory simulations 
organised to study taxpayer behaviour is relatively simple. By means of specially 
designed experiments in which the subjects are asked to decide within a certain timc- 
interval what percentage of a hypothetical income they intend to declare, it is possible to 
verify how various items of information given to them during the experiment affect their 
decision-making processes. 
In this chapter I shall examine experimental work on tax evasion. In order to 
facilitate discussion of these experiments I begin by providing a taxonomic grid which 
will give coherent organisation to the analysis that follows. 
I have decided to classify the experiments on tax evasion on the basis of two criteria: 
(1) according to the variables that they examine: 
- group A: the relationship between fines, problems of investigation, 
income, public transfers and evasion, 
- group B: tax equity, 
-group C: explanations given by the experimental subjects, 
- group D: imitation among evaders, 
(2) according to theories that they consider: 
I. utility theory 
II. prospect theory 
III. attribution theory 
IV equity models 
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In the previous sections I discussed the theoretical approaches to tax evasion. Only 
one theory shown in the above taxonomic grid has not yet been discussed: the so called 
"equity model" or equity theory approach. I have not included this approach in the 
theoretical review because it does not take the form of a real theory. In fact equity 
models resemble more a body of empirical studies concerned with the role played by 
mechanisms of psychological self-enforcement of rules and laws than a structured 
theory. Many authors (e. g. Adams, 1965; Thibaudt, Friedland, Walker, 1974), starting 
from empirical observations, have reached the conclusion that the degree of compliance 
with the rules is influenced by the perceived "fairness" of the rules themselves. More 
precisely, these psychological devices of self-restraint seemed strongly correlated with 
the nature of the exchange relationships between the agents. In the specific case of tax 
evasion the exchange is between the tax-payer and the state, and therefore the degree of 
effectiveness of the mechanism of individual self-restraint fails when the tax-system 
becomes too oppressive, i. e. when it is perceived as unfair. In the theoretical model that 
I have used to build the experiments discussed here, the central idea embodied in the 
equity models has in some way been recovered, but it has been inserted into a -more 
rigorous microeconomic theory frame. 
Table 2.1, which provides a cross-referenced representation of the two classifications 
suggested for the taxonomic grid, shows that certain experiments analyse two opposing 
theories in order to verify whether the taxpayer's actual choices correspond to one 
theory or to the other. In group A, for example, many authors analyse both utility theory 
and prospect theory in order to falsify the one with respect to the other. In the same way, 
in group B, Kaplan, Reckers and Reynolds analyse both attribution theory and equity 
theory. 
It is worth stressing that many of the experiments reported in table 2.1 aim to test 
specific parts of the theories from which they start. More precisely, experiments on tax 
evasion are mainly intended to check the existence of some form of relationship 
between a more or less large set of theoretical factors and the decision to evade. None of 
the experiments discussed here tries to suggest a brand-new theory about taxpayer 
behaviour deduced from the empirical data obtained from the experiments. The 
experiments run with a more pronounced `exploratory' aim are those belonging to 
groups B and C, but they do not reach any strong (formalised) theoretical conclusion 
and remain only at a descriptive level. 
This limit of the experimental approach to fiscal evasion is partly due to the high 
degree of complexity that the decision to evade taxes can imply. The number and nature 
of the psychological and moral factors that may influence the decision to evade is 
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evidenced by the descriptive part of the experiments belonging to group B and C. These 
experiments, as will be discussed in detail in the following sections, show that the 
experimental subjects take a large number of `built-in' ideas about taxes and fiscal 
fairness with them into the experiment. To isolate these factors from those explicitly 
considered by the experiment is almost impossible, not only because they are part of the 
so-called "central value system" of each subject, but also because they are very 
complex. 
Among the psychological elements reported by experiments (e. g. Spicer, Becker 
1980) certainly one of the most interesting is that of the psychological mechanism used 
by the subject to build their subjective range of tax fairness. This psychological device 
is apparently built on a comparative basis. The subjects need to compare their individual 
position with that of the other taxpayers and considerations about the relationship 
between the amount of taxes paid and the amount of public services received seems to 
be of minor importance unless it is referred to a comparative landscape. 
Given the large number of experiments on tax evasion and for the sake of brevity and 
clarity, I shall not discuss every essay reported in table 2.1. Instead, I shall confine my 
comments to the main results obtained for each group of experiments, from which I 
shall also discuss in detail one or two papers particularly closely related to the 
experiments that I have carried out and which I shall discuss in the following chapters. 
Table 2.1 Experiments divided into homogeneous categories 









Al) N. Friedland, S. Maital, A. 
Rutenberg, 1978 X 
A2) M. W. Spicer, J. E. Thomas, 1982 X 
A3) N. Friedland, 1982 
A4) 0. H. Chang, D. R. Nichols, J. J. 
Schultz 1987 X X 
A5) J. C. Baldry 1985 X 
A6) W. Becker, H. J. Buchner, S. 
Sleeking, 1987 X 
A7) J. Alm, G. H. McClelland, W. D. 
Schulze, 1992 X X 
A8) J. Alm, B. R. Jackson, 
M. McKee, 1992 X 
A9) Y. Benjamini, S. Maital, 1985 X 
A10) J. C. Baldry, 1986 X 
All) P. Webley, S. Halstead, 1986 X 
A12) P. Webley, I. Morris, F. Amstutz 
1985 
X 
Group B, tax equity 
B1) M. W. Spicer, L. A. Becker, 1980 X 
B2) S. E. Kaplan, P. M. J. Reckers, K. D. 
Reynolds, 1986 X X 
B3) P. A. Hite, 1990 X 
B4) H. S. J. Robben, P. Webley, R. H. 
Weigel,. K. Warneryd, 1990 X 
Group C, explanations given by the experimental subjects 
Cl) S. E. Kaplan, P. M. J. Reckers, 1985 X 
C2) P. A. Hite, 1987 X 
C3) Q. Thurman, 1988 X 
Group D, imitation among evaders 
D1) M. W. Spicer, R. E. Hero, 1985 X 
D2) S. E. Kaplan, P. M. J. Reckers, S. J. 
Roark, 1988 X 
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2.4.1 Group A: the relationship between fines, problems of investigation, income, 
public transfers and evasion 
The experiments belonging to the first group are particularly important because they 
yield interesting insights into the role played by all the factors suggested by the 
microeconomic theory. The main results obtained from these experiments have been 
summarised in table 2.2, in which the first group of columns show the nature of the 
relationship between the factors analysed by experiments and the frequency of evasion 
(and/or the amount of money evaded). The second part of the table reports the degree of 
coherence between the results and two theories: expected utility theory and prospect 
theory. 
Table 2.2 Relationships between tax evasion and some influencing factors 
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Before discussing table 2.2, it should be stressed that any comparison among the 
experiments must be made with great caution, because the experimental designs are 
often so different as to make immediate comparison between the results impossible. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion, some comparative deductions are legitimate because most 
of the works explicitly refer to previous experiments. 
The first observation that emerges from analysis of table 2.2 concerns the close 
coherence among the results obtained from the majority of the experiments on the role 
played by audit probability and fines. Audit probability is always negatively correlated 
with the frequency of evasion and with the amount of money evaded; in many 
experiments this correlation is extremely close. On the other hand, the amount of fines 
seems to be much less influential than the frequency of tax audits. More precisely, 
numerous experiments report that the importance of fines is extremely low on its own, 
that is, when it is not reinforced by a simultaneous increase in the probability of 
discovery. The extreme and apparently irrational result concerning this phenomenon is 
reported by experiment A8, which found a (very weak) positive correlation between 
fines and evasion when audit probability was left unchanged. 
After audit probability and fines, the only factor shown to produce identical effects in 
all the experiments is gross income. The correlation is always positive, and therefore - 
assuming that the individual propensity towards risk does not change during the 
experiment, and keeping both fines and audit probability constant - it seems that this 
relationship signals a phenomenon of decreasing marginal utility of money, which is in 
accordance with the usual assumptions made by utility theory. In fact, if the expected 
monetary value of an additional pound does not change and the attitude towards risk 
remains constant, then, in accordance with expected utility theory, at higher levels of 
income tax evasion should decrease, because the utility of an additional sure pound 
should be lower than the utility of a sure pound at low levels of income. Assuming that 
U, is the additional utility that a taxpayer obtains from a pound of additional income 
and hypothesising decreasing marginal utility of money, we have: 
U, ` >U 
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where U, is the additional utility obtainable from one sure additional pound when the 
income is low, and U, is the additional utility obtainable from one sure additional 
pound when the income is high. Assuming for sake of simplicity that a low income tax 
payer j with a gross income of 2 pounds can choose between the following alternatives: 
a) earn a sure net income of 1 pound by paying 1 pound of taxes; 
b) evade the entire gross income by taking the risk of being audited with probability 0.5 
and therefore of paying 1 pound of tax plus 1 pound of fee. 
Given these alternatives the expected monetary value of a pound evaded is EV, =1 
pound (i. e. the taxpayer is confronted by a fair gamble). Therefore if we observe that the 
taxpayer decides to evade, we should have: 
I UMEI" > UJI 
where UjEv, is the utility obtained from evasion by j, who is therefore a risk seeker. As 
we assumed that EV1, as well as the taxpayer's attitude to risk, are constant, and 
remembering that U; > U; , it follows that at higher 
levels of income we should observe 
higher levels of evasion. 
It is worth stressed that many experiments have found that at least some of the 
assumptions of expected utility theory may fail. The most interesting of these failures 
are, in my opinion, those reported by experiments A5 (Baldry, 1985) and AlO (Baldry, 
1986). Since both these experiments are particularly interesting, in the following two 
files they have been described in some detail. 
Experiment A5: "Income Tax Evasion and Tax Schedule: some Experimental Results" 
Jonathan C. Baldry, 1985 
Aim of the experiment 
The experiment was designed to effects of net income and of marginal tax rates on tax evasion. 
Methodology 
Taking part in the experiment were two groups of volunteer students from the University of New 
England: 
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- group A, consisting of 20 first-year students of economics who received payment, plus 20 
unpaid students used as a control group to establish whether payment was necessary to induce 
rational behaviour. 
- group B, consisting of 20 third-year students of ecosystem management. 
The experiment consisted of six rounds. At the beginning of each round the subjects received an 
envelope containing the following material: 
- information on their amount of gross income for that round; 
- instructions on how to calculate the amount of tax to pay; 
- an income declaration form to be completed by each subject indicating the amount of income 
that s/he intended to declare and the corresponding taxes; 
-a statement that some income declarations would be checked at random: for group A, 6 
declarations out of 20 would be checked in each round; for group B, 5 declarations out of 20 
would be checked in each round; 
- the information that at the end of the experiment each subject would receive a payment 
corresponding to the amount of gross income received minus taxes and the fines paid. 
The gross income for each group was defined randomly by a given distribution: 
- used for group A was a Paretian distribution modified with a maximum of 200 and a 
minimum of 32. The average gross income was 60. 
- used for group B was a rectangular distribution with a maximum of 300 and a minimum of 
30. The average gross income was 88. 
The tax rates were of 3 types for group A and only one type for group B. 
Results and conclusions 
The participation rate was the same for both groups. Tax evasion behaviour (the average increase 
in the taxes evaded and the average propensity to evade) was very similar in both of them as well. 
Yet these apparent similarities of behaviour between the two groups concealed a number of 
important differences: 
- tax evasion behaviour was much more variable in group B. This is explained by the fact that 
the declarations in this group were made in public, while in group A they were compiled in 
private. 
- whereas in group A only 31% of tax declarations were completed honestly, in group B the 
honestly completed declarations amounted to 54%. Following the Author the only explanation for 
this difference lies in the different types of language used on the forms: the information on tax 
rates and on fiscal controls used in group B was expressed in more forceful and formal language. 
The theory of expected utility predicts that, when the control variables (probability of being 
checked and punishment) remain constant, tax evasion behaviour can only be explained by 
income. More specifically, it states that tax evasion is positively influenced by income; a 
contention largely borne out by the experimental results from group B. 
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Again according to expected utility theory, tax rates have no influence of tax evasion, and all 
subjects will attempt to evade taxes at least once. This prediction was not confirmed by the 
experiment: indeed, its results show that high tax rates encourage evasion. 
Experiment A 10: "Tax evasion is not a gamble: a report on two experiments" 
I J. C. Baldry, 1986 
Aim of the experiment (experiment 1) 
In the work described in the previous file Baldry conducted an experiment designed to test certain 
predictions of the `standard' model of tax evasion, which views this activity as a simple game. 
Under a number of hypotheses concerning enforcement parameters (given) and the net income 
earned by individuals (exogenous), it can be shown that a risk-averse taxpayer, with a utility 
function defined on disposable income: (a) will always attempt to evade to the extent that the 
expected gain is positive; (b) will seek to evade more, the higher the level of his/her net income; 
(c) will always evade less with an increase in the probability of detection or in the fine; (d) the 
parameters of the tax function - the tax schedule - (marginal or average rate) by itself does not 
influence tax-compliance decisions. The experiment was designed to verify hypotheses (a), (b) 
and (c). 
Methodology (exp. 1) 
The subjects were allocated a gross income extracted from a given distribution in each of the 6 
rounds of the experiment. They were given a tax schedule with which to calculate their taxable 
incomes and asked to complete an income-tax return. They were then told the probability of 
being audited and informed about the fines that they would have to pay if evasion was detected. 
The aim, therefore, was to replicate the tax imposition and control procedure(for greater detail 
see Baldry 1985) normally implemented by the tax authorities. 
Results and conclusions (exp. 1) 
The results consistently supported prediction (b) but rejected (a) and (d). 
Firstly, it seems that the decision whether or not to evade is also influenced by "constraints, moral 
remorse"; it certainly does not depend on the net expected return on evasion alone. 
Secondly, introduction of the marginal or average tax rate as an additional explanatory variable 
significantly improves the performance of the estimated tax evasion function, with a limited 
effect on the (significant) estimates already obtained for the other coefficients. 
This suggests that, although the standard model provides a good basis for analysis of tax evasion, 
it should be improved: for example by including "moral costs" and the average or marginal rates 
as separate arguments in the utility function. 
56 
Aim and methodology (exp. 2) 
In order to add further information to the above results, in October 1985 another experiment was 
designed and conducted. This experiment was formally equivalent to the previous one but it was 
presented as a gamble. The only difference was that, whereas in experiment I the probability of 
being audited was set at 0.25 and the fine at 2, with a net expected gain (NEG) of $0.25 per $ 
evaded in all rounds, in experiment 2 variable values of the fine and of the audit probability were 
used, enabling NEG to vary between -0.4 and +0.2 (negative in 2 rounds). 
Given the structure of experiment 2 and the results obtained from experiment I, the second set of 
results were expected to show the absence of `moral costs' in gambling, so that the sum wagered 
(attempted evasion) would always be positive, unlike in experiment 1. Secondly, it was hoped to 
provide support for the hypothesis that the marginal or average tax rate has a distinct influence on 
evasion behaviour. This should have been evidenced by the greater amount of variance in actual 
evasion (AE) explained by net income, the probability of being audited and fined in experiment 
2, compared with the amount explained only by net income in experiment 1. The residual 
variance of AE in experiment I would thus be due to the independent influence exerted by some 
fiscal parameter, whereas this influence would be absent in experiment 2 because the participants 
were not given a tax schedule for the income allocated to them, nor could they infer it. 
Results and conclusions (exp. 2) 
The fact that all the subjects always staked a positive sum in each round (implicitly, they 
attempted to evade), even in the presence of negative NEG, apparently supports the hypothesis 
that there are `moral costs' involved in evasion which do not arise in the case of straightforward 
gambling. 
Unfortunately, the data were of no great help in verifying the second hypothesis concerning a 
distinct influence exerted by fiscal parameters on tax-compliance decisions. The subjects always 
evaded the maxim amount available to them (i. e. all the tax due) in all rounds (flat regression 
equation). 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from these experiments is that the traditional theoretical 
approach to tax evasion should be altered or supplemented, since evasion is a complex 
phenomenon, one not comparable to a simple gamble. 
The main lessons to be drawn from A5 are two: the first is that when tax declarations 
are kept private, evasion increases, while it decreases when tax declarations are public. 
The second is that increasing tax rates also increases evasion. The important discovery 
made by A10 is that the subjects' behaviours changes if they are asked to take decisions 
in a context which resembles a gambling game or a real world situation. 
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The psychological pressure exerted by a public declaration and real world 
contextualisation seem to produce a similar discouraging effect on tax evasion. On the 
other hand, increased tax pressure produces a sort of defiance, which leads to an 
increase in tax evasion. The experimental subjects therefore seem sensitive to cultural 
values which act as a deterrent against tax evasion, but at the same time they react by 
evading more when they judge the tax pressure to be excessive. It should be pointed out 
that these considerations are not verified by Becker's experiments. They may therefore 
provide the basis for further experimental tests - like those, in fact, which I have 
conducted and report in the following chapters. More specifically, my experiments 
considered both the effect of public audits and the effects of an experimental design 
which models a real world context versus the effects produced by a pure game context. 
Similar problems are investigated by two other experiments (or groups of 
experiments) worth commenting on. I refer to Al I (Webley, Halstead, 1986) and A12 
(Webley, Morris, Amstutz, ). Experiment Al I was divided into three separate 
experiments, all designed to investigate the relevance of the experimental context. I 
shall restrict my comments to the second and third of these experiments, given that the 
first one was "introductory", serving to provide some sort of reference frame for the 
ones that followed. By contrast, the second experiment conducts detailed exploration of 
the subjects' psychological attitude towards the experimental situation. More precisely, 
Webley and Halstead's second experiment sought to investigate, given certain 
instructions, how the way in which individuals perceive the experimental situation 
influences their tax evasion behaviour, taking account of the fact that, in general, a tax 
simulation can be interpreted in at least four different ways: (i) as an optimisation 
problem, (ii) as a game, (iii) as a simulation of income declarations, (iv) as a 
psychological experiment. 
The main results of this experiment are the following: 
- 10 subjects (the total number was 16) saw the situation as a game. They also stated 
that the fact that the simulation was carried out on a computer may take them to 
associate it closely with a video game. These subjects tended to declare only part of 
their income. 
-3 subjects perceived the context as a mathematical optimisation problem and tended 
to adopt an `all or nothing' approach to tax compliance. 
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-3 subjects believed that the situation was one of actual income-tax declaration. They 
were almost all honest `taxpayers' who justified their behaviour by saying that `it is 
wrong to evade' and that `it would be too shameful to be caught' (honesty 
component). 
Despite the fact that the majority of the subjects viewed the situation as a game, and 
that their strategies changed according to their perception of it, it was not possible to 
conduct qualitative analysis of these data because of the small size of the group of 
subjects and the uncertain nature of the classification outlined above. A different 
approach was therefore required to demonstrate the existence of a link between the 
subjects' perceptions of the experimental situation and quantitative measures of their 
behaviour. This issue was addressed by study 3, which varied the instructions given to 
the subjects. The results obtained from this third experiment provided quantitative 
confirmation that the various perceptions of the experimental situation, already 
discovered in the second experiment, may have diverse consequences on the decision- 
making strategies adopted by individuals - strategies also conditioned by the fact that 
the subjects knew that they were involved in an experiment, not in a real-world 
situation. It was shown in particular that variations in the instructions given to the 
subjects, and able to alter their individual perceptions of the experimental context, may 
give rise to very different types of fiscal behaviour, even in the presence of equal fiscal 
and enforcement parameters (as I have already pointed out when analysing the results 
from Baldry 1986). 
Another experiment closely related to my own experiments described in the 
following chapters is experiment A8 (Alm, Jackson, McKee, 1992), which reports the 
effects exerted by the introduction of a public good. This factor has a negative effect on 
evasion: that is, the introduction of a public good, produced by using the tax revenue, 
seemingly reduced evasion. 
Finally a more general but no less important lesson to be drawn the whole A group of 
experiments regards methodology. Inspection of the experimental designs reveals the 
following common features: 
1) the number of experimental subjects is always quite small (ranging from a minimum 
of 13 persons - experiment A3 by N. Friedland - to a maximum of 56 - experiment 
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A4 by Chang, Nichols and Schultz - although this maximum is exceeded by almost 
all the experiments in groups B, C and D); 
2) the experimental subjects were all students; 
3) most of the experiments were carried out without the aid of computers, using 
envelopes, questionnaires, etc., instead. Experiments All (Webley, Halstead, 1986) 
and A12 (Webley, Morris, Amstutz, 1985) are the exceptions to this rule; 
4) many experiments provided the subjects with clear information on how to compute 
their taxes, fines in case of evasion, etc. 
2.4.2 Group B, tax equity and group C, explanations given by subjects 
The experiments belonging to group B and C share the common feature that they 
investigated topics on the border between economics and psychology. The main factors 
investigated by these experiments were the following: 
1) unfairness of the tax system (exp. B1, B3) 
2) social or personal justifications (exp. B2, Cl, C2). 
The other experiments in these groups, i. e. B4 and C3, respectively analysed taxpayer 
behaviour in an international context (B4), and the effects of some specific methods of 
tax evasion deterrence. 
The main findings of the experiments analysing the role played by the perceived 
unfairness of the tax system are the following: 
a) the degree of unfairness of a given tax system is subjectively measured on a 
comparative basis, i. e. the subjects evaluate their position as taxpayers by looking at 
the other participants in the experiment and then deciding whether or not they have 
been correctly taxed; 
b) the perception of tax fairness derives mainly from assessment of the value of tax 
pressure, while the other components of the fiscal system are less influential on 
subjects' beliefs. 
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In my opinion, the most interesting of the experiments on fiscal fairness is experiment 
BI by Spicer and Becker (1980), which I briefly summarise in the following file. 
Expriment ß1: "Fiscal inequity and tax evasion: an experimental approach" 
Michael W. Spicer and Lee A. Becker, 1980 
Aim of the experiment 
The purpose of the experiment was to examine the relationship between the perception of 
inequity in the tax system and tax evasion. The aim was to verify the following proposition: "the 
amount of taxes evaded increases among victims of inequity and decreases among its 
beneficiaries", the intention being to clarify whether the perception of inequity* effectively 
increases evasion or whether it is instead only one way to rationalise illegal behaviour. 
Methodology 
The game consisted of a tax game lasting ten `monthly' periods in which the subjects were 
confronted by hypothetical decisions on tax evasion. Participating in the experiment were 57 
students from the University of Colorado, 21 males and 36 females, aged between 21 and 29. 
At the beginning of the game the participants were told that: 
- each player would receive the same wage at the beginning of every month; 
- each of them had to decide how much of his/her wage to declare and then pay the relative 
tax; 
- in each period, randomly selected participants would be audited and if the tax paid was less 
than the sum due, fines equal to 15 times the amount of tax evaded would be inflicted. The 
participants were informed that there was I chance in 15 of being checked, and that checks were 
made only on taxes evaded in that month. 
The objective of each participant was to maximize his/her net income (gross income - taxes paid - 
fines), on which basis a money reward was distributed at the end of the game. 
The subjects were also given further, false, information on tax rates in order to induce some of 
them to feel that they were being treated unfairly. All the subjects were informed that the tax rate 
was 40%. But then 19 of them were told that the average rate was 65%, while a further 19 were 
told that the rate was 15%. The remaining 19 subjects were told the truth, i. e. that all participants 
paid at the same rate. 
When the ten months had passed, a questionnaire was administered to the subjects in order to 
ascertain their perception of, and attitude towards, tax evasion. 
Results and conclusions 
The results indicate that on average the participants in the experiment evaded 23.13% of the taxes 
payable, and that the percentage of evasion was higher among those who had been told that they 
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had to pay at a higher-than-average rate, and lower among those informed that they would be 
paying at a lower-than-average rate. 
Moreover, the results of the regression show that with respect to the dependent variable 
`percentage of taxes evaded': 
- the coefficient relative to the tax rates was positive and significant; 
- sex had a significant influence on evasion: other variables remaining equal, males evaded 
more than females; 
- age and earnings did not seem to be significantly correlated with evasion. 
These results therefore supported the proposition that a perception of unfair 
treatment increases tax evasion. 
The main point of interest concerning Spicer and Becker's experiment is the very clean 
information that it provides about the relationship between tax fairness and evasion. The 
Authors underline that the relationship between tax pressure and evasion follows a 
linear increasing path. The existence of this relationship can be of crucial importance for 
the correct design of new experiments, and it must be carefully considered when 
analysing the data from experiments on tax evasion. 
Clearcut conclusions are less easy to draw from the results of experiments analysing 
the impact of different socio-economic scenarios than they are from the results of 
experiments on tax fairness. In particular, it is rather difficult to specify the effects 
produced by a situation of individual need as a justification for tax evasion. Some 
experiments indicate that this individual condition may or may not be seen by subjects 
as a valid reason for evasion. The results are strongly influenced by other conditions 
introduced in the experiment, like for example the social attitude towards tax evasion. 
Furthermore, the designs of these experiments are often so different that direct 
comparison between the results is even more problematic than the usual. 
Nevertheless, some lessons can be drawn even from these experiments, viz.: 
a) the decision to evade is not based on a merely economic calculation of the expected 
monetary reward from evasion but is closely influenced by socio-economic factors; 
b) an individual's reputation can indirectly influence the behaviour of the other 
taxpayers, i. e. if it is known that a taxpayer with an high moral reputation has evaded, 
the propensity to evade of the other subjects increases; 
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`I i c) the explanations given by the subjects for their decision to evade are related more to 
external factors (i. e. social or cultural elements) than to internal causes (i. e. 
individual socio-economic characteristics). 
Finally, it should be noted that the experiments in these groups all adopted some sort 
of mixed methodology whereby experiments were combined with questionnaires. When 
interpreting the results, therefore, particular care should be taken not to mix 
considerations relative to the opinions expressed by the subjects with ones relative to 
their actions during the experiments. Actions and opinions lie at different cognitive 
levels and must be carefully confronted in order to avert the risk of considering them 
part of the same decision process. From a methodological point of view, the main 
considerations concerning the experiments in groups B and C are the following: 
1) sex may have a significant influence on evasion; 
2) many experiments avoided the use of students as experimental subjects (experiment 
B3 by Hite, experiment B4 by Robben, Webley and Weigel, experiment C2 by Hite, 
experiment C3 by Thurman); 
3) many experiments used subjects of very different ages. 
Some experiments (e. g. experiment 134) mixed and compared results from very 
heterogeneous samples (comprising students or ordinary people or specially selected 
subjects - high-income earners). These comparisons seem to demonstrate that a 
particular bias is introduced by a specific category of subjects. 
2.4.3 Group D: imitation among evaders 
This final group comprises only two experiments, both of which sought to analyse 
the mental process followed by experimental subjects when they had to decide on 
paying taxes. More precisely, these experiments concentrated on imitation - that is, on 
whether the subjects look at the behaviour of the other participants in the experiment 
when taking their decisions. Specifically, experiment D2 analysed the imitative 
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behaviour in the context of attribution theory, while experiment DI was simply 
concerned with the effects of imitation foul court. 
The results seem to suggest that imitation does not greatly influence the decision to 
evade, while experience and the building a system of individual rules are apparently 
more important. The file for experiment D2 by Kaplan, Reckers and Roark (1988) 
follows. In my opinion, it is the most complete. 
Experiment D2: "An Attribution Theory And Analysis of Tar Evasion related Judgements" 
Steven E. Kaplan, Philip M. J. Reckers and Stephen J. Roark, 1988 
Aim of the experiment 
The experiment examined the connection between the causal attributions made by subjects 
regarding tax evasion by others and their own intention to evade taxes. The aim of the experiment 
was to identify the circumstances in which taxpayers justify evasion and which may therefore 
encourage their own tax evasion. 
Methodology 
The theoretical approach used in this experiment differed from that usually adopted in fiscal 
research. Instead of concentrating on real tax evasion, brief scenarios of hypothetical cases of 
evasion were used. The experiment consisted of two studies (A and B) which applied attribution 
theory to the phenomenon of tax evasion. 
The same procedure was used in each experiment: 99 subjects took part in study A, and 105 in 




a) high need condition: a taxpayer was described as extremely needy because of recent major 
family medical expenses; 
b) low need condition: in this case too, the taxpayer was described as having faced major medical 
expenses but that they had been paid by an insurance policy or out of savings. 
taxpayer consensus 
a) high social consensus condition: the taxpayer was told that tax evasion was very common and 
was becoming even more serious; 





a) high salience condition: this scenario states that a taxpayer is generally an `honest 
businessman'; 
b) low salience condition: this scenario states that a taxpayer is generally `a shrewd businessman'. 
Social need: 
a) high social need condition: this scenario states that tax evasion seriously affects the fairness of 
income tax and makes higher tax rates necessary in order to recoup lost revenues; 
b) low social need condition: this scenario states that tax evasion has little effect on national 
income and that it therefore does not make any increase in income tax rates necessary. 
The task of each subject was to respond to the following two dependent variables: 
1. causal attributions: the subjects were asked to assess to what extent tax evasion is influenced by 
the character of the taxpayer and to what extent by situational/environmental factors; 
2. intention: the subjects were asked if, in the same circumstances as described in the scenario, 
they would adopt the same evasive behaviour. 
At the end of the experiment, the participants completed a questionnaire asking them for 
information about: 
- age; 
- which of the five tax brackets they belonged to; 
- if tax evasion is immoral; 
Results and conclusions 
Causal attributions 
Study a: ancova 2x2 analysis, in which the independent variables were taxpayer consensus and 
need, while age and income bracket were co-varied, showed that both the manipulated factors 
(consensus and need) were significant in explaining the causal attributions. In fact, when the 
taxpayer's need was high, external attribution to the environment was 39%, whereas when 
consensus was low external attribution rose to 52%. These results were not as predicted by the first 
hypothesis of attribution theory (see Section 2). 
Study b: ancova 2x2 analysis, in which the independent variables were salience and social need, 
while age and income bracket were co-varied, showed that only salience was a factor significant in 
explaining the causal attributions. In fact when there was a high salience condition, the external 
attribution was 46%, while when it was low external attribution was only 37%. Thus the second 
hypothesis made by attribution theory is supported. Information on social need is not significant. 
Consequently hypothesis 4 of attribution theory is not upheld. 
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Intentions 
The following results were obtained from regression analysis of the overall data from studies A 
and B, in which the independent variables were causal attributions and moral beliefs: 
1. the intention to evade was high among subjects with high external causal attributions; 
2. subjects who considered tax evasion not to be immoral stated that they had a high intention to 
evade. 
These findings seemed to support hypotheses 5 and 6 of attribution theory. 
The methodological problems implied by experiment D2 are in my opinion more 
serious than those confronted by the other experiments discussed. I believe, in 
particular, that the results reported by experiment D2 were closely influenced by the 
specific way in which either the so-called "salience" and "social need" factors were 
modelled. Applied psychologists have demonstrated (e. g. Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, 
1982) that even small changes to the lexicographic description of an experiment can 
produce great differences in results. Consequently, a simple change to the language (the 
syntax) used to describe the scenarios which Kaplan, Reckers and Roark used to check 
the influence of the factors analysed by their experiment may give rise to different 
results. 
2.5 Some brief methodological considerations 
Returning to the theoretical discussion of previous sections, and looking at the topics 
investigated by the experiments hitherto described, the main conclusion to be drawn is 
that expected utility theory is still the most powerful theoretical framework with which 
to start. One reaches this conclusion, not because the expected utility maximisation 
theory always fits the results of experiments, but because almost all the influencing (or 
supposedly so) factors can be included in a micro-economic model and rigorously 
tested. By contrast, neither prospect theory nor so-called attribution theory is able to 
offer this opportunity because they lack an equally powerful analytical apparatus. This 
limitation is particularly evident as regards attribution theory, although prospect theory 
is to some extent able to overcome it. The analytical problem with prospect theory is 
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that it is difficult to build a formal model of the first stage of the decision-making 
process, that is, the so-called `editing step'. This first stage is of crucial importance 
because it determines the reference point for the decision-maker and therefore splits the 
value function. After the reference point has been determined in the editing stage, the 
decision-maker's behaviour is described by prospect theory in a manner that does not 
differ greatly from that of the traditional expected utility approach. 
It is also worth emphasising that the expected utility model is the only approach to 
tax evasion that forms part of a more general theoretical framework. Starting from an 
expected utility model, one can insert the tax-payer decisional problem into neo- 
classical economic theory, connecting it with the theoretical architecture of the entire 
economic system. This means that, if necessary, it is possible to build organic 
connections with other economic problems. An example of this way of connecting tax 
evasion with other economic spheres of decision is provided by the relatively recent 
" literature on tax evasion and monopoly (Kreutzer and Lee, 1986; Wang and Conant, 
1988; Wang, 1990; Lee 1997). The central issue analysed by this literature is the 
relationship between the decision to evade profit taxes and the profit maximising output 
level of the monopolist. Even though the aims pursued by this body of literature are 
only theoretical, there are some findings from the experiments on tax evasion (those 
designed on the basis of the expected utility model) that can be related to the theoretical 
results obtained. The best example of this potential link is the effects produced by 
different audit-punishment systems (high fines versus high probability of being 
detected) on the experimental subjects. 
The experimental literature on tax evasion has shown that subjects react differently to 
an increase in the fines level or to an increase in the audit probability. On the other 
hand, the above mentioned models of the monopolist who must cope with the joint 
decision to evade and to fix her/his optimal output level do not distinguish between the 
effects exerted by an increase in fines or in the audit probability. As both the literature 
on tax evasion and monopoly and the experiments that study the role played by fines 
and audit probability start from a common theoretical frame, more or less directly 
inspired by the Allingham and Sandmo model, it follows that the experimental findings 
can be easily transferred to the theoretical debate on profit taxes and monopoly. 
Similarly, even though the experiments reported in this thesis analyse income tax 
evasion, points of contact can be found with the parallel theme of profit taxes evasion, 
or with other topics related to the economic effects produced by taxes, because the 
theoretical frame used by my experiments is coherent with the microeconomic theory. 
A second consideration arising from the discussion of the experimental literature on 
tax evasion is that a very large number of designs have been tested and accepted. This 
means that the planners of a new experiment benefit from quite ample freedom in 
deciding its operational aspects. For example, there are no restrictions on the choice 
between carrying out the experiment using material support (envelopes, questionnaires, 
real money, etc. ) or computers which simulate the experimental environment. 
On the other hand there are some methodological considerations that should be borne in 
mind, most notably: 
Since sex seems to be of some influence, it is better to keep the experimental subject 
samples gender-balanced (with 50% males and females, if possible). 
2) The number of experimental subjects does not seem to be particularly important, 
but it is preferable to have at least 25-30 subjects for each experiment. 
3) The experimental context is crucial and must therefore be kept under control, 
especially if the experiment is to be repeated several times. 
4) The large number of factors that may affect the decision to evade taxes suggests that 
simple experiments should be conducted with only a few variables involved. 
I shall return to these methodological issues in a later section devoted to the practical 
problems that must be solved when setting up an experimental laboratory. 
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3. The theoretical model and the experimental schemes 
Foreword 
The following introduction and sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this chapter formed the basis 
of sections II and III of Bosco and Mittone (1997 p. 298-302), and they were discussed 
and written jointly by Bosco and myself. Section 3.3 and sections 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 of the 
following chapter are an extension of sections IV, V, VI and VII of Bosco and Mittone 
(p. 303-321) and they have been written by myself alone. 
3.1 Introduction 
The survey of the theoretical literature in the previous chapter showed that, from a 
microeconomic perspective, tax evasion has been mainly studied as a problem of choice 
under uncertainty (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972): like any portfolio manager, the 
taxpayer has to allocate her/his fixed gross income between two assets: a risky asset 
which is tax evasion, and a safe asset (with a zero return) which is tax payment. Tax 
evasion activity is risky because there is a certain probability that it will be discovered 
and punished. As suggested by the portfolio theory, the taxpayer's choice will be 
affected by her/his preferences - mainly by her/his attitude towards risk-taking - and by 
the return on the risky asset determined by the tax structure, which includes both the tax 
rate and the penalties in the case of evasion. 
However, the pure gamble model appears unsatisfactory on various grounds. Among 
these, and most importantly for my present purposes, it neglects the psychological 
aspects of the decision to evade tax because it rules out any feeling of shame about 
evading or being detected and punished, and it ignores any intrinsic pleasure derived 
from successful evasion. In other words, the pure gamble model does not take full 
account of the moral constraints involved in the tax evasion decision. 
This theoretical perspective is not completely new and has been explored by at least 
two articles: Gordon (1989) and Myles and Naylor (1996). Both these works take the 
hint from the problem of justifying the failure of the standard Allingham and Sadmo's 
model in predicting the effects produced on evasion by an increase in tax rates (as 
reported by some empirical studies e. g. Clotfelter, 1983). The standard model predicts 
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that if the tax rates increase then tax evasion should reduce, while the empirical 
observations show the opposite. Gordon tries to justify this failure of the Allingham and 
Sadmo's model by suggesting that the decision to evade taxes generates a "psychic 
cost" and that this cost increases as the amount of taxes evaded rises. The model by 
Gordon goes in the direction here followed but has been criticised by Myles and Naylor 
exactly because of this assumption of direct relationship between, psychic costs and tax 
evaded. Following these Authors there are no reasons to justify this hypothesis and they 
suggest a different solution to the problem. The Myles and Taylor's model links in fact 
the decision to evade to a sort of "reputational" budget. The tax payer evaluate the 
possibility to evade by attributing a value to her/his social reputation that could suffer a 
damage if s/he will be detected as evader. The final aim of the Authors is to reconcile 
the standard model with the empirical observations. 
The main difference between the " Myles and Taylor's model and the theoretical 
approach here adopted is that I include in the utility function of the tax payer not only 
psychological costs related to a some sort of value given by society to honesty, but also 
a moral cost that derives from a strictly individual value system. This cost has been 
called "Kantian" and will be described in the following section. 
3.2 The tax payer model as a pure gambler model 
Adopting a partially different version of the model illustrated in the introduction I 
shall assume that the taxpayer has a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that is 
concave in consumption: 
E(IS) =(1-n) U{Cs} +n U{Ca} 
where: 
X is the percentage of tax evaded (?. =O if the taxpayer is perfectly honest, X =1 if the 
taxpayer is perfectly dishonest); 
Y= income; 
it is the probability that evasion will be discovered; 
70 
t is the tax rate; 
Cs = [I -t(1-X)] Y is the consumption level enjoyed if the taxpayer escapes detection; 
Ca = [1-t -XP(L)t] Y is the consumption level should the taxpayer be caught and 
punished; 
P(%. ) is the punishment mechanism which links the surcharge to the level of evasion? 
Under these assumptions the taxpayer's problem is as follows: 
MaxE(U) 





The traditional analysis seemingly assumes that everyone except the tax 
administration behaves as an isolated individual, playing a game against nature. 
However, the cognitive process leading up to the decision to evade tax appears to be a 
more complex and richer process, in analysis of which the individualistic approach is 
clearly unsatisfactory. Among other things, it overlooks the possibility that the tax 
evasion decision may be driven by perceived injustices or inequalities in the tax system, 
and it neglects the influence of the prevailing social climate on the decision of the 
taxpayer to violate the fiscal law. 
We have seen from the review of the empirical literature that numerous components 
of the theory can be either criticised or enriched by considering the role played by socio- 
economic and psychological factors. More precisely, the results of most empirical 
studies point to the general conclusion that the tax evasion game cannot be reduced to a 
'I assume that the penalty rate is imposed on evaded tax, an institutional device used in many developed 
countries. I further assume that P'(A) >0 and P"(%, ) 2t0. 
The first order condition problem is: 
SE(U) 
SA = 
(I -n)U'{Cs}tY-nU'(Ca)[P(X)+ P'(X)X]tY =0 
The second order condition is verified once it is assumed that U"{C} S 0. This rules out the case of a 
risk-loving taxpayer, i. e. a taxpayer willing to accept an unfair gamble. 
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pure gamble. On the contrary, rather than being solely a pure gambler, a taxpayer is also 
a free rider: by evading tax s/he is not excluded from consumption of the public goods. 
The taxpayer may therefore be aware that her/his evasion will damage the welfare of the 
community in which s/he lives: hence evasion may produce different types of 
psychological cost. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that, in the same 
circumstances, and mainly when the taxpayer is convinced that s/he is paying too much 
in absolute or relative terms or with respect to the public goods provided, an increase in 
welfare, as well as the saved tax payment, may accrue to the taxpayer when evasion is 
successful. 
It should also be noted that the model proposed here includes only the consumption 
of a private good, while any utility is obtained from consumption of the public goods 
produced by the tax revenue. The consumption of a public good has been excluded 
because the individual contribution to total tax revenue is not relevant, and therefore the 
amount of public good can be assumed as a constant. 
3.3 The rational tax payer with moral constraints 
In this section I shall extend the model set out in section 2.1 so that full account can 
be taken of the moral constraints involved in the tax evasion decision. The first problem 
is therefore formulating a definition of the concept of moral constraint in the tax evasion 
context. This topic has been partially treated by the literature and from various 
perspectives, of which two are of particular interest here: 
1) the "Kantian" morality approach (Laffont, 1975; Sudgen, 1984): this approach is 
broadly related to Kant's definition of morality and is based on the assumption that, for a 
given taxpayer, a "fair tax" (t Y) is the amount of money that s/he believes fair for all 
other taxpayers to pay under the same conditions. ' Assuming that the tax-payer deems 
the tax imposed by the Government to be fair, then the decision to evade becomes to 
3 The degree of the perceived (un)fairness of the tax burden depends mainly on the amount of services 
(public goods plus merit goods) that the state provides. Wealth redistribution may be seen as one of the 
duties performed by the state and can therefore be included among the services that it provides. In this 
sense the degree of perceived tax fairness should also depend on the degree of inequality, and on the 
expected effectiveness of the equity policies implemented by the state. 
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some extent constrained by the knowledge that her/his evasion will reduce the amount 
of resources available for social welfare. 
Thus a Kantian moral cost K(ß. )6 can be defined where K(X) represents a 
psychological cost incurred irrespective of whether the act of evasion is observed. The 
effectiveness of this deterrent rests on the assumption that a false declaration will 
generate anxiety, guilt or a reduction in self-image. It should be stressed that my 
hypothesis is that taxpayers feel these costs only if they do not believe that they are not 
paying more taxes than is fair. It is fairly obvious that no moral constraint can work as a 
spontaneous device to reduce tax evasion if taxpayers feel that they are subject to an 
unfair tax burden. If this is the case, and then t>t, rather than inducing guilt or a 
reduction in self-image, tax evasion may be perceived as necessary self-defence, and the 
act of tax evasion in itself may increase the taxpayer's welfare. 
2) the social approach: under this approach the taxpayer is not exclusively interested 
in her/his own welfare but is also concerned about the general opinion in her/his society 
towards tax evasion. It may thus be defined as a moral constraint S(X) based on the 
social evaluation of tax evasion which can be represented as a non-pecuniary cost 
caused by the damage to the evaders' reputation resulting from detection. ' 
It therefore represents what I shall call the social stigma: the moral cost incurred by 
an individual who is discovered to be in breach of the law. ' In other words, we may 
imagine that tax evasion is subject to moral censure in a given society. In this case, 
those who decide to evade must consider the risk of being both fined and censured by 
public opinion, even when they do not feel any moral constraint to evade. The intensity 
of this social stigma clearly depends on the extent to which evasion behaviour is 
widespread in the community. The social stigma may be very great if the taxpayer 
perceives him/herself to be in the tiny minority, but if there is a economy-wide 
propensity to tax evasion, s/he may feel far less morally culpable. Note that what is 
important is the prevailing perceived rate of evaders, because the true number of evaders 
is unknown not only to tax payers but to the fiscal Authority as well. Our assumption is 
6 assume that the cost component K is an increasing function of X. 
1 assume that the cost component S is an increasing function of X. 
`I may also appeal to the literature on social customs (Akerlof, 1980 and Naylor, 1989). See also 
Gordon, 1989 
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Under these assumptions, the utility function of the taxpayer becomes: 
E(U) = (1-it) U(Cs, Ms) + it U{Ca, Ma} 
where: 
Ms=(t -t)K(A. ) and Ma=(1-1)K(?. )+(µ -µ')S(ß. ) 
In order to render the problem analytically tractable, I assume that 
UCM=UMC=O, UMM=O and K"(X) = S"(X)=0. The taxpayer's problem is still the 
following: 
MaxE(U) 
but under these assumptions, the taxpayer's utility function is: 
E(L =(1-n) U{Cs} +7r[U{Ca}-(µ-µe)SaJ-([-t )Ka 





nP'(X)U'{Ca} nP'(X)U'{Ca}tY [3.1] 
The optimal level of evasion depends on two terms: the first displays the role played 
by both the structure of the gamble - that is, the probability of being audited and the 
punishment function - and the taxpayer's risk propensity - that is, the curvature of 
her/his utility function. This first part of equation [3.1] shows results quite similar to 
those obtained by the traditional approach to fiscal evasion (e. g. Srinivasan, 1973). The 
second term of [3.1] displays the role played by the moral factors. It suggests that 
optimal evasion will decrease with an increase in social stigma (S), unless the evasion 
level perceived as physiological by the tax payer (µ) is lower than the perceived 
average level of evasion in society (µe). Similarly, the optimal evasion will decrease 
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with an increase in the Kantian moral cost (K): in this case too, the direction of the 
effect of K on X depends on the difference between the perceived fair tax (I ) and the 
current tax level (t). 
It is now evident that the fairness of the gamble, even when accounting for the degree 
of risk aversion, is not longer sufficient to generate evasion behaviour. In order to 
induce evasion the fairness of the gamble must overcompensate the psychological costs 
involved in the tax evasion decision. This finding explains some experimental results 
(for example Baldry 1985,1986) which show that there are some people who choose 
not to evade even if it is apparently convenient for them to do so. On the basis of the 
apparatus used here, we may state that the non-pecuniary disadvantages for these 
taxpayers were higher than the pecuniary advantages deriving from evasion. It is worth 
noting, moreover, that the moral constraints were defined in such ,. 
a way that the 
opposite result is possible as well. " 
Whatever the sign of the parameters, one notes that in the model proposed here the 
level of evasion depends not only on the tax-enforcement variable (t and P) and on the 
probability of being audited (n) but also on variables which, albeit naively, capture the 
role played by the prevailing social climate and by perceived injustices or inequalities in 
the tax system. 
It is of interest to investigate the sign of the comparative static analysis, since this 
will reveal whether my model is able to shed light on the discrepancies between the 
comparative static results obtained by theoretical analysis and those deriving from 
experimental and empirical inquiry. In the case of an increase in the tax rate, the result 
on the optimal level of evasion is no longer definite: 





In this case, the effect of an increase in the tax rate can be distinguished into two 
different and opposite effects: a wealth effect of negative sign, as long as the assumption 
"The effect of moral constraints on the decision to evade is, in fact, contingent on the sign of 
(µ - µ`) and (i - t). If the level of taxation is perceived as too high, and as therefore unacceptable to 
the taxpayer - (1- t) < 0, and/or if the proportion of evaders in the community is judged to be greater than 
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of DARA is retained, and a lax unfairness effect that is positive. The overall effect is not 
unambiguously definite a priori. However, it may happen that if the value of K is 
sufficiently high - i. e. if the tax unfairness effect is relatively stronger than the wealth 
effect - the result obtained by the traditional analysis is reversed, so that the 
level of 
evasion tends to increase with an increase in the tax rate. The reason for this is quite 
obvious: an increase in tax either decreases the psychological cost of evasion (if 
(t - t) > 0) or increases the pleasure of evasion (if (i - t) < 0). 
Interestingly, if 1 decreases, the level of optimal evasion increases. " When, owing to 
political or cultural changes, the level of tax judged to be fair by taxpayers decreases, 
the incentive to evade increases, as well as the optimal level of evasion. 
Although I have not defined the cognitive process determining the perceived average 
level of evasion, it is reasonable to assume that this variable is in some way directly 
influenced by the true (albeit unknown) level of evasion. " In this sense, the evasion 
choice can no longer be considered to be merely individualistic. Assuming that µe is 
directly influenced by the actual total number of evaders, the behaviour of the other 
taxpayers will enter the optimal response function of our taxpayer. 
We observe that: 
S 
Sµ µ` -SOC 
Therefore, as just said, the optimal level of evasion depends negatively on the 
subjective judgement of the physiological, and therefore acceptable, average level of 
evasion, and positively on the perceived current proportion of evaders in the 
community. Note that this introduces a dragging effect: should a change occur in one of 
the variables affecting the decision to evade (tax rate, tax surcharge, income, probability 
of being audited), there will be a direct effect on the individual's decision to evade and 
an indirect effect based the change induced in µ. Furthermore, some of the factors 
the normal, physiological, proportion - (µ - µe )<0- moral considerations may operate in reverse and 
increase the level of evasion. 




influencing the perceived tax fairness may be completely independent of fiscal policy. 
For example: since wealth redistribution can be considered one of the duties performed 
by the state, the level of perceived tax fairness should depend directly on the degree of 
inequality in society, and on the perceived effectiveness of the equity policies 
implemented by the state. 
3.4 Hypotheses to test: the experimental schemes 
My discussion of the theoretical approaches to tax evasion and analysis of the 
theoretical model proposed here show that there may be more than one explanation for 
taxpayer behaviour. I have chosen to adopt a traditional utility optimisation theoretical 
framework because I believe that it is still the most effective of the possible theoretical 
approaches to the problem. Nevertheless, I have stressed that theoretical analysis alone 
leaves a number of issues unresolved. The experimental approach can help to resolve 
these questions while suggesting improvements to the theoretical analysis. The main 
advantage of experiments is that they allow clear distinctions to be drawn among the 
effects produced by different variables over a given (observed) phenomenon. More 
precisely, among the possible empirical approaches to the study of tax evasion, only 
experimentation allows direct observation of the existence and relevance of a 
relationship between subjective factors and behaviour. 
There are two main alternative empirical approaches to the study of tax evasion: the 
first is analysis of statistical data (an example of this kind of analysis is given by the 
first chapter of this thesis), the second is the administering of questionnaires. The 
drawback to the first approach is that it does not allow investigation of the role played 
by psychological factors, like the ones suggested here, while the weakness of the 
questionnaire approach is that the data collected are based, not on observed behaviour, 
but on the opinions declared by the subjects investigated. 
Obviously, neither is the experimental approach exempt from risks and limitations, 
as we shall see in the following pages, but the great number of alternative theoretical 
" Many factors influence the perceived rate of evaders, among them the prevailing attitude of the media 
towards the phenomenon, the relative position of each taxpayer with respect to the others (a poor 
taxpayer may have a different perception of evasion from a rich one), and so on. 
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scenarios developed on taxpayer behaviour open broad space for experiments aimed not, 
or not solely, at falsifying the theories but mainly at increasing direct knowledge of such 
behaviour. In the final chapter, I shall attempt to build a taxonomy of the behaviours 
observed and collected from the repeated experiments that I carried out in the 
Experimental Economic Laboratory of the University of Trento. 
Summarising the foregoing discussion, the more interesting hypotheses to be 
experimentally tested are the following: 
H 1) Does a feeling of social blame somehow influence the decision to evade taxes? My 
assumption is that the adoption by the fiscal Authorities of a device that publicise 
the identity of the tax evader, exposing her/him to the collective blame, should 
reduce the propensity to evade taxes. 
H2) Does knowledge that one is damaging others (or reducing the value of some sort of 
social welfare function) reduce tax evasion? I expect this moral cost14 to reduce the 
number of tax evaders. 
H3) Is there any form of mutual reinforcement between the two forms of moral 
constraint, or are their effects independent? I assume that joint action by both 
constraints achieves the best results in terms of reduced tax evasion. 
H4) Does the perceived fairness of the tax system have any effect on taxpayer 
behaviour? 
H5) Is it true that the level of evasion at a given time has an effect on taxpayer choices? 
The main problem is finding a way to test all these hypotheses. In particular, testing 
the role played by the moral constraints described in the theoretical model seems very 
difficult. As I have said, the choice of experimental testing appears almost obligatory: 
otherwise, it is almost impossible to collect hard statistics on the role played by these 
psychological components of the tax compliance decision. 
Nonetheless, even in an artificial experiment it is anything but easy to produce an 
`artificial' feeling of collective blame, and to test the effects of subjective moral 
constraints. In particular, it is very difficult to be sure that the artificial environment of 
the experiment reproduces some sort of moral value system really felt by participants. 
"I shall use the term "moral cost" synonymously with "moral constraint", and vice-versa. 
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Furthermore, it is even harder to be sure that what I call `subjective moral constraint' 
and `collective disapproval' are perceived by the participants in the manner desired. 
Owing to these difficulties, and because of the quite large number of hypotheses to 
be tested, I tackled the problem by carrying out several experiments. More precisely, I 
carried out two one-shot experiments, one performed in Trento (experiment STI, where 
ST means "static") and the other in Milan at the Catholic University (experiment ST2), 
and five repeated choices experiments in Trento between 1995 and 1997 (experiments 
DYI, DY2, DY3, DY4 and DY5, where DY means "dynamic"). 
In order to increase the amount of information, I also decided to submit a list of 
questions to the participants in the one-shot experiments. These questionnaires - 
presented in detail in the Appendix - were designed to explore the participants' opinions 
on topics closely related to each experiment (e. g. the perceived audit risk, the moral 
importance attributed to tax evasion, etc. ). Some of these questions were extracted from 
a field survey conducted by the Italian Exchequer, and they made it possible to test the 
degree of homogeneity between the participants' opinions on these problems and those 
of the Exchequer's sample. 
It should be mentioned that I also used this field survey to weight the tax rates used 
in the STI and ST2 experiments. As we have just seen, in fact, one of the problems 
implied by the moral constraint is that if participants feel that they are unfairly taxed, 
they may be powerfully induced to evade. Although, as said, I did not investigate the 
extent of this phenomenon, some guarantee is needed that the disincentive effects of 
what I have called `moral constraints' are not weakened too much by the incentive 
effect produced by a perceived unfair tax pressure. For this reason, the tax rates used 
here are similar to those considered "normal" by the majority of the respondents to the 
Exchequer's questionnaire. 
3.5 How to carry out an experiment and set up an experimental laboratory 
This thesis has been planned and written contemporaneously with the setting up of 
the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the Department of Economics of the 
University of Trento. Consequently, I was able to learn how to run an experiment while 
at the same time participating in the setting up of a laboratory as one of its members. 
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The experiments that I designed and performed at the laboratory confronted me with 
a wide range of decisions to be taken when carrying out economic experiments. The 
best way to describe these decisions is to relate them to the phases of an experiment. I 
have summarised the experimental steps and the operational actions necessary to carry 
out each stage in the scheme given in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 highlights the complexity of the entire process of conducting an 
experiment. As the figure in Table 3.1 is a simplified scheme, it is useful to comment on 
each step of the central stages of the process, i. e. phase B and phase C, which represent 
the core of the operational aspects of the experiment. Phases A and D are not really 
operative stages and have been added to the scheme simply to complete the picture of 
the whole process. 
The operational start of an experiment is its project (design). This is a crucial 
moment because errors committed in this phase may compromise the quality of the data 
collected, potentially vitiating the results of the whole experiment. Furthermore, a good 
experimental design reduces the risk of making mistakes in the subsequent phases of the 
experiment itself. The design phase is divided into two separate stages. The first consists 
in analysis of the experimental literature, checking whether is possible to find, among 
experiments already carried out, a design which fits the objectives defined in the 
theoretical premises of the experiment (phase A of Table 3.1). If it is not possible to use 
or adapt a pre-existing experiment, it is necessary to devise a new experimental design. 
In this case, the first decision to take concerns the environment in which the experiment 
will be performed. There are two main ways to carry out an experiment. The first is to 
use material supports like envelopes, polling booths, etc.; the second is to use 
computers. Both empirical methods have some steps in common, while they differ as 
regards certain advantages and disadvantages. 
The common steps are reported in the first two boxes of the "specific actions to 
perform" row of Table 3.1: they concern the writing of the instructions for the 
experimental subjects (which in the computer-aided experiments can be shown to the 
subjects directly on the computer screen), selecting the sample of subjects, recruiting 
the subjects, choosing the statistical tools with which to interpret the data, and perhaps 
choosing the reward for the experimental subjects. The main differences between the 
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two methods are the claim for software for the computer-aided experiments, and the 
need to choose an appropriate place and procedure for the traditional ones. 
Table 3.1 Phases and operating actions of an experiment 
Phases Actions to perform 
General 
) Theoretical definition of the 1) Analysis of the theoretical 
topics covered by the literature 
experiment J2)__Building of a model 
Design of the experiment I) Analysis of the experimental 
literature 








Surveillance of the correct 
realisation of the experiment 
......................................:.. 
) Payment of the subjects 
Analysis of the data 1) Organisation and check of 
collected the collected data base; 
) Statistical analysis 
I) drafting of the instructions for the 
experimental subjects; 
2) choice of the characteristics of the 
experimental subjects sample; 
3) recruitment of the experimental 
subjects; 
4) choice of the place where the 
experiment will be carried out (e. g 
a room with pooling booths) 
5) choice of the way to collect the 
data; 
5) choice of the statistical tools to 
analyse the data collected; 
7) choice of the reward for the 
experimental subjects. 
pl)production of the software; 
p2)choice of the characteristics of the 
experimental subjects sample; 
p3)recruitment of the experimental 
subjects; 
p4)drafting of the instructions for the 
experimental subjects; 
p5)choice of the statistical tools to 
analyse the data collected; 
p6)choice of the reward for the 
experimental subjects. 
rc 1) check of the correspondence 
between the subjects actually 
present and the planned sample; 
rc2) briefing of the subjects and 
distribution of the instructions; 
rc3) assignment to each subject of 
her/his place to occupy during the 
experiment. 
1) careful restraint of the subjects' 
behaviours during the exp.; 
2) check of the correct carrying out 
of the operating actions. 
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The instructions for the participants are crucial, because each single word may affect 
the behaviour of participants during the experiment. It is not possible to predict with 
absolute precision the relationship between the formulation of the instructions and the 
subjects' behaviours. Consequently, the only way to proceed is to test the instructions 
on pilot samples of experimental subjects. In experiment STI, a psychologist was asked 
to verify the instructions, which were then submitted to ten students, whose individual 
`interpretations' of what they were required to do were checked. This was not a totally 
reliable procedure, however, because it only verified whether the instructions had a 
good degree of precision and whether, according to the psychologist, they were free 
from macroscopic undesired framing effects. 
Equally important is the choice of the sample of experimental subjects. Building a 
good sample requires verification of whether there is any relationship between the 
socio-economic characteristics of the subjects and the topic studied by the experiment. 
When no previous experiment has been carried out on the phenomenon (or similar 
occurrences), it is essential to conduct one or more pilot experiments in order to 
ascertain the existence of these relationships. Once these tests have been carried out, the 
sample must be selected, keeping the socio-economic characteristics relevant to the 
phenomenon studied under control. In my case, I was fortunately able to benefit from 
the experiments described in the literature on fiscal evasion. I could therefore choose my 
samples (both for the one-shot and the repeated games experiments) keeping control of 
the only socio-economic variable that has been reported as potentially influential, 
namely sex (Spicer and Becker, 1980). This was done simply by building samples with 
the same numbers of males and females, thereby allowing direct comparison among the 
results from different experiments. 
Recruiting the participants is probably the least complicated of the experimental 
phases, since care need only be taken to select a larger number of subjects than is 
strictly necessary for the experiment, and to store their names in a data base. The former 
precaution is necessary in order to avert the risk of not having enough subjects because 
of defections (as unfortunately happened with my first experiment ST1, when I had not 
recruited enough substitutes). The second device is essential if it is planned to run a 
group of experiments on the same topic, or, more in general, if the experiments are to be 
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carried out in a permanent laboratory. Maintaining a data base with the names of each 
participant is necessary to ensure that the same subjects do not participate in 
experiments which need new ones: that is, subjects who have never had to deal with the 
specific problem treated by the given experiment. Furthermore, only if a record of the 
participants is available is it possible to repeat an experiment with the same subjects, 
when this is required by the experimental design. To date, the Experimental Economics 
Laboratory of the University of Trento has collected data on about 600 subjects, data 
which have also been used to pay the participants. 
The statistical analysis of the data must be carefully planned before running the 
experiment, because if the experiment has not been properly designed, it may prove 
impossible to analyse the results. For example, if multiple analysis is considered 
essential for correct understanding of the results, it follows that the design of the 
experiment must include all the elements that may produce the desired variables. 
Finally, the last stage of the design phase is choosing the reward for the participants. 
I used money in all the experiments described here, although in some cases other forms 
of payment (e. g. vouchers to spend in the University book shop) can be used. Another 
rather sensitive problem is how much money to give to the subjects. Fortunately, the 
literature suggests that the amount of money given to subjects does not seem to be an 
influential factor (Baldry, 1987), so that it can consequently be decided without any 
particular constraint. It should also be pointed out that the decision of how much money 
to give to the participants is obviously influenced by the amount of resources available 
for the experiment. If relatively small rewards are chosen, more experiments can be run, 
given the amount of money available for the experimental programme. Careful 
consideration should be made of this aspect, since it can enable investigation of more 
topics, or improvements in the amount and quality of the data collected. 
Collecting adequate resources is another crucial point in the whole experimental 
process. Sometime the design of the experiment can incorporate this problem by 
covering topics of some interest to a sponsor (e. g. the Ministry of Finance). 
Choosing the place and defining the procedure to follow when carrying out a 
"traditional" experiment involve the same problems as those which arise when writing 
the instructions for the participants. A wrong contextualisation of the experiment may in 
fact be due to carelessness in writing the instructions or to inaccurate definition of the 
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routine to follow. In experiment STI, for example, great care was taken to ensure that 
one condition required by the experiment - namely anonymity - would be effectively 
guaranteed by the procedure that the subjects had to follow. Only if a totally safe 
procedure had been designed could the subjects be sure that their anonymity would 
respected - and the experimenters sure that the results obtained were not vitiated by the 
uncertainty of some subjects concerning respect for the anonymity condition. 
Unfortunately, in this case too, as in that of the instructions, it is not possible to be 
absolutely sure of the total absence of some undesired frame effect. Consequently, great 
care must be taken during analysis of the results to evaluate whether the phenomena 
observed do not result from some unplanned framing effect. 
Using a computer to run an experiment does not automatically solve the undesired 
framing effects problem. On the contrary, there is good reason to suspect that the 
computer by itself introduces a highly specific frame into the experiment, modifying the 
results in an unpredictable way. Computer-produced framing effects have been tested 
even in the specific field of tax evasion (Webley and Halstead, 1986), and the results 
seem to suggest that the use of a computer may induce subjects to consider the 
experiment more as a video game than as taking place in a real world context. I ran all 
the repeated choices experiments using computers, and I tried to check whether the 
degree of `realism' might have influenced the final results of the experiment. I shall not 
discuss the results here, because they are reported in Chapter 5. I merely point out that 
every experiment, now matter how it is performed, is in some way affected by a framing 
effect. The artificiality of the experimental context is in fact an unavoidable limitation of 
this approach, and the use of envelopes, pooling booths, etc. instead of a computer 
screen does not solve the problem. Furthermore, I do not wish to go into the 
epistemological aspects of the experimental approach, since this is a topic beyond the 
scope of this study. 
Good software for an experiment has the following characteristics: 
1) it allows the experiment to be conducted without undesired interruptions; 
2) it allows automatic storage of the results in a pre-organised data base; 
3) it allows constant monitoring of the experiment, possibly introducing on-line 
corrections when these are admitted by the experimental design; 
85 
4) it keeps undesired framing effects under as close control as possible. 
The software that I used is described in the Appendix. Here I shall only summarise 
the various steps in its production. 
The name "TEMAG" (Tax Evasion Multiple Agent Game) was given to the software 
used for all the repeated experiments discussed here. It resulted from the following 
process: 
1) discussion of the results from the one-shot experiments; 
2) choice of objectives for the dynamic experiments; 
3) choice of the computer platform (i. e. the computer operating system); 
4) choice of the degree of modularity for the software; 
5) first design of the software; 
6) testing the software on a pre-sample of subjects; 
7) final design of the software. 
The purpose of the first two stages was to give precise definition to the performance 
that could be expected of the software. It was decided to design very flexible software 
which would allow the conduct of numerous different experiments and the testing of a 
wide variety of hypotheses. It was also decided to choose a flexible computer platform 
would allow the use of either work stations or personal computers. More precisely, we 
decided to produce software which could work with Microsoft® operating systems 
(DOS, Windows 95, Windows NT, etc. ) as well as with the Apple Macintosh® 
operating system. 
We also chose to develop highly modular software which could be straightforwardly 
adapted to completely different experiments. This decision was taken because, when we 
designed TEMAG, we were also planning to run a set of experiments on double auction 
markets in the Economics Laboratory. Consequently, we needed software which could 
also be used to run this kind of experiment. 
Having taken all these decisions, we wrote a first prototype of TEMAG. This was 
tested on a pre-sample of 10 subjects who used it in a complete simulation of the 
dynamic experiments. This test revealed some drawbacks to the software, the most 
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serious of which was the need to keep the local network on which TEMAG worked 
hermetically sealed. In fact, it was found during this first pilot experiment that someone 
surfing the Internet could join the experiment, sending messages to the experimental 
subjects and obviously ruining all our work! 
The final version of TEMAG was used in all the repeated choices experiments 
discussed here. It did not need any further corrections, with the obvious exception of the 
adjustments made to take account of the specific differences required by each 
experiments. 
Once all the stages of the design of the experiment phase have been completed, the 
experiment can be run. This means first of all organising the reception of the 
participants, checking the correspondence between their characteristics and the sample 
planned. Then the instructions must be distributed and the participants assisted in 
correct understanding of the instructions themselves. This is a crucial task because the 
written instructions must be interpreted in the same way by all the participants. 
Furthermore, no conflict must arise between the content of the written instructions and 
the spoken explanations given by the researchers. 
For the one-shot experiments the instructions were tested on a pilot sample, while I 
checked the written instructions for the dynamic experiments during the pilot 
experiment run to test the TEMAG prototype. I was thus always able to answer the 
participants' questions without introducing conflict between the written instructions and 
their interpretation of them. Moreover, although I was helped by student volunteers 
(most of them were preparing their first degree theses under my supervision), I 
personally answered all the questions regarding all the experiments, both one-shot and 
repeated. 
After the briefing, each subject must be assigned to her/his place, which in the case 
of a computer-aided experiment is a computer screen, and helped through the 
introductory steps of the experiment. After the briefing for the one-shot experiments, it 
was not necessary to give any further help to the participants, who only had to follow 
the procedure described in the instructions; it was only necessary to direct the 
operational stages. " In computer-aided experiments it is usually necessary to start up the 
software, so that some form of direct intervention by the researchers is required. In our 
" For more detailed description of these procedures see the next chapter and the appendixes. 
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case, TEMAG requires only a few start operations, which were always performed before 
the subjects were assigned their places. Consequently, when they were sitting in front of 
the computer screen, they only had to follow the instructions on the screen. 
In the starting stage, it is very important to prevent the participants from 
communicating, because any exchange of opinions about the experiment may introduce 
biases into their behaviour. For this reason, the subjects were carefully supervised 
during every stage of the experiments, and any communication among the participants 
was prevented. In the dynamic experiments we also positioned the computer screens in 
such a way that no participant could see the screen of any other participant, and was 
thus prevented from seeing the decisions taken by the other subjects. A further device 
introduced was the use small typographical characters, so that only the person directly in 
front of the screen could read the messages transmitted by TEMAG. 
During the dynamic experiments, the Laboratory staff, under my direction, was 
divided into two groups: the first ensured that TEMAG was working properly; the 
second watched the participants in order to prevent communication and undesired 
behaviour. 
Once the experiment has finished, the subjects must be rewarded. In our one-shot 
experiments this was done during the experiments themselves, because the participants 
were given real money at the beginning of the experiment. In the repeated choices 
experiments, we used the data base produced by TEMAG, which gave us a list of the 
rewards for each participant. More specifically, each subject was identified by a 
numerical code assigned automatically by TEMAG at the beginning of the experiment 
and which each participant wrote on a small sheet given with the instructions when the 
experiment began. In this way we could pay the participants only a few minutes after the 
end of the experiment. 
Finally it should be stressed that successful conduct of experiments of this kind 
requires specifically trained staff. The training of staff is an important stage in the 
experiment, and it can be most effectively performed by involving its members in 
several experiments, given that some methodological problems are common to all kinds 
of experiments. I found it impossible to use the results from two dynamic experiments 
because the staff committed errors in the running phase. These errors were mainly due 
to the inadequate training that I was able to give to those members of the staff. 
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4. The one-shot experiments 
4.1. The design of experiment ST1 
Experiment ST1 was designed so that it could be performed using four groups of 
participants each consisting of 16 subjects. However, the sample actually used only 
consisted of 60 subjects because 4 of those selected did not come to the meeting and not 
enough substitutes had been recruited. The groups were as follows: 
- group A, total absence of moral constraints; 
- group B, only collective moral constraint (social blame); 
- group C, only subjective moral constraint; 
- group D, collective and subjective moral constraints. 
The presence or absence of a collective moral constraint was realised respectively by 
conducting a public tax audit (obviously restricted only to those extracted), or by 
assuring total anonymity to all participants independently of their choices. The 
presence-absence of a subjective moral constraint was realised by introducing a system 
of partial redistribution of the tax yield among the participants. 
The assumptions implied by these operating definitions are the following: 
A1) subjective (Kantian) moral constraint: participants dislike the idea that someone 
may suffer because of their behaviour (tax evasion reduces the total yield and therefore 
leaves less money for the final redistribution); 
A2) collective (social) moral constraint: participants believe that the other agents 
involved in the experiment (researchers, fellow participants) firmly condemn tax 
evasion. 
Assumption Al seemed reasonably realistic because the participants were 
undergraduate students, and we imagined that the idea of stealing money from their 
fellows would be a good morally based deterrent against tax evasion (see the definitions 
of moral constraints). For a similar reason, we also believed that they would be 
concerned (assumption A2) about the risk of being detected as potential `criminals' by 
their teachers and fellows. 
Summarising we have: 
- group A, total anonymity, absence of any redistribution of tax yield; 
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- group ß, public audit, absence of any redistribution of tax yield; 
- group C, total anonymity, partial redistribution of tax yield; 
- group D, public audit, partial redistribution of tax yield. 
Each group was divided in two sub-groups which were originally intended to consist 
of 8 subjects. "' These two sub-groups were distinguished by the total amount of work 
(number of psychological tests) done by the participants before the experiment. Each 
group was therefore made up of two sub-groups: the sub-group of `heavy workers' who 
worked for about one hour, and the sub-group of `light workers' who worked for 
approximately 30 minutes. These two sub-groups received different amounts of money 
as a reward for their time spent on the experiment, but they were taxed at the same tax 
rate. The members of the two sub-groups (heavy or light workers) were recruited on a 
voluntary basis: in other words, they were free to choose between heavy or light work. 
We paid 60,000 Italian lire (about 27 UK pounds - 37.5 USA dollars) to the heavy 
workers, while the light workers received 30,000 Italian lire. A 40% tax rate was then 
applied to the members of both groups. The introduction of two different levels of 
income was intended as another device with which to check the presence-absence of an 
`unfair tax' incentive to tax evasion. Since the tax rate was identical for both sub- 
groups, we expected that if some form of tax unfairness incentive to tax evasion was in 
operation, it would be stronger in the low income group than in the high income group. 
It is important to stress that a parallel reason for our decision to keep the tax rate 
constant was the need to reduce the number of participants (and consequently the 
experiment's total cost), while still having a number of subjects large enough to allow 
reasonable generalisations to be drawn. 
The tax yield redistribution has been performed by using only a fraction (70%) of the 
total amount of money collected. I decided to redistribute only a part of the total yield 
for the sake of realism, that is, to simulate the burden due to administration costs. The 
money was then redistributed in identical individual parts among the members of the 
groups with redistribution. This means that if an experimental subject decided to evade, 
s/he was aware that s/he would participate, at the end of the experiment, in the share-out 
of the tax yield without having honestly contributed to building it. The fact that both 
heavy workers and light workers received an equal portion of the tax yield redistribution 
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does not modify the absolute distances between the groups; on the contrary the relative 
difference changes, but only to a quite small extent. More precisely, in experiment STI 
the relative distance between the rewards (incomes) received respectively by the light 
workers and by the heavy workers fell from 50% in the without redistribution groups to 
44% in the groups with redistribution, while in ST2 the distance between the rewards of 
the heavy and the light workers, belonging to the groups with redistribution, diminished 
to an even smaller extent to 42%. 
After the pre-experiment phase, " all the participants were called on the same day at 
the same time and were divided into the experimental groups (A, B, C, and D). Each 
group was assembled in a separate room and received a different set of written 
instructions (described in the two appendices). The steps in the procedure common to 
every group were: 
1) both the `heavy workers' sub-group and the `light workers' sub-group in each group 
were invited to enter a room containing a `polling-booth'; 
2) each room contained two boxes on which was written "more work" and "less work"; 
3) a set of envelopes for each member of the heavy work sub-group was extracted from 
the "more work" box; a similar set of envelopes for each member of the light work sub- 
group was extracted from the "less work" box ; 
4) each set of envelopes included: 
a) a white envelope containing 60,000 lire (five 10,000 lire notes, one 5,000 lire note, 
and five 1,000 lire notes) for the heavy workers group and 30,000 lire (two 10,000 lire 
notes, one 5,000 lire note and five 1,000 lire notes) for the light workers group, and two 
tickets bearing an identification number; 
b) two envelopes: the first labelled "ticket envelope", the second labelled "personal 
reward envelope", both open and joined (glued) together; 
c) an envelope labelled "tax envelope" containing a piece of paper on which was written 
the tax rate and the amount of money that the participant should pay: specifically, light 
work group 12,000 liras, heavy work group 24,000 liras; 
d) a paper clip; 
5) each participant received the experiment instructions (see Appendix); 
16 The actual number of `heavy workers' who participated in the experiment was 31; that of `light 
workers' was 29. 
"The phase in which the participants must perform the amount of work envisaged. 
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6) supplementary questions were contained in the tax envelope (see Appendix). 
Finally, to heighten the realism of the decision problem, and in order to induce the 
participants to perceive the money that they received as a true personal income, and not 
as the `prize' for a game, the experiment began with a `job' assigned to each participant, 
who was asked to participants to take a quite large and demanding set of psychological 
tests. The participants were thus introduced to the real experiment as if it was be the 
final payment stage of the whole procedure. In this way, they would not perceive the 
money received as a prize in some totally artificial game but as real earnings for work 
done. 
4.2 Analysis of results from experiment ST1 
On 30 July 1993 the experiment was performed using a sample structured thus: 
- group A (total anonymity, no redistribution of tax yield) 16 subjects; 
- group B (public audit, no redistribution of tax yield) 14 subjects; 
- group C (total anonymity, redistribution of tax yield) 15 subjects; 
- group D (public audit, redistribution of tax yield) 15 subjects. 
The number of subjects that decided to evade was 38 (63.3% of the population 
sample). Average evasion for the entire population was about 7,000 lire, while the 
average evasion for the evader sub-population was about 11,000 liras. The distribution 
of the amount of money evaded is given in figure 4.1. 
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On inspecting figure 4.1 it is interesting to note that there is a jump between the 
15,000 lire level and the 23,000-25,000 lire levels, which represent the total evasion 
level for the heavy workers group. In other words, the evasion distribution does not 
display a continuous pattern, and there seems to be some sort of threshold effect: those 
taxpayers in the heavy workers group who decided to evade more than 15,000 lire 
directly jumped to the total evasion threshold, instead of choosing an intermediate level 
of evasion. 
Most of the variables considered by the experiment are dichotomous and may at the 
same time have some form of dependence on one or more other variables. I first 
consider the role played by moral constraint simulated by the assumption of the 
redistribution of the tax yield, and by social blame simulated by the absence of 
anonymity. Preliminary analysis of the data suggests that moral cost is a real deterrent 
against tax evasion, while anonymity seems to be significant, although at a lower level 
of significance, but ill signed, as shown by Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
In the presence of a moral cost, 14 subjects (given a total of 30 subjects) decided to 
evade. In the absence of any moral constraint, 24 of them (again with a sample of 30 
subjects) evaded. Another way to state the phenomenon is as follows: 72.7% of the total 
taxpayer population were included in the moral cost group. By contrast, if we look at 
fahle 2 we find that 22 members of the non-anonymous group (which was made up of 
29 subjects) decided to evade, compared with 16 in the anonymous group (31 subjects). 
The chi-square values seem to confirm these considerations, allowing us to reject the 
9, 
3,0 7,0 110 15,0 19.0 23,0 27,0 
hypothesis of independence between the decision to evade and the moral constraint. The 
same applies to evasion and anonymity, although the value of the test (0.05) is weaker 
than it is for the former couple of variables and on the border of significance. 
Tab. 4.1 Crosstabulation Evasion X by moral cost K 
x 
by K 





aded 6 (20.0) 16 (53.3) 





Column 30 (50.0) 30 (50.0) 60 (100) total 
Chi-square - 7.17 sig. 0.007 
Tab. 4.2 Gosstabulation Evasion X by anonymity S 
a 
by S non anony 
mous 
anonymous 
raded 7 (24.1) 15 (48.3) 
d 22 (73.3) 16 (51.6) 
Row 
total 




COIF 29 (48.3) 31(51.7) 60 (100) total 
Chi-square - 3.79 sig. 0.05 
From this preliminary analysis it therefore seems that anonymity was not perceived 
by the subjects as a deterrent against fiscal evasion, " while the moral constraint worked 
as a rather powerful disincentive. The problem is now is to devise a better test of the 
validity of this consideration, controlling that the dependence between these two 
variables is a `clean'- phenomenon, and not a spurious one induced by one (or more) 
other variables. Before addressing this problem, which is of central importance for all 
further analysis of the data, it is advisable to give some more results. 
" The perverse sign of the artificial variable `anonymity', which is confirmed by the result of multiple 
analysis, suggests that students are not particularly worried by the prospect of being detected as evaders 
by teachers and colleagues. They instead feel the incentive to evade as a proof of courage. 
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A second interesting issue to explore is the following: is it the expected probability of 
being audited or is it the income level that influences the decision to evade? In this case 
too, I shall use a simple cross-tabulation to examine these matters. 
Tab. 4.3 Crosstab. Evasion X by expected audit probability 
x 
by i prob. < 0.2 prob. > 0.2 
< 0.5 
prob. > 0.5 
aded 10 (47.6) 8 (25.8) 4 (50.0) 
d 11(63.2) 23 (74.2) 4 (50.0) 
Row 
total 




COIF 21(35.0) 31(51.7) 8 (13.3) 60 (100) total 
Chi-square-3.27 sig. 0.194 
The expected audit probability has been transformed from the 1-7 scale to a 0-1 
traditional scale, and the continuous variable thus obtained has been converted into a 
three-level variable (expected probability lower than or equal to 0.2; expected 
probability, between 0.21 and 0.5; expected probability greater than 0.51)". 
It is rather difficult to interpret the results set out in Table 4.3 because the subjects' 
behaviour tends to change in a quite curious manner: the propensity to evade seems to 
be similar for those subjects belonging to the two extreme levels (low expected 
probability and high expected probability), while it rises quite dramatically for subjects 
who believed that they had a moderate probability of being audited. Table 3 has 11 
evaders out of a total of 21 subjects for the low probability level, while the 8 subjects at 
the high probability level are exactly divided between evaders and honest taxpayers. 
A similar result is also shown by the graph in figure 4.2 which plots the expected 
probability of being investigated (drawn as an area) and the amount of money evaded by 
subjects. 
" Obviously, the possible number of levels and kinds of interval for the conversion of expected audit 
probability into a discrete variable can be various. In fact, I have also tried a second transformation that 
keeps the number of subjects included in each level constant. Since the results are not significantly 
different, they are omitted for reasons of space: the interested reader is referred to the working paper 
version of this article. 
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The numeric values of the"value" axis are referred to money evaded 
Figure 4.1 confirms the phenomenon just observed in Table 4.3. One notes, in fact, 
that the amount of money evaded does not seem strictly related to subjective forecasts of 
being investigated. Note in particular that six subjects in the heavy workers group 
decided to evade the entire amount of tax due, and that four of them are divided between 
the lower part (two of them forecast a probability lower than 0.14) and the higher part 
(two of them believed that the risk of being investigated had a probability higher than 
0.42) of the expected probability distribution. An even better picture of this 
phenomenon can be obtained if we plot (Fig. 4.3) the expected value from evasion 
computed using the expected audit probability declared by the participants that decided 
to evade. 
Of, 
Fig. 4.3 Value expected from evasion 








- Value exp. from eva! 
Sure reward 
The interesting phenomenon exhibited by fig. 4.3 is that all the evaders decided to 
evade even if their expected probability of being audited - obviously combined with the 
penalty - gave an expected value from evasion that was always lower than that offered 
by the sure choice - that is, the net reward after taxation. One can envisage three main 
explanations for this phenomenon: 
a) the subjects completely ignored any criteria when computing the expected value; 
b) all of these subjects were risk-takers, i. e. they took pleasure from making the risky 
choice; 
c) some 'psychological' factor and/or the mental process followed to compute the 
expected audit probability induced the STI subjects to make an apparently bad 
choice. 
Obviously, these three explanations can be combined, since they arc not necessarily 
antagonistic. 
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37 11 15 19 38 42 46 50 
Unfortunately, the experiment gives little insight into the predominance of one 
explanation over the others; but the applied psychology literature provides a great deal 
of evidence that the behaviour observed is not uncommon. 
Explanation a) seems rather weak. All the subjects were second- or third-year 
students from the Faculty of Economics and therefore had already attended courses on 
statistics and on microeconomics. Explanation b) cannot be tested because no 
information was forthcoming about the individual generic attitude of the subjects 
towards risky choices. Finally, explanation c) is the most interesting because it provides 
an opportunity to discuss a wide range of considerations which will be also analysed in 
the following sections using the data obtained from the dynamic experiments. 
It should also be noted that these results do not seem easily reconcilable with the 
theoretical apparatus. This suggests that the expected probability of being audited is a 
`poor' variable in influencing the decision to evade and the amount of money evaded (as 
also confirmed by the bad values of Chi-square test in table 3). Two remarks are in 
order. First, the variable that most strongly influences the decision to evade is risk 
aversion, and not expected audit probability. This means that it is perfectly rational to 
evade if the agent has a high expected audit probability but a low risk aversion - that is, 
if s/he is a risk taker. 
On the other hand, it is interesting that there is a certain degree of similarity between 
my result concerning expected probability and the result of the survey conducted by the 
Italian Exchequer, which was used to design the experiment. 20 The results concerning 
expected audit probabilities reported by Exchequer's survey (the question was: "What, 
according to you, is the probability that you will be audited by the tax inspectors? ) are 
the following: 
less than 1% = 36.8 
between I% and 10% = 22% 
between 11% and 30% =18.2% 
between 31 % and 50% = 11.8% 
between 51 % and 80% = 5.5% 
20 In the Italian Exchequer' survey the question to answer was: "which do you believe is the probability 
that you will be audited by the fiscal police? " 
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more than 80% =4.5% 
missing = 1.3% 
If we add the percentages of respondents who believed that they had less than a 30% 
chance of being audited, we obtain a total of 77% of respondents. Going back to the 
results from STl we discover that 66.6% of the sample was made up of subjects who 
had an expected audit probability lower than 31%. Therefore, the beliefs of the two 
samples are broadly similar, and this is particularly true of subsets with between 1% and 
30% expected audit probability. These subsets have a cumulative percentage of 40.2% 
for the Ministry's sample and of 50% for my sample, while the other subgroups show 
very different cumulative percentages. " The Italian Exchequer's data therefore seems to 
show that my subjects' beliefs sufficiently approximated some sort of `common sense' 
or `collective realistic' forecast of expected audit probability as believed by the sample 
of citizens analysed by the Italian Government. 
Turning to income level, it should be borne in mind that only two income levels were 
planned. Consequently, in this case too, a 2x2 cross-tabulation can be used, as in Table 
4.4. 
From analysis of Table 4.4 it seems that there is a quite close relationship between 
income and tax evasion: richer subjects tend to evade more than poorer ones do. More 
precisely the "heavy workers" subgroup has a 77% tax evasion rate while only 48% of 
"light workers" have decided to evade. 
From the experimental design we know that the definition of moral constraint rests 
on the assumption that subjects perceive the (partial) redistribution of the tax yield 
among participants as a fairness device. More precisely, we assume that participants 
dislike the idea that someone may suffer because of the reduction in total yield due to 
their decision to evade. 
21 The lower than 1% subset accounted for 36.8% of the Exchequer's interviewees compared with 10% of 
mine sample; the greater than 31% subset includes 21.8% of the Ministry's sample, while in my case 
subjects included in that subset represent 33.3% of the entire sample. 
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Tab. 4.4 Crosstabulation Evasion X by income levels Y 
A 
by Y 






aded 15 (51.7) 7 (22.6) 
d 14 (48.3) 24 (77.4) 





Chi-square - 5.48 sig. 0.019 
The problem is that another effect produced by redistribution is an increase in total 
legitimate income, so that this change may be directly interpreted by subjects as an 
income component, and not as a separate factor. This suspicion is reinforced by the fact 
that redistribution can be seen as a sort of public good financed out of the tax yield. As 
we have seen from the literature review, the provision of public goods can have a 
negative effect on evasion when the size of the community is not too large. ' This means 
that once we assume that the number of tax payers is infinitely large, the provision of 
public goods does not change the level of evasion. On the contrary, if the size of the 
community is relatively small, taxpayers believe that evasion will decrease her/his 
consumption level of public goods. 
One way to address this problem is to produce a further 2x2 cross-tabulation between 
the decision to evade and the level of income, splitting the sample into two subsets: 
respectively with or without moral constraint. The results are given in Tables 4.5 and 
4.6. The most important result shown by these tables is the inversion of light worker 
(poor people) subgroup percentages. In the absence of moral constraint the majority 
u If we suppose that there is a single homogeneous public good, the utility function is: U{C, G}; where G 





where 4(n) is the cost to the government of enforcing the probability of detection 
a, and y1(n) is the constant marginal rate of transformation of the private consumption good into the 
public good. y(n) is a non decreasing function of n and satisfies the following conditions (Cowell, 1990): 
t< yr(n) s n, lim_ t/ Y(n) = 0, lim.. VI(n) /n=; > 0. The extreme value 4y(n) =n corresponds to the case of 
completely rival goods and y(n) =I corresponds to the case of absolutely non-rival goods. For the sake 
of simplicity, I shall further assume that all taxpayers are identical and that people are not satiated with 
public goods. Given these assumptions it is easy to show that the optimal value of evasion is now: 
(1-a)Uý. {Cs} -iP(k)UU{Ca} 
- 
U" 
iiP'()L)UU. (Ca) aP'()L)UU. (Ca} 
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(66.7%) of light workers decided to evade, whereas in the presence of moral constraint 
the evaders dropped to only 28.6% of the total subset. Also heavy workers tend to evade 
more in the absence of moral constraints but the majority of this subgroup is always 
clearly made up by evaders. On the other hand, it should be stressed that in the absence 
of moral constraint only one subject in the heavy workers sub-group refused to evade, 
while in the presence of moral constraint six members of this group decided to pay all 
their taxes. Supposing that subjects perceived what we consider to be a moral constraint 
only as an increase in their expected legal income, or as an increase in their level of 
consumption of the redistribution-public good, the results seem point to the conclusion 
that if the amount of legally-earned money is increased, people tend to reduce their 
propensity to evade. 
Tab. 4.5 Crosstabulation Evasion X by income levels Y 
controlle d by K -1 moral constraint 
x 




aded 10 (71.4) 6 (37.5) 
d 4 (28.6) 10 (62.5) 
Row 
total 
has not el 
has evadh 
Chi-square - 3.45 sig. 0.063 
COIF 14 (46.7) 16 (53.3) 30 (100) total 
16 (53.3) 
14 (46.7) 
Tab. 4.6 Crosstabulation Evasion X by income levels Y 
controlled by K-0 moral constraint 
A 




aded 5 (33.3) 1(6.7) 







COIF 15 (50.0) 15 (50.0) 30 (100) total 




The problem is that this phenomenon conflicts with the fact that rich subjects always 
have an higher evasion rate than poor ones. Furthermore, poor subjects tend to raise 
their evasion rate proportionally more than rich ones do when the moral constraint is 
removed. 
Summarising, there is no strong argument to conclude that the tax yield redistribution 
was perceived only as an income effect or was correctly (from the point of view of our 
assumptions) interpreted by subjects. More careful analysis is required of the data, 
therefore, and probably more information is also required - that is, a more complex 






4.3 Multiple analysis (experiment ST1) 
In previous sections I performed simple two dimensions analysis to investigate the 
possible relationships between the variables. A further step in the statistical analysis is 
to try to verify if there is some form of multiple relationship among the variables 
considered by the experiment. 
In this specific case, we can imagine a quite complex interaction among the 
variables. Recalling our hypotheses, we should investigate the existence of some form 
of multiple relationship between the decision to evade, the amount of money evaded and 
the following variables: 
a) the income level; 
b) the moral constraint (yield redistribution); 
c) anonymity; 
d) expected probability of being audited; 
e) expected rate of evasion; 
f) resentment at someone else's evasion. 
I shall begin investigation of these relationships by ignoring the amount of money 
evaded. In other words, I shall imagine that the decision to evade is some sort of Iwo- 
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step process: first the subject decides whether to evade or to pay and then decides the 
amount of money to evade. Our task is therefore to estimate a model with a dichotic 
rather than a continuous dependent. As is well known, one of the most widely used 
statistical techniques in these cases is logistic regression analysis, 23 which was used to 
estimate the following model: 
X=f( 7i, K, S, Y, `', µ) 
where: 
%= evasion (binary variable); 
7i = expected audit probability (continuous variable); 
K= moral constraint (binary variable); 
S= anonymity (binary variable); 
Y= income level (binary variable); 
lP = disappointment at knowing that someone has evaded (continuous variable); 
µ= expected rate of evaders (continuous variable). 
[4. l] 
The assumptions for the model are basically the same as those discussed in previous 
sections. However, brief comment is required to justify the inclusion in the model of '' 
and µ. Both these two variables are expected to be proxies of the perceived social 
attitude towards evasion that, as seen in the theoretical analysis, should play an 
important role in the decision to evade. More precisely, strong resentment at the 
knowledge that someone has evaded should be a proxy for a very strong moral attitude, 
while a high expected rate of evasion should go in the opposite direction, signalling the 
belief that the prevailing social attitude is in favour of evasion. 
These are the results obtained by the logistic regression: 
2' As well known (Amemiya, 1985) the logistic regression analysis or logic model is defined by P(y1= 1) 
= F(x'1ßa), with i =1,2, ..., n where (y1) is aa set of dichotomous 
independent variables, ßp is a vector of 
unknown constants and F is a known function. In logit models F(x) is equal to X(x) _ +e+ , which 
is a 
distribution function similar to the normal distribution but characterised by a much simpler form. 
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-2 Log Likelihood 53.542 
Goodness of Fit 53.787 









6 (df) 0.0003 (signific. ) 
B S. E. Wald df Sig Exp(B) 
1.7981 2.0168 0.7948 1 0.3726 6.0381 
1.8000 1.4227 1.6006 1 0.2058 6.0496 
-2.0500 1.1806 3.0153 1 
-1.4477 0.8030 3.2501 1 
-1.4896 0.7385 4.0682 1 
1.6300 0.7423 4.8222 1 






The model has an 80% overall percentage of correct prediction: more specifically, 
63.64% of the non-evasion cases observed were correctly foreseen by the model, and 
89.47% of the observed evaders were correctly predicted. 
To evaluate the statistical significance of the explicative variables I used the Wald 
statistics, that are computed as the square of the norma "t statistics" and are therefore 
asymptotically distributed as chi square with one degree of freedom". Looking to the 
values of Wald statistics we can see that only the coefficients for Y and S seem to be 
significantly different from 0 using a significance level of 0.05. The coefficients for K 
and T are on the border of significance, while n and µ should be removed from the 
model. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the signs of the parameters are all coherent with our 
assumptions. 
If if and µ are excluded from the model, we obtain the following results: 
-2 Log Likelihood 56.196 
Goodness of Fit 52.629 
Model Chi-Square 22.662 4 (df) 0.0001 (signific. ) 
Z' For more information on Wald statistics (Wald, 1943) see Amemiya (1985) p. 142. A weakenss of this 








S. E. Wald df 
1.0206 2.6359 1 
0.7477 6.1632 1 
0.7029 4.2977 1 
0.7222 5.8048 1 







The overall percentage of correct prediction of the model has fallen to 75%, and the 
Wald statistics signal that `Y should be removed by the model. It therefore seems 
advisable to test a further model by including only S, K and Y. 
These are the new results: 
-2 Log Likelihood 58,927 
Goodness of Fit 54,332 






S. E. Wald df 
0.7117 8.3007 1 
0.6863 4.5999 1 
0.6932 6.6162 1 







0.0002 (signific. ) 
The overall percentage of correct prediction of this new model is 73.33%. The 
likelihood ratio has increased, and the Wald statistics suggest that K is the most 
explanatory of the three variables included in the model, followed by Y, while the 
weakest variable is S. The good performance of this reduced model therefore seems to 
confirm the importance of the moral constraints introduced in the experiment, and the 
comparatively weaker role played by the extra-experimental moral factors monitored by 
means of the questionnaire. 
Regardless of this conclusion, it is interesting to test a diametrically different model 
which includes only the extra-experimental moral variables together with Y. 
105 
The results are as follows: 
-2 Log Likelihood 




17.635 3 (df) 0.0005 (signific. ) 
Variable B S. E. Wald df Sig Exp(B) 
2.7530 1.2732 4.6753 1 0.0306 5.6893 
T -2.0797 0.9585 4.7077 1 0.0300 0.1250 
Y 1.3831 0.6451 4.5967 1 0.0320 3.9871 
Constant -0.3122 0.7747 0.1624 1 0.6870 
The overall percentage of correct prediction for this model is 78%. The value of the 
model chi-square test allows rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the 
exogenous variables (excluded the constant) are 0. The Wald statistics for all the 
variables included are reasonably good, and finally all the signs of the coefficient 
confirm our theoretical premises. From these results, and assuming that T and µ are 
true proxies for the perceived social attitude toward evasion, we may conclude that each 
individual's ethical system influenced the decision to evade, as well as the artificial 
constraints introduced by the experiment. This conclusion is unsurprising because the 
design of the experiment did not enable exclusion of the effects exerted by subjective, 
psychological factors embodied in the cultural histories of our subjects. The important 
point is that both lY and it can be interpreted as alternatives to K and S, reinforcing the 
conclusion that the moral factors do indeed play an important role in determining the 
decision to evade. 
I also ran a traditional OLS regression using the first reduced model and replacing 
the dependent dichotomous variable with the amount of money evaded. The OLS results 
- reported in appendix A3 (section 6.3) - show that this model has rather weak 
explanatory power. Nevertheless, the starting hypotheses and the results just obtained 
using the logistic regressions seem broadly confirmed, although in this case it is K 
rather than IF which plays the leading role as a deterrent against evasion. Finally, it is 
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worth pointing out that the third reduced model used in the logistic regressions - that is, 
EVAS = f(µ , `Y, Y) - yields worst results if compared with the 
former one. 25 
4.4 The implications of ST1 
The results obtained by experiment STI seemingly confirm most of the initial 
theoretical hypotheses and reveal one major unexpected phenomenon. More precisely, 
the two variables analysis showed that only one of the two moral constraints considered 
influenced the behaviour of our subjects and that the amount of the reward given was 
the more influential factor. This conclusion is in part weakened by the multivariate 
analysis, which suggested that the moral constraint (the redistribution of the tax yield) 
was less important than other cultural factors not directly checkable by the experiment. 
The most important of the unforeseen results is fact that, more than the artificial moral 
constraints introduced by the experiment, it was some sort of natural, cultural constraint 
which operated as a deterrent against evasion. 
A final consideration concerns the static nature of this experiment, which is a serious 
limitation on the context examined. The decision to evade is in fact a typically dynamic 
phenomenon, because taxes must be paid every year and because audits are generally 
conducted on several tax declarations. It should be therefore of great interest to conduct 
a similar experiment but in repetitive form. 
4.5 The design of the experiment ST2 
The design of the ST2 experiment is identical to that used in ST 1, with two important 
changes: 
1) in the STI experiment the subjects did not know the probability of audit, while in 
ST2 this information was given to the subjects; 
Zs The R2 descends to 0.34, the EXPEVAS variable is not significant, and REGRET is on the border of 
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2) in the STl experiment the subjects did not know that the tax rate was the same for 
every participant, while in ST2 the subjects knew that they were being treated equally - 
that is, they would all be taxed at the same tax rate. 
Another difference between the two experiments concerns the questionnaire, which 
was enlarged in ST2 to include a new set of questions (see Appendix). 
The ST2 experiment had two aims: the first was to check the role played by 
uncertainty about tax audit probability; the second was to verify the effects of 
uncertainty with regard to the level of the tax rate applied to the other participants. In 
the former case the intention was to overcome the difficulties encountered in the ST1 
experiment to explain the role played by the expected probability of being audited. 
Similarly, also the second theme - namely the role played by, the perceived fairness of 
the tax rate investigated - was prompted by the STI experiment. In the STI experiment 
the participants were unaware of the tax rate applied to the other players and might 
therefore have thought that they were being unfairly discriminated against. This doubt 
was reinforced by the quite high tax rate adopted in STI, which may have induced the 
subjects to suspect that they were being harshly taxed without any equity guarantee 
concerning the treatment of the other participants. 
It was decided to repeat the STI experiment in Milan because of the availability of 
financial support from the Catholic University in that city. The objection that distortions 
may have been produced by conducting the experiments in two different cities and 
universities is unfounded. The participants in both experiments came from almost 
identical socio-economic backgrounds: they belonged to middle-class families, they 
were second- and third-year university students, and they were resident in Northern 
Italy. 
4.6 The analysis of results of ST2: a first overview 
The ST2 experiment was performed using a sample consisting 64 students from the 
faculties of economics and law and structured as follows: 
acceptability. 
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- group A (total anonymity, no redistribution of tax yield) 16 subjects; 
- group B (public audit, no redistribution of tax yield) 16 subjects; 
- group C (total anonymity, redistribution of tax yield) 16 subjects; 
- group D (public audit, redistribution of tax yield) 16 subjects. 
As in the STI experiment, the members of each group were divided into two sub- 
groups: the so-called heavy workers group and the light workers group, each made up of 
8 subjects. Again following in the ST1 design, the members of these two sub-groups 
received different amounts of money as rewards for the differing amounts of time that 
they had spent on the experiment. 
The total number of evaders in ST2 was 18, and the distribution of the amount of 
money evaded is shown in fig. 4.4. The figure highlights that also in ST2, as previously 
noted in ST1, there is some sort of jump from the 13,000-15,000 lire level to the total 
evasion level, which is 24,000 lire for members of the heavy workers group. In this 
sample too, therefore, it is possible to discern the same threshold effect as observed in 
the STI experiment. However, the 15,000 to 24,000 lire level is not the only threshold 
in the ST2 sample, as it was in the ST1 sample, because there was also a second 
threshold between 7,000 and 13,000-15,000 lire. Obviously, there is no reason to 
suppose that the amount of money evaded by participants should approximate a normal 
distribution. Hence the existence of jumps need not be interpreted as something 
necessarily unusual. However, the presence of thresholds may signal that the decision to 
evade - at least within this experimental context - has been taken as if it were based on a 
discrete set of amounts of money. 
S 
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Fig 4.1 Tax evasion histop-m (S'1'2) 
(11) 
4 
k-v. Sttuid =7396.34 
Lelia =10333.3 
-18.00 
Analysis of the effects exerted by the first moral constraint considered by the 
experiment - namely the `moral cost' represented by the redistribution of the tax yield - 
is assisted by Table 4.7, which gives the cross-tabulation between evasion and the 
presence-absence of redistribution. The most important information yielded by Table 
4.7 is the equal distribution of evaders between the groups with and without the moral 
constraint. This finding refutes one of the central theoretical assumptions of the original 
model, and it is in open contrast with the results from STI. These considerations are 
crucial, and for this reason they will be discussed after this first overview of the results. 
Tab. 4.1 Crosstabulation Evasion x by moral cost K 
A 
by KI non moral I moral cost I 
Row 
total 
has not evaded 1 23 (71 9) 1 23 (71.9) 1 46(71.9) 
has evaded 
lI9 
(28 1) I9 (28 1) I 18 (28 1) 
total 
i 32 (500) 32 (50.0) 64 (100) 
total 




ided 23(71 9) 23 (71.9) 
1 9 (28 1) 9 (28 1) 
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Again following the ST1 experimental design, the second constraint considered was 
the presence-absence of anonymity. In this case too, the results are set out in a cross- 
tabulation table (Table 4.8), analysis of which shows that, in this case, unlike the moral 
constraint, the anonymity constraint seems to have had little effect on the decision to 
evade. Only 7 members of the non-anonymous groups decided to evade, in fact, 
compared with the 11 members of the anonymous groups. However, it should be 
pointed out that the statistical significance of these difference is on the border of 
acceptability, as shown by the modest value of the chi-square test. Once again, I shall 
comment on this result in the following section. 
Tab. !. t A osstabulation Evasion 7l by anonymity S 
I 
by S non anony 
mous 
anonymous 
ded 2S(78.1) 21(65.6) 
7 (21.9) 11(34.4) 
Row 
total 




32 (50.0) 32 (50.0) 64 (100) total 
Cii-square = 3.79 sig. 0.0S 
46 (71.9) 
1e (28.1) 
The third important factor included in the experimental design was income level. 
Table 4.9 shows that the evaders belonging to the light workers groups were slightly 
larger in number than those belonging to the heavy workers group. Note that here the 
statistical significance of the relationship between the two variables considered is even 
weaker than it was in the case of anonymity and evasion: It also interesting that once 
again the results from the ST2 sample are different from those observed in ST I. 
Tab. 4. C osstabulahon Evasion I by income levels Y 
I 
by Y 






ied 22 (68.8) 24 (75.0) 
10 (31.3) 8(25.0) 






Chi-square=5.48 sig. 0.019 
4.7 Comparing the results of ST2 with the ST1 experiment 
Summarising the results just presented and comparing them with those obtained from 
the ST1 experiment, the main findings concern: 
a) number of evaders: in the ST1 experiment there were 38 evaders out of a total of 61 
subjects, whereas in the ST2 experiment there were only 18 evaders out of a total of 64 
subjects; 
b) "moral" constraint (redistribution of the tax yield) effect: in the ST2 experiment this 
constraint had no influence at all on the subjects' behaviour - the 18 evaders were 
exactly divided between the groups with and without redistribution of the tax yield - 
while in the ST1 experiment redistribution of the tax yield led to a marked reduction in 
tax evasion; 
c) anonymity effect: whereas in the STI experiment this constraint did not have any 
strong effect on the subjects' behaviour, in the ST2 experiment it apparently exerted 
some influence, because the number of evaders was slightly higher in the anonymous 
groups (11 subjects) than in the non-anonymous ones (7 subjects). 
The findings from the ST2 experiment, as anticipated in the previous section, seem 
somewhat discouraging vis-a-vis the theoretical premises. Nevertheless, they can be 
usefully interpreted if we consider the two differences introduced into the ST2 
experiment, namely removal of uncertainty about a) the audit probability and b) the 
112 
other participants' tax rate. Both points a) and b) are important for explanation of the 
differing results obtained from the two experiments. I shall begin with the first 
difference - that is, the higher rate of evaders in STI. 
From a neo-classical theory perspective, deciding to evade, when knowing the 
objective probability of being audited, or when adopting a subjective forecast of such a 
probability, should induce the same decision-taker to make different choices only if 
these probability measures - the objective one and the subjective one - differ. Likewise, 
and this time from a probability theory perspective, two random samples extracted from 
the same population of decision-takers should display the same frequency distribution of 
the attitude towards risky choices. Assuming that the samples are from the same 
population -a reasonable assumption given the selection criteria used - this means that 
we should expect an increase in audit probability - whether subjectively or objectively 
measured - to produce a reduction in the number of evaders. This is wholly contradicted 
by the results from the two experiments: in ST1 the average expected audit probability 
was 28%, 9 points higher than the declared audit probability used in ST2, where there 
were about 80% fewer evaders than in ST1. 
This result seems to signal the important role played in the decisional budget by 
direct information - "three people from your group of 16 will be audited" - instead of a 
generic signal - "some of you may, or may not be audited". The validity of this 
interpretation is further reinforced by the apparently irrational behaviour of the ST1 
subjects in their subjective forecasting of the audit probability. One of the difficulties 
arising in the analysis of the results from the STI experiment was, in fact, the frequent 
absence of any apparently rational relationship between the decision to evade (and the 
amount of money evaded) and the expected subjective audit probability declared by the 
subjects during the experiment. In the ST1 experiment, ignorance of the real risk run 
seems therefore induced the `dangerous' decision to evade. Obviously, this statement 
requires confirmation, and it cannot be taken as constituting a definitive result. 
Equal to, if not more important than, audit probability is the knowledge of the rules 
used by the researchers to decide the tax rate level. Each individual subject in STl may 
have thought that s/he was being unfairly taxed - remember the very high tax rate 
adopted in the experiment (40%) - while her/his experimental fellows were subject to 
lighter fiscal pressure. This belief can act as a powerful incentive for fiscal evasion, and 
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the suspicion that many of the STI subjects regarded the 40% rate as unfair fiscal 
pressure is confirmed by comparison between fig. 4.4 and fig. 4.1, which reveals that in 
STI there was a much larger number of evaders who decided to evade small `symbolic' 
amounts of money (44% of evaders evaded less than 9,000 lire, which is slightly more 
than 3 V2 pounds, and there is also the extreme case of a subject who decided to evade 
only 2000 lire - about 80 pence) than in ST2. This explanation of the different evasion 
rates in the two samples seems to be supported by the different behaviour of the `rich' 
subjects in ST1 and ST2. 
In STI. the percentage of evaders belonging to the heavy workers group was higher 
(77%) than the percentage of evaders belonging to the light workers group (48%). By 
contrast, in ST2 the percentage of evaders belonging to the rich group was lower (25%) 
than that of the evaders belonging to the other group (31%). Now, imagine being a poor- 
light worker player in the STI experiment. In that context you will not know the tax rate 
used by the researchers to tax your richer fellows. It is therefore reasonable for you to 
suppose that they are being taxed at an even harsher tax rate, according to a generic 
equity criterion such as the one applied in the real world. In this case you may therefore 
believe that the high tax rate is not a problem of individual discrimination against you, 
but a more general one common to all the participants in the experiment. Conversely, in 
the ST2 experiment environment you will be perfectly aware that the rich players are 
subject to the same tax rate as you are. You may therefore interpret this decision by the 
researchers as unfair with respect to a common-sense idea of fiscal equity. It follows, as 
seemingly demonstrated by the results, that it is reasonable to expect an higher 
percentage of evaders among the poor subjects in ST2, and the opposite in ST1. 
On the other hand, we may suppose that the subjects evaluated the degree of fairness 
of the tax rate used in the experiment on the basis of their experience of the real world. 
In this case, the subjects should compare what they believe to be the prevailing tax rate 
in society with the tax rate applied in the experiment. Unfortunately, this information 
was known only for the ST2 sample, because in STI the subjects were not asked about 
this point. In ST2 the question was: "In your opinion, what is the prevailing average tax 
rate in Italy? ". The structure of the replies is shown in fig. 4.5, from which we learn that 
in ST2 48.6% of the respondents (one was absent) believed that the average tax rate in 
Italy was equal to or higher than the rate adopted in the experiment. This percentage 
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rises to 51.7% if also include those who believed that the average Italian tax rate was 
39% of income. This result therefore seems to show that in ST2 there was a prevailing 
belief that the researchers had adopted some sort of realistic criteria in determining the 
tax rate. Obviously, this consideration goes some way towards explaining the relatively 
1()%% rate of evaders in ST2. 








Much more difficult to explain is the apparently total failure of the `moral' constraint 
(redistribution of the tax yield) in ST2, and the relatively stronger role played by 
anonymity. A possible explanation is provided by the results from the regression 
analysis conducted on the STI data. This revealed that, more than the arli/iciul moral 
constraints introduced in the experiment (anonymity and tax yield redistribution), what 
actually influenced the decision to evade were the subjects' personal (declared) opinions 
of the fairness of evasion as social behaviour. In other words, I discovered that the non- 
evaders in STI were those who felt some form of moral condemnation of tax evasion. 
'I he eftects of this cultural value may then have been reinforced by the experimental 
mural constraints or, in some cases, the former may even have been replaced by the 
latter. In any case, this extra-experimental moral value was one of the factors that most 
clo, elý influenced the experimental subjects' decisional balances in STI. 
Assuming the validity of this analysis, is any confirmation of its accuracy provided 
by the ST2 data' Two questions were used to measure the subjective feeling of rejection 
iii 
of evasion in both STI and ST2: "how many of the other participants do you think will 
evade taxes? " and "how much do you resent the fact that some of the other participants 
have decided to evade their taxes? ". The assumption implicit in these questions is that if 
a participant believes that only a very few people will evade, and if s/he feels strong 
resentment on discovering that many of her/his fellows have decided to evade, s/he will 
also strongly condemn tax evasion. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 respectively report the ST1 and 
ST2 distributions of T (degree of resentment), transformed from the original range 1-7 
to a 1-10 range, and of µ (expected rate of evaders). It is immediately clear from both 
these figures that the degree of condemnation of tax evasion is definitely stronger in 
ST2 than in ST I. 
Further confirmation of this stronger moral attitude in ST2 is provided by the 
frequency distribution of both variables µ and `I', from which we find that 61% of the 
subjects in ST2 declared a value for P equal to or higher than 5 (the admitted range was 
1 to 7). In ST1 the percentage of subjects who declared that they felt resentment equal to 
or greater than 5 was only 27%, while 36.7% declared that they felt only low resentment 
(in ST2 the percentage of subjects who felt "low resentment", compared with those who 
decided to evade, was only 12.5%). Likewise, with regard to the expected rate of 
evasion, one notes that there was a lower expected rate of evaders in ST2 than in ST1: 
for example, in ST2 the cumulative percentage of subjects expecting that more than the 
30% of subjects would evade was 43%, while in STI this percentage was 53%. We may 
conclude from these results that the endogenous moral constraints against tax evasion 
were more powerful in ST2 than in ST1. 
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If this interpretation is accepted, we can straightforwardly explain both the weak 
effect produced in ST2 by the artificial moral constraint represented by the 
redistribution of the tax yield, and the comparatively (with STI results) stronger effect 
exerted by anonymity. It is clear, in fact, that in the presence of a strong moral 
endogenous attitude against tax evasion, the artificial enforcement introduced by the 
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Fig 4.6 Degree of resentrn nt ST1 and ST2 
experiment plays a very marginal role. At the same time, anonymity may be viewed as 
some sort of easy emergency escape for those who, knowing that they were among 
virtuous puritans (remember that the ST2 experiment was conducted at the Catholic 
University), nevertheless decided to evade. 
4.8 Multiple analysis (ST2) 
Better understanding of the results from the two-variables analysis performed in the 
previous section, and improved understanding of the differences between the two 
experiments, may be yielded by multivariate analysis. 
Following the analytical method already adopted when commenting on the ST1 
experiment, I estimate a slightly simplified version of the [4.1 ] model: ` 
? =f(K, S, Y, `Y, µ) [4.2] 
These are the results obtained from the logistic regression: 
-2 Log Likelihood 64.014 
Goodness of Fit 67.979 
Model Chi-Square 12.034 5 (df) 0.0343 (signific. ) 
Variable B S. E. Wald df Sig Exp(B) 
0.0299 0.0125 5.6919 1 0.0170 1.0304 
`Y -0.2544 0.1909 1.7762 1 0.1826 0.7754 
K -0.0021 0.7110 0.0000 1 0.9977 0.9979 
S 0.6462 0.6303 1.0511 1 0.3053 1.9083 
Y -0.1773 0.6235 0.0809 1 0.7761 0.8375 
Constant -1.1363 1.0441 1.1846 1 0.2764 
26 The only difference is that in this case I have excluded the expected probability of being audited from 
the model. 
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The model has a 81% overall percentage of correct prediction, but the results of Wald 
statistics signal that none of the explicatives, excepting for µ (i. e. the expected rate of 
evaders), are related to the dependent. Despite the weakness of the model, the final 
result is coherent both with the considerations that emerged from the two-variables 
analysis and with the results obtained from the ST1 experiment. In ST2, too, the most 
influential moral factor seems in fact not to have been the "artificial" constraints 
introduced in the experiment, but the "natural" ones represented by one of the proxies of 
the participants' "central values system". From this point of view the greatest difference 
with respect to the ST1 results is the weakness of P. 
Confirmation of these results can be obtained by running an OLS regression using 
the amount of money evaded as dependent and µ and P as only explicatives. These are 
the results: 
Multiple R 0.41621 
R Square 0.17323 
Standard Error 5633.12742 
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square 
Regression 2 398929673.38582 199464836.69291 
Residual 60 1903927469.47132 31732124.49119 
F= 6.28590 Signif F= . 0033 
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T 
67.456822 28.045376 0.286119 2.405 0.0193 
`1' -836.204347 383.343577 -. 259482 -2.181 0.0331 
(Constant) 4606.259689 2172.630783 2.120 0.0381 
The percentage of the dependent's variance explained by the model is very low - only 
17% - but the sign and the significance of the T statistics confirm the importance of both 
µ and T. None of the other possible explicatives, including both those considered in 
model [4.1 1 and others, such as sex and degree of knowledge of fiscal topics (binary 
variable obtained by asking the participants if they have attended a course on Public 
Finance), shows any significant relationship with the dependent. 
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5. The dynamic experiments 
The main issues that emerged from the one-shot experiments are the following: 
1. The subjects' perception of risk and their attitude towards it, as shown in fig. 4.3, can 
be explained by looking at the nature (subjective versus objective) of audit probability; 
2. The psychological frame has a significant influence on taxpayer behaviour. 
From these insights I extracted some questions that I decided to explore using a set of 
repeated choices experiments: 
QI) Does the possibility of playing more than once change the subjects' attitude towards 
risk and consequently towards fiscal evasion? 
Q2) Does the more effective of the two moral constraints introduced in the one-shot 
experiments (i. e. tax yield redistribution) play any role in a repeated choices frame? 
Q3) Can one identify some form of learning process which teaches the subjects how to 
cope with risk? 
Q4) Does the context (the simulation of a fiscal environment) have any effect on the 
subjects' behaviour? 
In order to find an answer to these questions I ran five dynamic experiments, which 
are discussed in this chapter. I start with a description of the parts of the experimental 
design that were common to all the experiments. 
5.1 The design of the dynamic experiments 
The dynamic experiments were run using a computer-aided game designed for this 
specific purpose with the help of a computer scientist from the Computable and 
Experimental Laboratory of the University of Trento. The software architecture is 
described in the appendix. Thirty subjects participated in each experiment (15 men and 
15 women, students from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Trento). All the 
experiments were of the same length (60 rounds, a duration that was communicated to 
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the subjects) and they were run by taking the variables that enter the lottery structure as 
constant. The values for the lottery were the following: 
a) income - 1000 Italian liras from round I until round 48, then 700 Italian liras; 
b) lax rate - 20% from round I until round 10, then 30% from round 1I until round 30, 
and finally 40% from round 31 until the end; 
c) lax audit probability - 6% from round I until round 21, then 10% from round 22 until 
round 40, and finally 15% from round 41 until the end (the individual probability of 
being audited was independent of the other subjects' probabilities of being audited, 
and the players were informed of this characteristic); 
d) fees - the amount of the tax evaded plus a fee equal to the tax evaded multiplied by 
4.5; the tax audit had effect over the current round and the previous three rounds. 
To approximate a real life situation more closely, I decided to extend the tax audit 
over a period of four rounds. For this reason, and as the lottery structure changed during 
the experiment, computation of the expected value from evasion was rather more 
complex than it was for the one-shot experiments. To calculate the expected values for 
the different lotteries I used a simple program produced using Mathematica° and 
reported in the appendix. The graphic result from the simulation is shown in fig. 5.1, in 
which the horizontal axis represents the tax paid and the vertical axis represents the 
expected value from evasion. Fig. 6 demonstrates that the lottery structure for the 
dynamic experiments was always unfair. As the one-shot lottery was a more than fair 
lottery, I expected the percentage of evaders in the dynamic experiments to be smaller 
than it was in the one-shot ones. Obviously this consideration was valid only for the first 
round of the game. 
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P1: income=1000; tax=20%; audit prob: 6% 
P2: income=1000; tax=30%; audit prob: 10% 
P3: income=1000; tax=40%; audit prob: 10% 
P4: income=1000; tax=40%; audit prob. =15% 
P5: income=1000/700; tax=40%; audit prob. = 15% 
P6: income=700; tax=40%; audit prob. =15% 
During the experiment the players were not allowed to communicate, and they 
received information only from the computer screen, which showed the following items 
of information: 
a) the total net income earned by the player since the beginning of the game, 
b) the gross income of the active round, 
c) the amount of taxes to pay in the active round, 
d) the number of the active round, 
e) the number of players that decided to evade in the previous round (as a percentage). 
Item e) was not information really produced during the experiment, because it was 
provided to the subjects using a pre-built data base, which was kept identical for all the 
experiments. This device was introduced in order to test the players' reactions in a 
controlled and constant environment and to allow comparisons between different 
experiments. For the same reason the subjects were divided into two groups, and they 
underwent a fiscal audit in correspondence to the same rounds (specifically rounds 13, 
31,34,48,54,58 for the first group and rounds 3,24,27,40,46,50 for the second 
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group). I decided to include information e) and f) with the aim of enhancing the 
`realism' of the experiments. 
A further information device in the experiment took the form of a snap interruption: 
the computer screen changed and a message appeared informing the subjects that the 
audit probability would change after three rounds (this item of information kept the 
subjects constantly informed about the relevant parameters of the lottery). When each 
subject had read the information on the screen and had taken her/his decision, s/he 
wrote, using the computer keyboard, the amount of money that s/he had decided to pay 
and then waited to see if s/he had been extracted for a fiscal investigation. 
As said, the dynamic experiments were designed to test some specific- hypotheses; 
this task was performed by introducing the following differences to the original design: 
DYI) was the standard experiment; 
DY2) was the same as DYI but with the introduction of the tax yield redistribution 
(which was one of the `moral' factors investigated in the one-shot experiments); 
DY3) was the same as DY2, except that the tax yield was used to finance the provision 
of a public good (the creation of a scholarship fund); 
DY4) was exactly identical to the standard experiment, except that it was designed as a 
generic gamble and every reference to the fiscal environment was eliminated (I shall call 
it the "gamble experiment" for convenience); 
DY5) was the only experiment with a different lottery structure and a different timing of 
the fiscal audits. 
I shall give more details of the structure of the experiments in the following section, 
when I discuss the results. 
5.2 The aggregate results 
This section provides a picture of the results from the dynamic experiments by means 
of graphs obtained from the subjects' aggregate behaviour for the entire duration of each 
experiment. Before starting the analysis of the graphs, it is helpful to look at the number 
of evaders computed for the first round of each experiment and at the total tax yield 
produced: 
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The first consideration that arises from Table 5.1 is that the percentages of evaders in 
the first round for all the repeated choices experiments were much higher than that 
reported in the one-shot experiment with objective audit probability (in experiment ST2 
evaders were only 28.2% of the total sample). Since the starting lottery of all the 
dynamic experiments was unfair, while the lottery in ST2 was more than fair, this result 
is once again rather difficult to explain on the basis of expected utility theory, unless we 
hypothesise that the subjects in ST2 had strong risk aversion while in all the dynamic 
experiments they were not risk averse. 
The second consideration concerns the number of evaders (or more precisely the 
number of times that someone has decided to evade during the whole experiment) and 
the total tax yield collected at the end of the experiments. The differences confirm the 
importance of the moral constraint already tested in the one-shot experiments. Both the 
experiment with tax yield redistribution (DY2) and the one with a public good financed 
from the tax yield (DY3) produced a higher tax yield than was collected in the standard 
experiment (DY1) and in the gamble experiment (DY4). Similarly, also the number of 
evaders was noticeably lower in the experiments with redistribution (499) and with a 
public good (715) than in those without any moral constraint (respectively 951 evaders 
for the standard experiment and 1012 for the gamble experiment). These results 
therefore seem to confirm the anti-evasion effect exerted by some psychological factor 
implied by the redistribution of the tax yield either in the form of money or as a public 
good. 
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The graphs from experiment DYI are reported in fig. 5.2 and 5.3, which show the 
dynamic of the subjects choices. 
Fig. 5.2 Standard experiment (DY! ) 
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Two considerations arise: the first is that it is rather difficult to interpret these choices 
in the light of traditional expected utility theory; the second is that the evolution of the 
aggregate choices is apparently unaffected by modifications to the lottery structure. If 
the usual Von Neumann Morgenstern approach is used to interpret the dynamic 
observed, a very unrealistic hypothesis must be introduced, namely that there is a large 
proportion of subjects who are risk neutral (given the different lotteries) and who 
consequently choose the amount of money to pay in each round at random. This latter 
consideration can be evaluated better by looking at two periods of the DY1 experiment, 
i. e. from round 11 to round 30 and from round 31 to round 48. During these periods all 
the influential variables of the lottery were constant, except for the audit probability, 
which changed at rounds 21 and 40. Dividing these two periods into four sub-periods: 
rounds (11-21); (22-30); (31-40); (41-48), and computing for each sub-period the 
average tax-yield per round, we obtain the following values: 
(sub-group A- rounds 11-21 - tax audit = 6%) - average tax yield per round 5,610.3 
(sub-group B- rounds 22-30 - tax audit = 10%) - average tax yield per round 6,032.2 
(sub-group C- rounds 31-40 - tax audit = 10%) - average tax yield per round 7,608.5 
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(sub-group D- rounds 41-48 - tax audit = 15%) - average tax yield per round 8,458.9 
The increase in the average tax yield from A to B is 7.5%, as opposed to an increase 
of 66% in the audit probability. The tax yield increase from C to D is 11.1% while the 
increase in the audit probability is 50%. It follows that the effects on tax evasion exerted 
by the increase in the tax audit probability are very small. 
Fig, 5.3 Standard experiment (DY1) 
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A clearer picture of the subjects' behaviours, with respect to the probability of being 
audited and fined, is given by figs. 5.4 and 5.5, which show the average expected values 
computed by using the lotteries chosen by the two sub-groups of subjects that 
participated in the standard experiment. It will be seen that the expected values for both 
the two sub-groups are always lower than the value of the corresponding sure choice 
(i. e. to pay taxes), and the amount of money evaded seemed unrelated to the trend of the 
expected values. By contrast, there is a negative correlation between the amount of 
money evaded and the value of the sure choice (the linear correlation coefficient 
between the value of the sure choice and the average tax paid by the first group of 
subjects is -0.48 and -0.36 for the second group, with a significance level of 0,000 for 
the first coefficient and 0.004 for the second). This relationship is coherent with 
expected utility theory because is rational to evade less when the value of the sure 
choice is high and more when it decreases, assuming a constant risk propensity. 
126 
147 1013161972252831 343740434649525558 
Fig 5.4 Standard Exp. (DY 1) 
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Fig 5.5 Standard Fq. (DY! ) 
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An even better picture of this phenomenon is given by table 5.2, which reports the 
average tax evaded per round and the extent to which subjects tend to increase their 
evasion when the sure choice decreases. 
On the other hand, and this time in contrast with expected utility theöry, the expected 
value from evasion is negatively correlated with the amount of tax evaded. The linear 
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correlation coefficients computed for these variables are - 0.2735 for the first group of 
subjects (with a significance level of 0.03) and - 0.2097 for the second group (with a 
significance level of 0. I). I have just said that to justify the dynamics reported by figs. 
5.2 and 5.3 from the expected utility theory perspective, we must assume that the 
subjects were choosing randomly. Now, explanation of the inverse correlation between 
tax evasion and expected value from evasion requires a different assumption: that is, we 
must hypothesise that the subjects' risk propensity changes with each round, and that it 
is negatively correlated with the expected value from evasion. I shall return to this topic 
after discussing the results from the other experiments. 
Table 5.2 Sure choice and tax evaded (exp. DY1) 
Round Avg. tax evaded (It. Liras) Sure choice (It. Liras) 
First sub-group Second sub-group 
1-10 54.93 67.36 800 
11-30 112.33 99.58 700 
31-48 152.33 115.23 600 
49-60 165.16 125.49 300 
By combining the existence of an apparently rational behaviour, based on the inverse 
relationship between the sure choice value and the amount of tax evaded, with the 
continuously changing structure of the subjects choices, we may suppose that some 
form of adaptive dynamic behaviour is taking place. It seems that the subjects ignore the 
trend of the expected value from evasion (maybe because it is too difficult to compute) 
and that they `explore' the space of their alternatives by changing their choices in each 
round. The situation is like that of someone doing a jigsaw puzzle who, when looking to 
the pieces of the puzzle on the table cannot combine them in her/his mind, and therefore 
decides to make numerous practical attempts to find the solution. 
Returning to fig. 5.2 and 5.3 and introducing the graphs obtained from experiments 
DY2, DY3 and DY4 (fig. 5.6,5.7,5.8,5.9,5.10 and 5.11), one notes another important 
aspect of the results obtained from the experiments which may in some way support this 
latter consideration. Even if the trends are highly unstable and apparently follow some 
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sort of random walk, one discerns a constancy in the rounds immediately after a fiscal 
audit, which is followed by a systematic increase in tax evasion. This increase generally 
has its lowest peak in correspondence to the round immediately after the fiscal audit, 
and sometimes lasts for more than one round. I shall call it the "bomb crater effect": the 
subjects choose to evade immediately after a fiscal audit because they think that it 
cannot happen twice in the same place (time). This effect may have some sort of echo, 
so that some subjects persist in evading for two or three rounds after the audit. It is 
important to stress that this echo effect is probably reduced (compressed in time) 
because of the particular system of fiscal audits introduced into the experiment, which 
took effect over the last three rounds before the active round (the round when the audit 
effectively took place). 
The "bomb crater effect" is influenced neither by the tax yield redistribution nor by 
the context. Hence it can be assumed to be some sort of mental representation of 
probability activated by the subjects. One can test whether experiences modifies this 
mental representation of probability by looking at the behaviour of the subjects 
belonging to the separate sub-groups of each experiment. As just said, the subjects who 
participated in experiments DYI, DY2, DY3 and DY4 were all audited simultaneously 
during two rounds sequences, i. e. sequence 1: rounds 13,31,34,48,54,58, and 
sequence 2: rounds 3,24,27,40,46,50. The main difference between the two 
sequences concerns the moment in the experiment when the first audit takes place. In 
sequence 1, the first audit comes after a quite long period of game-playing (round 13) 
while in sequence 2 it occurs at the beginning of the experiment (round 3). 
Table 5.3 shows the amount of money paid by the subjects belonging to the two 
subgroups of each experiment. One notes that being subjected to an audit at the 
beginning of the experiment produces a sort of risk aversion effect. The members of the 
first subgroups (sequence 1) always evade more, and consequently pay less, than the 
members of the second subgroups (sequence 2). The only and very interesting exception 
to this rule is experiment DY4 - that is, the experiment that was designed as a game and 
not as taking place in a real world context. I shall return to this important exception 
shortly, when I have discussed the point about learning to be risk adverse. 
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Table 5.3 Evaders and tax yields of the sub-groups 
Experiment Number of evaders total tax yield (Italian liras) 
DY1 first sub-group 502 187,201 
DY1 second sub-group 449 206,318 
DY2 first sub-group 275 236,782 
DY2 second sub-group 224 258,563 
DY3 first sub-group 436 217,763 
DY3 second sub-group 279 249,258 
DY4 first sub-group 502 197,561 
DY4 second sub-group 510 199,963 
Fig 5.6 Exp. with redistribution (DY2) 
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Fig. 5.7 Eq. with redistribution (DY2) 
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Fig 5.8 Exp. with public good (DY3) 
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Fig. 5.11 Ganüle e erimert (DY4) 
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To investigate the apparent phenomenon of learning to be risk adverse requires the 
introduction of experiment DY5, the results of which are given in figs. 5.12 and 5.13. 
Fig 5.12 Special audits exp. (DY5) 
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It is evident from figs. 5.12 and 5.13 that, in experiment DY5, the fiscal audits were 
concentrated in the second half of the experiment for the subjects belonging to the first 
group, and in the first half for the subjects belonging to the second group. The structure 
of the lottery in DY5 was kept constant for the entire experiment in order to isolate the 
effects produced only by the audit timing. The result is clear. The subjects who "learnt" 
in the first half of their experimental lives that fiscal audits are a very uncommon event 
became risk takers (the total tax yield for them was only 177,429 lire, while the total tax 
yield for the subjects belonging to the second sub-group was 227,831 lire). They had a 
strong propensity to evade taxes which persisted when they move into the second half of 
their experimental lives, when the probability of being audited increased dramatically. 
The tax yield of the first 30 rounds (88,104 lire) was only slightly lower than the tax 
yield for the following 30 rounds (89,325 lire). By contrast, the subjects in the second 
group learned that fiscal audits were very frequent and consequently also learned to be 
risk adverse, maintaining this virtuous behaviour for the entire experiment. These 
subjects paid 111,645 lire in the first 30 rounds and paradoxically even more (116,186 
lire) in the second part of the experiment, when they were never investigated. 
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Table 5.4 Evaders and tax yield experiment DY5 
Experiment N° of evaders Tax yield (It. Liras) Avg. Evasion (It. 
Liras) 
first sub-group rounds 1-60 
rounds 1-30 
rounds 31-60 
406 177,429 228 
221 88,104 212 
185 89,325 247 
255 227,831 165 
146 111,645 160 
109 116,186 173 
second sub-group rounds 1-60 
rounds 1-30 
rounds 31-60 
These results are reported in table 5.4, together with two other interesting items of 
information: the number of evaders (or, more precisely, the number of acts of tax 
evasion) and the average amount of money evaded in each tax evasion. One notes that 
the total number of evaders decreases for both the two sub-groups between the first 30 
rounds and the second half of the experiment, while the average amount of taxes evaded 
increases. This phenomenon suggests that two main forms of adaptive behaviour were 
developed by the subjects in both the experiments: the subjects who decided to adopt 
the first strategic response tried to save money by reducing evasion - that is, they 
progressively abandoned evasion and adopted predominantly honest behaviour. Those 
subjects who adopted the second strategy tried to force their luck by evading larger and 
larger amounts of money as the experiment progressed. I shall return to this topic in the 
next section, which is devoted to analysis of individual behaviours. 
I have pointed out that there was an exception to the rule that the members of the first 
subgroups always evaded more than the members the second subgroups. This exception 
was experiment DY4, where the subjects belonging to the two subgroups adopted 
almost identical behaviour, or more precisely, reversed the rule by evading more (510 
evaders) in the first sub-group and less (502 evaders) in the second sub-group. This 
phenomenon introduces one of the topics that I treated with the dynamic experiments, 
namely the role played by the experimental context. The point is this: did the subjects 
really perceive the context that we tried to reproduce (i. e. a tax payer problem) or did 
they behave as if they were playing a video game? Furthermore, it should be borne in 
mind that this suspicion is reinforced by the fact that the dynamic experiments were 
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carried out using computers. One way to investigate this issue is to compare the results 
obtained from the standard experiment with the results reported from the gamble 
experiment, because they were perfectly identical in the lottery structure. The results 
from both the experiments are plotted in fig. 5.14. 
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From a first look of the plots shown in fig. 5.14, it might seem that the behaviours of 
the subjects of the two experiments are very similar, if not identical. Nonetheless, closer 
examination of the trends reveals that the behaviours are not always as similar as it 
might appear. In fact, if we look at the first 13 rounds we find that the number of 
evaders in the standard experiment is always lower (except for round 5 and round 12 
where the number of evaders is the same for both experiments) than the number of 
evaders in the gamble experiment. This phenomenon can be evaluated better by looking 
at fig. 5.15 and fig. 5.16, which show the number of evaders respectively for the first 13 
rounds and for rounds 14-31. The subjects that participated in the standard experiment 
paid about 10% less taxes in the first 13 rounds than those who participated in the 
gamble experiment (59,705 It. Liras versus 54,140 It. Liras). By contrast, in the 
following 18 rounds the two groups of participants paid almost the same amount of 
taxes (respectively 106,395 liras were paid by the subjects of the standard experiment 
and 106,584 by the subjects of the gamble experiment). It is worth stressing that 
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carrying out a statistical test to check if the differences between the two sub-groups of 
rounds are statistically significant is vital, because the number of observations is small. 
Moreover, the parametric tests usually adopted to verify whether two samples belong to 
the same statistical population, like the t-test, requires satisfaction of the well known 
postulates about the normality of the distribution of the population from which the 
samples are extracted. One way to overcome these limitations is to use a non-parametric 
test, which gives results that are less robust if compared with those obtainable by using 
a parametric test but at the same time allows one to avoid the hypothesis on the 
distribution of the starting population. Furthermore the non-parametric tests can easily 
manage small samples. 
Running the Mann-Whitney (1947) test (also known as Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test) to verify whether the difference in the number of evaders in the first 13 rounds is 
statistically significant between the two groups of subjects, we can reject with a 0.002 
level of significance the null hypothesis that the two samples come from populations 
with the same distributions. 
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The data collected from the experiments do not give a sure answer to this 
phenomenon, but a reasonable explanation can be suggested by consideration of the role 
played by the fiscal audits (or by the corresponding "drawing" of the gamble 
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experiment). After the first 13 rounds, all the subjects in both the sub-groups of each 
experiment experienced one inspection (or drawing). The first two sub-groups at round 
13 and the second sub-groups at round 3. The interesting point is that the effect played 
by this experience seemed to modify the risk attitude only of the participants in the 
gamble experiment. In other words, it seems that at the beginning of the experiment the 
subjects of the gamble experiment were more risk-takers than the subjects of the 
standard experiment, but this attitude changed after they experienced the first fiscal 
inspection, and became almost identically distributed among the participants in both 
experiments. This change in the risk attitude of the participants in the gamble 
experiment suggests that there is some form of relationship between the different 
experimental contexts and the attitude towards risk. At the same time, the risk attitude 
seemed to be influenced in accordance with the experimental context, by the experience 
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This phenomenon is confirmed by looking at figs. 5.17 and 5.18, which show the 
trends in the number of evaders for the two sub-groups in the standard experiment and 
the gamble experiment. In the standard experiment, as well as in all the other tax 
evasion experiments, the different timing of the audit experience produced a different 
behavioural pattern within the sub-groups of each experiment. In the tax evasion 
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experiments, as will be seen shortly, those who experienced an audit within the first 
rounds tended to evade less frequently (and to a lesser amount) than those who were 
inspected later. By contrast, in the gamble experiment the subjects who evaded more 
frequently were those who belonged to the sub-group that was drawn in the first part of 
the experiment. 
In figs. 5.17 and 5.18,1 fixed an arbitrary "high" number of evaders corresponding to 
11 evaders per each round and a similarly arbitrary "low" number of evaders equal to 5 
evaders. By counting the number of rounds with a number of evaders equal to or higher 
than 11 and, symmetrically, the number of rounds with a number of evaders equal to or 
lower than 5, one sees that the behaviours of the two sub-groups in the two experiments 
are mirror-reversed. 
Fig 5.17 Nu aber of evaders exp. DY4 
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In the gamble experiment (fig. 5.17) those who experienced the first draw at round 13 
(sub-group 1) reached or exceeded the "high" arbitrary line only 4 times, while those 
who were drawn for the first time at round 3 (sub-group 2) reached or exceeded the high 
line 10 times. By contrast, in the standard experiment the subjects belonging to the first 
sub-group reached or exceeded the "high" line in 9 rounds, versus only 2 rounds for 
those in the second sub-group. Symmetrically, and always with regard to the results 
from the standard experiment, one also sees that the "low" number of evaders line is 
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more frequently reached or went down by the sub-group 2 (11 times) than by the sub- 
group 1 (4 times). Conversely, in the gamble experiment the two sub-groups reached or 
went down the "low" line the same number of times (3 times). The learning process that 
built the individual attitude towards risk was therefore apparently influenced by the 
experimental context quite markedly, and at the same time yields further evidence on 
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These considerations highlight another interesting point concerning the nature of the 
relationship that ties the risk attitude to the subjective representation of probability. In 
all the dynamic experiments the probability of being audited was a known datum, and it 
should therefore be taken as "objective" information (and this is also the reason why it 
is correct to talk of taking decisions under conditions of "risk", instead of uncertainty). 
However, it is not possible to exclude the hypothesis that the experimental subjects do 
not treat this data within the "correct" computational frame. The well known 
probabilistic paradoxes discovered by quite simple experiments (most notably the St. 
Petersburg paradox discovered by Bernoulli, the Allais paradox and the Ellsberg 
paradox), demonstrate that even when all the probabilistic properties of a decisional 
problem are perfectly known the subjects can make "errors". 
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Particularly interesting as regards the experiments discussed here is the lesson from 
the Allais paradox, which can be condensed in the following statement: human beings 
tend to over-estimate the weight of small probabilities, making mistakes in the 
computation of the expected value of a given lottery and behaving in an apparently 
irrational way or, put more precisely, violating the substitution axiom. A simple 
description of the substitution axiom is suggested by Kreps (1990, p. 75). "Suppose that 
p and q are two probability distributions such that p is preferred to q (P >- q). Suppose 
that a is a number from the open interval (0.1) and r is some other probability 
distribution. Then ap + (1 - a)r >- aq + (I - a)r. " In the experiments analysed here, and 
more generally in all experiments that obtain results similar to those of the Allais 
paradox, it seems that p and/or q are not taken by the subjects to be given distributions, 
but are "re-modelled" as subjective probability distributions. Furthermore, in the 
experiments discussed here it seems that the modelling of these subjective probability 
distributions is in some way influenced by the decisional frame, i. e. they are functions 
of some context variables. It follows that if the values of the context variables change, 
then p or q changes, or both them. 
Note that this latter consideration goes into a different direction from that taken by 
the above hypothesis that the learning process leads to becoming risk averse or risk 
taker, because it states that the lesson learnt by the subjects during the experiments has 
nothing to do with their disposition towards risk, which can be assumed to be a sort of 
"built-in" attitude, but it concerns their subjective representation of the probability of 
being audited. This representation can be imagined as a model (of functional form 
which cannot be easily deduced from the data) whose independent variables include the 
experience of being audited and the experimental context. 
The main conclusions reached by analysing the aggregate data are summarised in 
table5.5. 
Table 5.5 shows that the most robust results concern the effect of tax yield 
redistribution and of audits (what I have called "bomb crater effect"). Both these effects 
can be seen, from a normative perspective, as devices to reduce evasion. Obviously, this 
conclusion requires further analysis. 
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Table 5.5 Summary of the aggregate results from the repeated choices experiments 
Experiment Risk attitude Psychological effects 
DY I objective probability; 
unfair lottery 
DY2 objective probability; 
unfair lottery; tax yield 
redistribution 
DY3 objective probability; 
unfair lottery; public good 
1) higher number of evaders than 1) Correlation between the sure 
the one-shot experiments choice value and evasion 
2) complex dynamic of choices 2) None correlation between expected 
3) "bomb crater effect" value and evasion 
1) complex dynamic of choices 3) tax yield redistribution 
2) "bomb crater effect" reduces evasion 
1) complex dynamic of choices 
2) "bomb crater effect" 
DY4 "gamble" experiment 1) complex dynamic of choices 
2) "bomb crater effect" 
DY5 objective probability; 
unfair lottery; artificial 
audits 
5.3 The individual data 
1) complex dynamic of choices 
2) "bomb crater effect" 
the production of a public good 
reduces evasion but less than 
redistribution 
1) the gamble context increases the 
risk attitude 
2) the learning process is different if 
compared with the learning process 
carried out in the tax evasion 
context 
3) learning to be risk adverse 
The conclusions reached in the previous section signal the utility of investigating the 
individual data. Analysing individual records is a rather complex undertaking, mainly 
because a relatively large number of observations are involved (30 subjects for each of 
the 5 experiments multiplied by 60 rounds each gives a total of 9000 values for each 
variable considered by the experiment) and because the individual behaviours displayed 
marked variability. A first step in organising the data set is to build some sort of 
behaviour taxonomy. One may begin by analysing the individual graphs, looking at two 
main characteristics: the percentage of tax paid in each round and the frequency of 
evasion. The aim is to find one or more general rules of behaviour. 
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Figs. 5.19,5.20,5.21 and 5.22 show the individual trends in the tax payments by four 
subjects taken from the standard experiment (DY I) who can be assumed to be 
representative of four different "styles" of play. 
The first kind of behaviour can be called "absolute stability" and it is displayed by 
subject no. 28 (fig. 5.19), who always paid all the tax required. In the standard 
experiment only one subject decided to adopt this strategy, while in the experiment with 
tax yield redistribution (experiment DY2) 7 subjects decided to always pay the whole 
amount of tax due, which can be seen as further confirmation of the deterrent effect of 
tax yield redistribution. The second kind of behaviour is exemplified by the graph of 
subject no. 18 (fig. 5.20). It can be called "relative stability" because this subject always 
evaded but followed a variable path, i. e. s/he changed the amount of money evaded in 
every round. 
Fig 5.19 Tax Payments subject 28 










Fig. 5.20 Tax payments subject 18 
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Subjects 28 and 18 can be considered to belong to the same behavioural group, even 
though they decided on opposite strategies, because they show the same constancy in 
their attitude towards risk throughout the whole duration of the experiment. In fact, 
subject 28 is always risk averse (or risk neutral) while subject 18 is always a risk taker. 
The characteristic that prevents from placing them in a single behavioural group is the 
"oscillatory" dynamic shown by subject 18, who changes the percentage of tax paid in 
each round, which is exactly the opposite of the absolute constancy shown by subject 
28, who never changes the percentage of tax paid (always 100%). 
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Fig, 5.21 Tax payments subject 0 
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5.22 Tax payments subject 8 
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The oscillatory trend of the choices of subject 18 is similar to that followed by all the 
other subjects who took part in the standard experiment. It is exemplified by the graph 
for subject 0 (fig. 5.21). Subject 0 followed some sort of random walk dynamic, 
combined with a continuously changing attitude towards risk, whereby s/he oscillated 
between total payment and partial (or sometimes total) evasion, with a ratio that comes 
very close to a perfect 1 to 1. This behaviour, which can be called "pendulum-like" (or, 
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in other words, "once I pay once I evade") is unusual in its regularity (the almost perfect 
l to I ratio between evasion and payment) but it is very common with respect to the 
variability of the risk attitude. 
Finally, the fourth behaviour is represented by subject 8 (fig. 5.22). This can be 
called "mixed" because in the first part of his/her experimental life this subject adopted 
a strategy in some way similar to that chosen by subject 0 (a sort of "pendulum" strategy 
but with a longer interval of oscillation and a different ratio between total payment and 
evasion, something like: I pay, I evade, I evade, I evade, I pay), while in the second part 
of his/her experimental life s/he decided to always evade the whole amount of tax due. 
This definitive change in the attitude towards risk, developed during the experiment, 
was evident in no other example in any other experiment, so that subject 8 is the only 
case that shows this behaviour. 
The simple taxonomy described by using the four graphs of figs. 5.19,5.20,5.21 and 
5.22 cannot be assumed to be satisfactory, because it does not provide an unambiguous 
criterion with which to group the subjects into statistically robust categories. The only 
unambiguous group that can be built is the one represented by subject 28. Unluckily, 
however, this kind of behaviour (always pay the entire amount of tax due) is uncommon 
(only 1 subject in experiment DY1,7 subjects in experiment DY2,2 subjects in 
experiment DY3 and no subject in the gamble experiment DY4). It can therefore be 
assumed only as some sort of very particular behavioural category. Similarly, also the 
strategy adopted by subject 18 (always evade) can be be assumed to be an extreme 
behavioural category, given that almost no other subject chose this style of play (only 
subject 18 in experiment DY1, none in experiment DY2 and in experiment DY3, and 
only 1 in experiment DY4). 
I used a two-step methodology to classify the experimental subjects into 
homogeneous categories. In the first step I constructed new data-bases, one per 
experiment, which included 30 cases (each case was an individual subject), each of 
which characterised by seven variables chosen as proxies for the following attributes: 
1) NUEVA = number of tax evasions during the experiment -+ proxy for the degree of 
stability of the risk attitude; 
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2) AVEVA = average amount of money evaded during the experiment -+ proxy for the 
absolute risk propensity; 
3) SDEVA = standard deviation of tax evasion -> proxy for the degree of variability of 
the risk propensity; 
4) FINE = total amount of fines paid during the whole experiment --4 proxy for the total 
deterrent effect played by the punishment system; 
5) NANE = number of fines paid during the experiment --* proxy for the frequency of 
direct experience of the punishment system; 
6) RSQ = Regression coefficient computed by interpolating the amount of money evaded 
in each round with a quadratic curve computed by using time as the only independent 
variable -4 proxy for the degree of similarity of the individual tax payment trend 
with the best interpolating function for the whole population; 
i) Ycum = Total income cumulated at the end of the experiment --ý proxy of the degree 
of success of the game strategy chosen by the subject. 
In the second step of the procedure I ran a cluster analysis using the variables just 
listed. The broad idea followed in this analysis was that the dynamic behaviours of the 
subjects could be captured by a set of variables summarising the most important 
characteristics of the behaviours themselves. The values assumed by these variables 
should then help to group the subjects into homogenous categories of behaviour. 
Among the possible methods available to build clusters made up of homogeneous 
categories, I decided to use the average linkage between groups method (also called 
IPGMA, unweighted pair-group method using arithmetic averages) and to run the 
cluster using standardised variables. The use of standardised variables is common in 
cluster analysis, given that all cluster techniques are based on some form of comparison 
between distances, so that variables measured with large numbers influence the 
computation of distances more than do variables measured with small numbers. The 
standardisation method chosen is a technique built into the statistical package that I used 
to run the cluster analysis. It is based on a system of scores with a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1. The algorithm adopted by the software (SPSS) subtracts the 
mean from each value of the variable being standardised, and then divides by the 
standard deviation of the values. If a standard deviation is 0, all values are set to 0. 
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A common way to represent the results obtained from a cluster analysis is to plot a 
so-called dendogram. The dendogram plotted running a cluster analysis using the 
standard experiment data is reported in fig. 5.23. 
The dendogram gives a graphical representation of the links tying the groups of 
subjects constructed using the variables just described. Since the clusters move from the 
highest level of scattering to the lowest (in the end, there is only one large cluster which 
includes all the subjects), the problem is finding a good compromise between the 
number of clusters obtained (reasonably small) and the degree of similarity of the 
subjects included. One way to solve this problem is to inspect the distance that separate 
the clusters. This distance (re-scaled to fall within the range of I to 25) is measured on 
the horizontal axis and one is helped in the choice of the best number of clusters by 
seeing when it becomes fairly large. A possible level of "cutting" the clusters is 
represented by the dashed line in fig. 5.23 and corresponds to four groups of subjects 
and to four isolated cases (the subjects labelled 3,8,15 and 28) representing clusters 
consisting of only one subject. Some summarising statistics on the clusters are given in 
table 5.6, where the variables used to run the cluster analysis have been augmented by 
two new variables: NTOTEV which reckons the number of total evasions and NTOTPAY 
which sums the number of times that the subjects paid the total amount of tax due. 
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Fig. 5.23 Dendrogram Standard Experiment (DY1) 
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Table 5.6 can be used to give a definition for the four clusters with more than one 
subject. The largest is cluster 4 which collects 12 subjects displaying behaviour that 
could be called "totally evade once, then pay the entire tax one or more times". The 
variables reported in the two last columns of table 5.6 show that the average number of 
total tax evasions for cluster 4 is 19.5 while the average number of total payments (i. e. 
when the subject pays the entire tax due) is 22.16. This means that the subjects 
belonging to this cluster tend to oscillate between two opposite kinds of choice with an 
almost perfect ratio of 1: 1. The best example of this kind of behaviour is provided by 
the graph of tax payments by subject 17 (fig. 5.24), who with only three exceptions 
(rounds 17,46 and 57) always either paid the whole tax or totally evaded. 
149 
Tab. 5.6 Standard experiment (Dl'1): summary statistics for 8 clusters 
Clusters NUEVA AVGEVA SDEVA YCUM FINE NFINE RSQ NTOTEV NTOTPAY 
1% 1 can J -. 
N 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 





Mean 7,0000 305.5833 112.4000 34050.0000 4015.0000 2.1667 ---. -4T8 8 4 0000 5 
. 
0000 
N 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Std. Deviation 2.5298 14 0681 16.3561 1386.3621 1785.5951 1.1690 . 1421 2.8284 2.5298 
Mean 58 0000 168 5000 53 0100 21760 0000 33330.0000 6.0000 
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Std. Deviation 3.7859 31.7935 28.7626 2493.2626 1768.7878 . 0000 
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Mean 5 . 5000 94.5900 29185.0000 
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Std. Deviation 
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Mean . 0000 333.3300 75.1600 6400.0000 . 0000 . 0000 AM . 0000 
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Std. Deviation 
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Fig 5.24 Tax payments subject 17 (Cluster 4) 
Standard experiment (DY1) 
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The second cluster by number of members is cluster 2, which includes 6 subjects 
whose behaviour can be called "mainly pay the whole tax due and sometimes evade the 
entire tax". Again looking at table 5.6, one notes that the average number of total 
payments for subjects belonging to this cluster is 36, while the average number of total 
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evasion is 3.6. This behaviour is therefore the reverse of that chosen by the subjects 
belonging to the previous cluster (cluster 4), because these subjects show a tendency to 
adopt fundamentally stable behaviours, while those belonging to cluster 4 continuously 
oscillate between totally opposite choices. Confirmation of this profound difference is 
provided by the values of the regression coefficient, which is very low for cluster 4 (RSQ 
= 0.1) and much higher (the highest of all clusters with more than one subject) for 
cluster 2 (RSQ = 0.42). This difference in the values of RSQ is closely related to the 
different styles of game, since the quadratic curve used to interpolate the individual 
strategies of game cannot fit a continuously oscillating behaviour such as that followed 
by the subjects belonging to cluster 4. 
Although I have distinguished between oscillatory behaviour and stable behaviour it 
would be more correct to say, for the sake of precision, that both the clusters identify 
"stable" behaviours, in the sense that the subjects belonging to both these clusters never 
change their strategy of play throughout the entire duration of the experiment. The 
fundamental difference between the two clusters is therefore that members of cluster 4 
chose a pendulum behaviour, as opposed to the quasi-perfect constant behaviour 
selected by the subjects of cluster 2. As previously noted, the large majority of subjects 
choose to follow the same strategy for the whole duration of the experiment (an 
exception to this rule, already commented on, was subject 8, fig. 5.22), and it seems that 
the only learning process undergone by the subjects is represented by an increase in the 
frequency of evasions during the course of the experiment for those who experienced 
the first audit at round 13 instead of round 3. A good example of the game style chosen 
by the subjects of cluster 2 is shown by fig. 5.25. 
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Fie 5.25 Tax payments subject 1(cluster 2) 
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The other two clusters with more than one subject are cluster 1, with 5 subjects, and 
cluster 6 with 3 subjects. Cluster I collects experimental subjects whose behaviour has 
some affinity with the behaviour of the subjects of cluster 4 and which could be "once 
evade a part of the tax due, then pay the entire tax one or more times". The main 
difference with respect to cluster 4 is that the members of cluster 1 almost never evade 
the whole amount of the tax due, while the subjects in cluster 4 almost never evade less 
than the entire tax. Another difference between the two clusters is that the members of 
cluster 1 alternate payments and evasions in a ratio which weakly privileges tax 
payments compared with tax evasion (the average number of tax evasions, measured by 
variable NUEVA of table 5.6, is 24, which corresponds to 40% of the total number of 
rounds), while the subjects belonging to cluster 4 weakly prefer to evade rather than pay 
(NUEVAcomputed for cluster 4 is 37.8). An example taken from the subjects belonging 
to cluster 4 is given in fig. 5.26. 
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While cluster I can be considered a sort of subgroup of cluster 4, this is not the case 
of cluster 6, which, although very small, must be kept apart because it represents a quite 
different category of behaviour. This cluster could be labelled "mainly evade the whole 
amount of tax due or a part of it and sometimes pay". The value of NUEVA for cluster 6 
is 55.6, which means that the subjects belonging to this cluster paid, on average, the 
entire tax less than five times during their experimental lives. An example of the 
behaviour adopted by the subjects belonging to cluster 6 is shown in fig. 5.27. 
Having discussed the four clusters with more than one subject, explanation is 
required of the fact that four subjects apparently do not fit any of these four clusters. 
First of all, one should bear in mind that cluster analysis is a sort of "qualitative" 
statistical method that requires careful interpretation of the results. 
Referring once again to the dendogram reported in fig. 5.23, one notes that two of the 
isolated subjects, specifically subject 8 and subject 15, should respectively join cluster 6 
and cluster I if the rescaled distance increases from 5.5 to 8.5. Unfortunately, both these 
aggregations can be criticised, albeit for different reasons. In the case of subject 8,1 
have already pointed out that s/he displays a very special behavioural pattern, having 
adopted a sort of dichotomous strategy which split his/her experimental life into two 
separate periods. On the other hand, none of the subjects in cluster 6 ever chose to 
change his/her game style at any stage of the experiment (for the sake of precision, the 
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only subject that can be coupled with subject 8 is subject 24, who at the end of the 
experiment decided always to evade the whole tax, but s/he took this decision only after 
the 50" round, while subject 8 started this strategy at round 29, i. e. in the middle of the 
experiment). 
The difficulty of joining subject 15 to cluster 1 derives from the fact that, in spite of 
the values assumed by some of the variables used by the cluster analysis, this subject 
actually behaved in a way much more similar to that followed by the subjects belonging 
to cluster 6. Inspection of table 5.6 shows that, with the exception of NUEVA, no other 
variable of cluster 6 has values nearer to the values of subject 15 (who corresponds to 
cluster 7 in table 5.6) than to those assumed on average by the subjects belonging to 
cluster 1. Nevertheless, it is clear from the graph of tax payments by subject 15 
(reported in fig. 5.28) that his/her game style is very similar to that of the subjects in 
cluster 6 ("almost never pay; almost always evade the whole amount of tax due or a part 
of it") and quite different from that adopted by the subjects belonging to cluster 1 
("evade a part of the tax due once, then pay all the burden one or more times"). 
Fig. 527 Tax payments subject 14 (cluster 6) 












11 I Ill/1 / 11 1 il 




"/l 11 fI 11 1I , fill 1I II i 11 1 ll l1I1 11 11111 IIIIi 
II 1I 11 11 II 11 11 IIII II i 
II \ ýi 1 11 ll V 11 1j 11 N Ij 





Finally we must consider the two remaining isolated subjects, i. e. subject 3 (fig. 5.29) 
and subject 28. Subject 3 could be included in cluster 6, but this time in accordance with 
the dendogram that actually puts subject 3 very near to cluster 6, while subject 28 
154 
should be left alone because of her/his uniqueness for this experiment. In spite of the 
statistical good proximity of subject 3 with the behaviours of the subjects belonging to 
cluster 6, it is worth stressing that his/her style of game also shows a deep difference 
with the way of playing of the other subjects of cluster 6. This difference regards his/her 
tendency to adopt highly constant behaviour, while his/her cluster mates follow an 
oscillatory strategy very similar to that adopted by the majority of the experimental 
subjects of all the clusters. From an economic point of view, the behaviour of subject 3 
can be coupled with that of subject 28, i. e. of the only subject who decided to always 
pay the entire tax. The difference between these two subjects is in fact one of of 
different risk propensities, but they share a common way of interpreting the game by 
looking at the lotteries structure, which in fact does not change with each round but 
remains constant for quite long periods. 
The conclusion is that the final number of clusters can be reduced to four clusters 
with more than one subject (clusters 1,2,4,6 with the inclusion of subject 3, subject 15 
and subject 8) plus a cluster with only one subject i. e. subject 28. Finally, it is worth 
stressing that the initial taxonomy of behaviours suggested at the beginning of this 










Fig 5.28 Tax payments subject 15 (cluster 7) 
Standard experiment (DY1) 
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Fig. 5.29 Tax payments subject 3 (cluster 3) 
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One way to test the robustness of the taxonomy just constructed is to carry out a 
cluster analysis using the data from other experiments and see whether the clusters 
contain groups of behaviours similar to those obtained with the data from the standard 
experiment. Obviously, one cannot expect the result to be a perfect fitting of the original 
categories, given that cluster analysis always requires some form of interpretation, 
which inevitably requires some degree of adaptation of the original taxonomy. This also 
means that comparisons among different experiments, for example in order to compare 
the numerousness of similar clusters, requires great caution. 
The aggregate results from the experiment with tax yield redistribution (DY2) are 
those that differ most from those obtained by the standard experiment. Conversely, the 
gamble experiment produced aggregate results that were the most similar to those from 
the standard experiment. Starting from the dendogram plotted by performing a cluster 
analysis (fig. 5.30) on the gamble experiment (obviously using the same variables just 
used for the standard experiment), one immediately notices that "cutting" the 
dendogram at the same distance chosen for the dendogram plotted for the standard 
experiment yields only five clusters, instead of the eight as in the case of experiment 
DY1. To obtain the same number of clusters it is therefore necessary to reduce the 
distance between the clusters. The results for eighth clusters are given in table 5.7. 
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Fig. 5.30 Dendogram Gamble Experiment (DY4) 































By comparing table 5.7 with table 5.6, we can attempt to derive some 
correspondences among the clusters from the two experiments. Recalling the results 
obtained from the standard experiment, we have the following main categories (clusters) 
of behaviour: 
a) category 1TEI P "totally evade once, then pay the entire tax one or more times"; 
b) category MPSE "mainly pay the whole tax due and sometimes evade the entire tax"; 
c) category I EI P "evade a part of the tax due once, then pay the entire tax one or more 
times"; 
d) category MESP "mainly evade the whole amount of tax due or a part of it and 
sometimes pay"; 
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e) category AP "always pay". 
With the exception of category AP, which is a "pure" category, all the other 
categories include a moderate mix of behaviours which more or less closely 
approximate the label just suggested. This means that if a category becomes sufficiently 
differentiated, it can give rise to two or more other sub-categories, and this possibility 
increases as we expand the total number of subjects considered. For example, subject 
18, who as we saw at the beginning of this section never paid and was included in 
cluster 6, could become a member of a sub-category of category 4 (or give origin to a 
new category) if we find some other subjects who adopted his/her game style. 
By comparing the results from other experiments we do exactly as just described: we 
enlarge the number of subjects analysed and consequently we also increase the 
possibility of distinguishing among sub-categories of behaviour. By comparing the table 
5.6 with table 5.7, which reports the results from the cluster analysis run using the data 
from the gamble experiment, we can build a broad structure of correspondences between 
the clusters of these two experiments (table 5.8). 
Tab. 5.7 Gamble experiment (DY4): summary statistics for 8 clusters 
Cluster NUEVA AVGEVA SDEVA YCUM FINE NFINE RSQ NTOTEV NTOTPAY 
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, 0000 5,826E-02 6,7689 9,2824 
Mean 3,5000 220,500 129,9111 20132,5000 2 9 482 
. 
30 00 6,0000 00 -02 19,0000 6,000 
N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Std. Deviation 4,9497 28,4021 23,8600 1933,9370 229,8097 
, 0000 5,657E-03 21,2132 4,9497 
Mean 59,0000 262,4333 97,8323 141 3,0000 993,0000 6,0000 1.200E-02 13,0000 , 0000 N 1 I I 1 I 1 1 1 1 
Std. Deviation 
" 
Me" 1.666 38.3999 52,4%9 1,6667 3,6667 . 6807 
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Std. Deviation 8,5049 7,3226 5,5317 1078.1078 1448,4151 , 5774 , 1143 , 0000 8.5049 Mean 10333 124,2943 32916,6667 4 
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Std. Deviation 3,0551 14,1313 6,7977 1543,2865 2222,7985 1,1547 7,023E-02 3,2146 3,0551 
can 31,33 93,416 11 , 741 30423,8333 11579,1667 . 2703 , 666 N 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Std. Deviation 8,1158 25,5590 14,4846 1168,4409 2484,6233 , 0000 , 1318 3,8471 8,1158 
Mean 1,666 8,8778 53,1749 35466,0000 1466,666 
. 5917 1,3333 59,3333 
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Std. Deviation 1.1547 3,8298 6,1228 1172,2918 1270,1706 , 3774 4,382E-02 , 5774 1,1547 




-72-9-3-65W 6,0000 ,60 , 0000 
N 1 I 1 1 
Std. Deviation 
" , 
Total can 33,7333 , 486 113,9434 29344,9000 -14804,3000 -5.1667 . 3000 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Std. Deviation 17,3321 69,6900 36,6992 5721,7509 9693,9439 1,7633 . 2298 8.6189 17,5321 
158 
Analysing table 5.8, one finds that the original categories should be supplemented 
with at least two new categories or sub-categories of existing ones. These two new sub- 
categories are represented by cluster 6 and cluster 7 of the gamble experiment. Cluster 6 
of the gamble experiment represents a sort of mix between category 1TEIP and 
category IE1P, because the data (and individual graphs, like that of subject 10 reported 
in fig. 5.31) shows that the strategy followed by the subjects is something like " totally 
evade once, then pay the whole tax due, then evade a part of the tax, then pay the entire 
tax", and so on, following the usual quasi-cyclical path. 
Table 5.8 Correspondences among clusters: standard and gamble experiments 
Categories Standard Gamble experiment Mann-Whitney 
experiment test 
cat. 1TE1P "totally cluster 4; 12 cluster 1; 11 subjects; good 
evade once, then pay subjects cluster 6; 6 subjects (as 
the entire tax one or a mixed sub-category) 
more times" 
cat. MPSE "mainly pay cluster 2; 6 subjects cluster 5; 3 subjects; very good 
the whole tax due and cluster 7; 3 subjects (it 
sometimes evade the could become a sub- 
entire tax" category) 
cat. IE1P "evade a part cluster 1; 5 subjects cluster 4; 3 subjects good 
of the tax due once, then 
one or more times pay 
the entire tax" 
cat. MESP "mainly cluster 6; 3 subjects cluster 2; 2 subjects + good 
evade the whole amount + cluster 3; 1 cluster 3; 1 subject 
of tax due or a part of it subject + cluster 5; 
and sometimes pay" 1 subject + cluster 
7; 1 subject 
cat. AP "always pay" cluster 8; 1 subject 
On the other hand, cluster 7 of the gamble experiment, unlike cluster 6, can be 
viewed as an "extreme" sub-category of category MPSE, because the subjects belonging 
to this cluster have evaded in only one or two rounds. 
One way to verify whether the correspondences shown in table 5.8 are statistically 
significant is to compute the Mann-Whitney test, which allows one to check if the 
samples corresponding to the clusters linked in the categories of table 5.8 can be 
considered as extracted by the same statistical population. 
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Fig. 5.31 Tax payments subject 10 






























The results from the Mann-Whitney test are reported in the appendix and are 
summarised here with a qualitative judgement in the last column of table 5.8. The 
meanings of the qualitative judgements are the following: 
very good = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally 
distributed populations for 6 or more of the cluster variables; 
good = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally 
distributed populations for at least 4 of the cluster variables; 
fairly bad = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally 
distributed populations for 3 cluster variables 
bad = acceptance of the hypothesis that the samples are extracted from equally 
distributed populations for 2 or less cluster variables. 
The overall results obtained from the Mann-Whitney test are good. We may therefore 
conclude that the categories built using the findings of the cluster analysis applied to the 
standard experiment can reasonably include also the subjects belonging to the clusters of 
the gamble experiment. As we have just seen, two new sub-categories could be added to 
the original ones. But the Mann-Whitney test has been computed by aggregating the 
sub-categories, and therefore the good results refer to the original categories as if they 
included the subjects belonging to the new ones. 
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The final step in this discussion is to compare the results from the cluster analysis 
computed using the data of the experiment with tax yield redistribution (DY2) with 
those of the standard experiment. 
Fig. 5.32 Dendrogram Experiment with Redistribution (DY2) 
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 

























The cluster analysis applied to the data of the experiment with redistribution has been 
conducted using only 23 subjects, because 7 subjects of this experiment belong to the 
"pure" category AP (always pay) and can be therefore be excluded from the sample. 
Consequently, the dendogram (reported in fig. 5.32) must be split into 7 clusters. This 
yields 4 clusters with more than one subject and 3 individual clusters (subjects 0,12 and 
14 who coincide respectively with clusters 1,6 and 7), while in the standard experiment 
there were 4 individual clusters. Comparing table 5.6 with table 5.9, it is this time rather 
more difficult to find clusters from the standard experiment which look sufficiently 
similar to some cluster of the redistribution experiment for them to be joined in a 
common category. 
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Tab. 5.9 Redistribution experiment (DY2): summary statistics 
Cluster NUEVA AVGEVA SDEVA YCUM FINE NFINE RSQ NTOTEVA NTOTPAY 
Mean _5. ,. 20,0000 5. 
N 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 
Std. Deviation 
Mean 192500 61,5125 119,500 2281,0000 7809,7500 5.2500 , 2938 9,2500 40,7500 
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Std. Deviation 6,2383 25,3489 29,1018 1392,8419 2361,4431 , 5000 , 1456 4.3493 6,2383 
Mean 32,7143 112,7976 141,0000 9386,4286 3781,4286 5,7143 , 1677 12,4286 27 2857 
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Std. Deviation 5,4380 17,5609 22,3458 1294,6837 1593,6899 , 7559 , 1151 5,6526 5,4380 
4 Mean 12,8000 49,0833 108,2000 34714,0000 4631,0000 2,4000 , 3232 7,2000 47,2000 
N 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Std. Deviation 5,5857 28,6469 31,5785 1288,8726 1903,8264 . 5477 , 063E-02 6,4962 5,5857 
Mean 6,2500 7,9875 36,0000 5820,5000 1058,7500 1,7500 , 7388 , 5000 53,7500 
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Std. Deviation 3,4034 3,8745 
13 
17,0294 941,0443 1032,2578 1,2583 , 1295 , 5774 3,4034 
Mean 34,0000 181,3 3 TT 179,0000 19350,0000 8050,0000 6,0000 , 100E-02 28,0000 26,0000 
N I I I I 1 I I I 1 
Std. Deviation , , 
Mean 45,0000 126 500 125,0000 0050,0000 925,0000 6,0000 , 1800 6,0000 15, 
N I I I I I I I I I 
Std. Deviation 
7 Total can 1,6957 75,83 7 , 942,6322 38,3043 
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Std. Deviatio 12,4003 50,3078 45,8762 5115,0183 7758,2151 1,8745 , 2327 7,6678 12,4003 
Table 5.10 reports the clusters from the redistribution experiment which fit the 
original categories constructed by using the standard experiment data. The categories 
shared by both the experiments are category 1TE1P, category MPSE and category 
IEIP. Note that categories 1 TE 1P and MPSE are those with the highest number of 
members for all the three experiments, and they can therefore be considered to be the 
two dominant types of behaviour. Note also that cluster 5 from the redistribution 
experiment should be considered a sub-category of MPSE because the subjects 
belonging to this cluster mainly pay the whole amount due (as do the members of 
MPSE), but the never totally evade the whole tax, while the majority of subjects 
belonging to MPSE alternate total payments with total evasions. 
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Table 5.10 Correspondences among clusters: standard and redistribution 
experiments 
Categories Standard Redistr. experiment Mann-Whitney 
experiment test 
cat. ITEIP "totally cluster 4; 12 cluster 3; 7 subjects; good 
evade once, then pay the subjects 
entire tax one or more 
times" 
cat. MPSE "mainly pay cluster 2; 6 subjects cluster 4; 5 subjects; very good 
the whole tax due and cluster 5; 4 subjects fairly bad 
sometimes evade the 
entire tax" 
cat. 1EIP "evade a part cluster 1; 5 subjects cluster 2; 4 subjects . very good 
of the tax due once, then 
one or more times pay 
the entire tax" 
cat. MESP "mainly cluster 6; 3 subjects 
evade the whole amount + cluster 3; 1 
of tax due or a part of it subject + cluster 5; 
and sometimes pay" I subject + cluster 
7; 1 subject 
cat. AP "always pay" cluster 8; 1 subject "artificial" cluster; 7 
subjects 
In this way, 27 subjects from the redistribution experiment find systemisation, while 
3 should be organised into a new category. On the other hand, on looking at fig. 5.32 we 
discover that these 3 subjects should form a single cluster, and that they have been split 
"artificially" because the software was forced to build 7 clusters. Unfortunately, this 
eighth cluster is difficult to interpret because its 3 members display behaviours that are 
only vaguely resemble each other, and are probably close in the dendogram only 
because they are not sufficiently similar to the other subjects to be joined to some other 
cluster. In fact, if we return to table 5.9 and look at the values of some variables (e. g. 
NUEVA or AVEA), computed for subject 12, we find that this subject could be added to 
category ITE1P as its "extreme" member, while in terms of the values of other variables 
s/he is too different from the other members. On the other hand, subject 0 may represent 
a mixed category midway between the mirror-like categories MESP and MPSE, because 
s/he chose to adopt a dichotomous strategy which alternated periods (lasting aboutl0 
rounds each) of strategy MESP and of strategy MPSE. Finally, subject 14 used a double 
strategy: in the first two thirds of her/his experimental life (until round 47) s/he played 
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as if s/he belonged to category MESP but then decided to always evade the entire tax or 
a part of it. 
5.4 Some conclusions from the individual data 
Analysis of the individual data has shown even more clearly that the dynamic of the 
subjects' behaviours is almost impossible to explain using a traditional expected utility 
maximisation approach. At the same time, two interesting remarks can be made: the role 
played by the tax yield redistribution as a deterrent against tax evasion is confirmed, and 
common game styles exist. 
The existence of a limited number (about 4-5 main categories) of common game 
styles suggests that it should be possible to find some form of general rule of behaviour 
on which to base a theoretical model of individual responses to this kind of decision 
frame. It is to be stressed that the choices made by the large majority of subjects are 
stable (or in other words, can be considered as a dynamic equilibrium), and that only 
very few subjects (for example, subject 8 in the standard experiment) changed game 
style during the experiment. Furthermore, the largest category for all the three 
experiments analysed is the one with the most cyclical dynamic, i. e. ITEIP, and this 
suggests that when subjects must cope with a situation of repeated choices under risk, 
they find it very difficult to understand the probabilistic nature of the problem correctly. 
They therefore choose to alternate opposite choices (once evade the whole tax, once pay 
the whole tax). There is a strong suspicion that the dynamic experiments produced an 
environment which induced the subjects to re-model the probabilistic structure of the 
problem, and this could provide the starting point for a theory on the subjective 
modelling of probability under conditions of risk. It should be borne in mind, in fact, 
that the subjects were always perfectly informed about the nature of the lotteries 
confronting them, and therefore had to decide under conditions of risk, not of 
uncertainty (here accepting the classical Knight (1921) distinction between uncertainty 
and risk). 
It seems that the cognitive complexity of the task assigned to the subjects of the 
dynamic experiments (the difficulty of computing the expected value of evasion for 
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each round) artificially transformed a problem of decision-taking under given 
probability into a situation of uncertainty. This late consideration goes in the direction 
of the more recent criticism on the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" 
probabilities (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). 
5.5 Normative lessons from cluster analysis 
An interesting question concerns the possibility of using the five taxpayer categories 
identified by cluster analysis as a basis for the design of tax policies. To answer this 
question, one could consider two main fields of action for fiscal authorities: the first 
regards fiscal audit strategies, the second the design of the punishment scheme. 
As is well known, a crucial problem for the tax authorities is how to reduce the 
administrative costs of carrying out fiscal audits. The best way to increase the efficiency 
of the fiscal police is to give them good "targets", that is, to reduce the number of 
unnecessary audits as much as possible, concentrating investigative effort only on high 
risk tax payers. For obvious reasons this selection cannot be performed by concentrating 
on individuals, but it is feasible if specific socio-economic categories are picked. 
Unfortunately, in modern societies socio-economic groups are generally very large - for 
example, from the researches discussed in chapter 1 we know that self-employed 
workers have more opportunities to evade income tax than employees, but the self- 
employed workers class is too large a group to be adopted as a specific category for 
fiscal audits - and they therefore do not allow the building of a good screening system. 
In this sense the results from cluster analysis just discussed can help to improve the 
effectiveness of the screening system. For example, one could investigate whether the 
opportunities to evade available to a specific socio-economic group and due to some 
imperfection in the tax system can fit with the most "dangerous" cluster category, i. e. 
cat. MESP (mainly evade the whole amount of tax due or a part of it and sometimes 
pay). 
An example of this kind of correlation is provided by a sub-group of self-employed 
workers (e. g. some types of artisan: plumbers, painters, electricians, etc. ) who derive 
their yearly earned incomes mainly by adding the payments of numerous small 
professional services. The parcelling out of the sources of earned income allows 
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reproduction of a tax payment style which fits the MESP category because the tax payer 
has the opportunity to hide each single revenue by not invoicing her/his customers or by 
under-invoicing the real price. ' Remembering that in all the repeated choices 
experiments discussed here the MESP category is one of the largest, and that the style of 
tax payment adopted by its members is stable behaviour, it seemed reasonable to 
conclude that a high percentage of tax payers belonging to the artisan class (and in all 
the other socio-economic groups with the same characteristics) will actually adopt the 
MESP strategy. 
This conclusion may seem rather obvious and certainly not brand new: in fact, we do 
not need to run a cluster analysis to discover that craftsmen often make up part of the 
persistent tax evaders category. Nevertheless the results from cluster analysis just 
discussed suggest a special two-step fiscal audit strategy: 
a) in the first step the fiscal authority carefully analyses whether the conditions of tax 
payment allowed to a given socio-economic group may give rise to MESP 
behaviours, making in this way a first selection of the potential candidates for fiscal 
audits; 
b) in the second step, remembering that the tax payers belonging to the MESP category 
seemed very reluctant to change their style of tax evasion even when they have been 
detected and punished, the fiscal authority should put each tax payer discovered as 
MESP in a special "high risk" audit group, monitoring her/him with regularity. 
It seemed reasonable to expect that this two-step procedure, and in particular the 
knowledge of running the risk of becoming a member not only of the "potential evaders 
category" but also of the very undesirable closely monitored group, should work as a 
strong deterrent to tax evasion. 
Looking at the largest cluster category, i. e. cat. I TE IP (totally evade once, then pay 
the entire tax one or more times) it is possible to draw another interesting lesson for 
modelling the audit strategy. The members of this category seemed unable to correctly 
evaluate the risk of being detected and punished, oscillating between two opposite 
behaviours, totally pay or totally evade, as if they were confronting a probability of 
being audited that changes dichotomously (once high probability then low probability), 
while, as we know, this kind of change never occurred in the experiments. Therefore a 
' This form of tax evasion in very common in Italy, see the first chapter. 
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good audit strategy, aimed at contrasting their attitude to tax evasion, would be that of 
extending the tax audit over the longest period possible. This device should force the 
ITEIP tax payers to build a mental representation of the probability of being audited on 
a sort of time continuum. The objective of this kind of fiscal audit policy should be to 
convince the tax payers that might potentially fall into the 1 TE 1P category to switch 
their behaviours to the AP (always pay) category, as a response to a probability of being 
punished perceived as constant over time. 
The second area of intervention for the fiscal authorities that might benefit from the 
results of cluster analysis is that of the punishment system. The most effective 
punishment system against the most dangerous evader category, i. e. cat. MESP, is 
probably a progressive one. The tax evaders belonging to the MESP category do not 
care how many tirpes they have been detected and punished, but this behaviour is 
probably due to the fact that the value of the fines in the experiments was independent 
of the number of tax evasions. This means that the fee applied to each tax evasion was 
always the same (4.5 times the amount of tax evaded), independently of how many 
times the tax payer had evaded. Changing this punishment system to a progressive one, 
that is, a system that increases the fines as the number of evasions detected increases 
(e. g. 4.5 for the first tax evasion, then 5.5 the second, 6.5 the third and so on), would 
probably break the behavioural pattern of MESP tax evaders. 
Similarly also the tax evaders belonging to category 1TE1P could be contrasted by 
using a specific punishment system which applies higher fees when the tax evasion is 
total or very near to total. Admitting that these tax evaders have a problem in modelling 
the audit probability, and remembering that this cognitive (computational) constraint 
induces them to adopt a dichotomous behaviour: evade or pay the entire amount of tax 
due, a system that punishes total evasion very severely should break the basis of their 
strategy. This system in fact should force them, when they have decided to evade, to 
leave the easy choice of total evasion because it becomes much less dangerous to 
modulate the amount of money evaded. Given their computational limitations, this 
could increase the number of honest income declarations, because they do not involve 
any additional cognitive cost. 
Unfortunately these late considerations are not explicitly supported by the 
experimental results and may therefore form the theme of further experiments. 
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A final question that can be asked by looking to the results from cluster analysis is 
the following: does exist some correlation between the styles of tax payments and some 
socio-economic indicators - like for example income, level of education and so on -? 
The finding of some relationship of this kind could help to concentrate the fiscal audits 
on the tax payers that have the highest probability to fall into the high risk categories. 
Unluckily I did not collect this kind of information about the experimental subjects and 
therefore I cannot verify this hypothesis unless I call back the experimental subjects for 
a supplementary enquiry. On the other hand it is worth remembering that all the subjects 
used in the experiments were university students, and therefore share many common 
socio-economic characteristics. It follows that they do not constitute the best possible 
sample to verify the existence of correlation between styles of evasion and many of the 
indicators just suggested. 
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6. Appendixes 
6.1 Appendix Al 
6.1.1 Instructions for the experimental subjects: ST1 experiment 
These are the Instruction for group A: total anonymity, absence of any redistribution of 
tax yield: 
"First of all we want to thank you for having answered the questions on the 
questionnaires we gave to you. 
The reward for your work is in the envelope that you have just received. Inside the 
envelope, besides the money, you will find two tickets with a number, which will 
ensure your anonymity when you cash the reward. 
As you know, the reward is proportional to the time you took and the amount of 
work you did in answering the questionnaires. In fact, some of you were given a larger 
number of questionnaires ('more work' state) than others ('less work' state). The 
members of the first group receive a reward of 60,000 lire, while the others receive 
30,000 lire. Like any form of earned income, these rewards are subject to tax. 
Your tax rate is written in the `tax envelope' together with the tax burden (rounded 
to the lower 1,000 lire), that you should pay. 
Before paying the tax you should answer the questions given to you with these 
instructions. 
The operations that you must perform in payin your tax are the following (you 
cannot take more than three minutes to do everything): 
1) enter the polling-booth; 
2) put the money for the tax in the `tax envelope' together with your answers to the 
questions; 
3) put the remaining money in the `personal reward envelope', and one of the two 
identification tickets in the `ticket envelope'; 
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4) seal all the envelopes; 
5) join all the envelopes together with the clip; 
6) keep the second ticket for yourself; do not show it to anyone, you will use it at the 
end to cash your money; 
7) put the envelopes in the box for your group (i. e. `more work' box or `less work' 
box), then go back to your seat and wait until all the other participants have 
finished paying their tax. 
You should bear in mind that if you pocket the whole reward without using the 
`personal reward envelope' you will lose the right to anonymity and the right to 
receive your personal reward. 
If you decide to evade tax you run the risk of being detected by the tax inspectors, 
in which case (only if your evasion is detected) you must pay your debt plus the 
following fines: 
I) evasion of less than 30% of the amount due: a fine amounting to 50% of the tax 
evaded; 
II) evasion of 31% to 60% of the amount due: a fine amounting to 80% of the tax 
evaded; 
III) evasion of more than 61% of the amount due: a fine amounting to 140% of the 
tax evaded; 
The procedure used to carry out the fiscal enquiry is identical to that followed by 
the revenue office. The procedure, which will ensure your anonymity, is as follows: 
After the envelopes to be inspected (more precisely the sets of three envelopes held 
together with the clip) have been selected, 
a) the `personal reward envelopes' and the `tax envelopes' will be opened; 
b) if tax evasion is found, the fine will be applied, with the remaining money being 
put back into the `personal reward envelope'; 
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c) the `ticket envelope' will not be opened (unless both the `personal reward 
envelope' and the `tax envelope' are empty). In this way, therefore, also the 
anonymity of tax evaders will be ensured anonymity. 
Eventually will be opened all the remaining `tax envelopes' with the aim to collect 
the information about the choices made by the subjects. No fine will be applied to 
these envelopes. We will keep the `tax envelopes', while the `personal reward 
envelopes' (closed) and the `ticket envelopes' (obviously still closed and glued to the 
`personal reward envelopes') will be put into a box, shuffled, and distributed to the 
participants using the reference ticket. " 
The instructions for the second group (group B, public audit, absence of any 
redistribution of tax yield) are identical to those just stated, the only difference being 
that no form of anonymity is guaranteed for the participants chosen for the fiscal audit. 
The instructions for the third group (group C, total anonymity, partial redistribution 
of tax yield) are also largely identical with those of group A, with the addition of a 
further item of information: 
"It is important that you should know that some of the total yield will be 
redistributed among all the participants. More precisely, 70% of the total yield will be 
distributed in identical individual portions. For example, if the total yield (i. e. the sum 
of the individual payments by all the members of both the `less work' and `more 
work' groups) is 200,000 lire, then each participant will receive 12,500 lire. " 
Obviously, members of the fourth group (group public audit, partial redistribution of 
tax yield) received the group C instructions without any guarantees of anonymity for 
those audited. 
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6.1.2 Instructions for the experimental subjects: ST2 experiment 
The instructions given to the subjects in ST2 are the same as those given in STI, 
except for the following two statements: 
al) "Your tax rate is written in the `tax envelope' together with the amount of tax 
burden (rounded to the lower 1,000 lire) that you should pay. " 
bl) "The procedure used to carry out the tax inspection is identical to the one followed 
by the revenue office. " 
These were changed to: 
a2) "The tax rate is 40% of your reward, and it is the same for all the participants. The 
amount of tax burden (rounded to the lower 1,000 lire) that you should pay is written 
in the `tax envelope'. " 
b2) "Three people will be randomly chosen for a tax inspection. " 
6.2 Appendix A2 
6.2.1 Questions contained in the tax envelope: ST1 exp. 
These are the questions asked: 
"a) According to you, what is your probability of being audited? Use the following 
scale to indicate your expected probability: 
1-------------------------------------7 
min. probability max probability 
b) How many of the other participants do you think will evade taxes? Write it as a 
percentage. 
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c) How much do you resent the fact that some of the other participants have decided to 
evade their taxes? Use the following scale: 
1-------------------------------------7 
low resentment high resentment 
d) Do you know the Ministry of Finance's audit procedure? 
e) In your opinion, how many Italians are audited each year by the Ministry of 
Finance? Write it as a percentage. 
f) Describe the audit procedure that you believe is actually used by the Ministry of 
Finance. " 
6.2.2 Questions contained in the tax envelope: ST2 exp. 
The questionnaire distributed to the participants to the ST2 experiment included 
questions b), c) and e) of the STI questionnaire plus the following new questions: 
"g) How many Italians do you believe usually evade taxes? Write it as a percentage. 




i) In your opinion, what is the average income tax rate in Italy? 
1) Suppose that the number of fiscal audits in Italy were doubled. In this case how much 
would tax evasion decrease? " 
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63 Appendix A3: OLS results for the ST1 experiment 
The model: 
X* = f(IF, K, S, Y) 
where: X* = amount of money evaded (continuous variable); 
K= moral constraint (binary variable); 
S= anonymity (binary variable); 
Y= income level (binary variable); 
T= disappointment at knowing that someone has evaded (continuous variable). 
These are the results obtained: 
k* =- 1286.82 - 3588.85 `1'- 2885.51 K- 2490.52 S+ 
(- 1.415) (- 1.723) (- 1.570) 
+ 7241.68 Y 
(4.521) 
Standard error= 6071.72 
R2 = 0.38 
F=7.68 
S. E. = 6071.72 
(the bracketed values are t statistics) 
The significance of the t statistic is good only for Y, and immediately on the border 
of acceptability for K (0.09). All the other variables should be removed from the model. 
Nevertheless, in this case too, the signs of the explicative variables confirm our general 
assumptions. The coefficient of multiple correlation is quite low: only 38% of the 
variance of the dependent is explained by the model. The F statistic is significant and 
therefore allows us to reject the independence hypothesis. 
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6.4 Appendix A4: Instructions for the experimental subjects of the dynamic 
experiments 
These are the instructions given to the participants of the experiments DYI, DY2, DY3, 
DY5: 
"This game is about the behaviour of tax payers. The game is computer aided, the 
software that you will use is pre-built, and there will be no direct intervention by the 
researchers during the experiment. The results of your choices will be collected only 
when the experiment has finished, and they will remain anonymous. 
The game simulates a real world environment. It comprises several rounds which 
represent different time periods (for example years). In each period you will receive a 
round income (which at the end will be your reward for the work you have done). In 
each period you will also be required to pay a tax, but you can decide to evade part of 
this tax, or even all of it. Regardless of your choice, you may be investigated at any 
moment during the game, and if you have evaded in one or more of the last five rounds 
you must pay the taxes evaded plus a fine. The inspection may never take place, and it is 
decided and performed only by the computer, without any direct or indirect intervention 
by the researchers. 
All relevant information will be provided directly on the computer screen, and you 
must not communicate with anyone during the whole experiment. 
This is the sequence that you must follow in each round of the game: 
1) get the information about your round income and the tax to pay; 
2) decide the amount of tax to pay (between zero and the total amount required); 
5) press the enter key. 
If you do not perform the entire routine, the computer will not allow you to pass to a 
new round, and you will have to repeat everything. " 
The experimental subjects of DY4 experiment received this modified instructions: 
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"This game is about gambling. The game is computer aided, the software that you 
will use is pre-built, and there will be no direct intervention by the researchers during 
the experiment. The results of your choices will be collected only when the experiment 
has finished, and they will remain anonymous. 
The game simulates a pure game environment: there are several rounds representing 
different game shots. In each round you will receive an amount of money to play with 
(which at the end will be your reward). In each period you must decide either to bet 
some of this money or to save it. Regardless of your choice, you may be selected for a 
tax inspection at any moment of the game, and if you have decided to bet in one or more 
of the last five rounds you will lose the bet and have to pay a fine. The extraction may 
never take place, and it is decided and performed only by the computer, without any 
direct or indirect intervention by the researchers. 
All relevant information will be provided directly on the computer screen, and you 
must not communicate with anyone during the whole experiment. 
This is the sequence that you must follow in each round of the game: 
1) get the information about your round money and the bet; 
2) decide the amount of money to bet (between zero and the total amount of disposable 
money); 
5) press the enter key. 
If you do not perform the entire routine, the computer will not allow you to pass to a 
new round, and you will have to repeat everything. " 
6.5 Appendix A5: Computation of the dynamic experiments expected values with 
Mathematica. 
pl=p 
p2= (1 - pl) p 
p3= (1 - p2) p 
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P4= (I - P3) P 
prob=pl +p2+p3+p4 
uno= prob /. p ->. 06 (* Probability of being audited on 4 round with p=6% *) 
due= prob /. p -> .1 (* Probability of 
being audited on 4 round with p=10% *) 
tre= prob /. p->. 15 (* Probability of being audited on '4 round with p=15% *) 
(* The following plots show the expected values for the lotteries *) 
(* Audit = 6% Income = 1000 tax = 200 *) 
p 1=Plot [(uno (I 000-tax-5.5 * (200-tax))+ (I-uno) (1000-tax)), { tax, 0,200 }] 
(* Audit = 6% Income = 1000 tax = 300 *) 
p2=Plot[(uno (1000-tax-5.5*(300-tax))+(1-uno) (1000-tax)), (tax, 0,300)] 
(*. Audit = 10% Income = 1000 tax = 300 *) 
p3=Plot[(due (1000-tax-5.5*(300-tax))+ (1-due) (1000-tax)), (tax, 0,300)] 
(* Audit = 10% Income = 1000 tax = 400 *) 
p4=Plot[(due (1000-tax-5.5*(400-tax))+ (1-due) (1000-tax)), {tax, 0,400}J 
(* Audit = 15% Income = 1000 tax = 400 *) 
p5=Plot[(tre (1000-tax-5.5*(400-tax))+ (1-tre) (1000-tax)), {tax, 0,400}] 
(* Audit = 15% Income = 800 tax = 400 *) 
p6=Plot[(tre (800-tax-5.5*(400-tax))+ (1-tre) (800-tax)), {tax, 0,400}] 
Show[p 1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6] 
6.6 Appendix A6: The "TEMAG" software 
The TEMAG (Tax Evasion Multiple Agents Game) software enables simulation of 
repeated tax-paying situation, with a variable number of persons who may (depending 
on the experimental design) interact with each other. In particular, the software enables 
easy adjustment of the experiment's strategic variables (the experimental subjects' 
incomes, the tax rate, frequency of tax audits, etc. ). 
The following information is shown to the experimental subject on the computer 
screen: 
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1. income (on which tax must be paid); 
2. amount of tax to be paid; 
3. aggregate income; 
4. probability of being audited; 
5. progressive number of the decision (i. e. number of the round of the experiment); 
6. income support (if envisaged by the experiment) 
7. percentage of evaders previous round. 
The information given to the subjects is extracted from an AQL (standard query 
language) database interrogated by the control program. 
The software is divided into two modules: the `server program' which supervises the 
experiment - recording the players, distributing information, and gathering decision data 
and the `client' software, which is the interface between the player and the server. 
The software architecture is shown in the figure: 
SERVER 
TEMAG 
Client I Client I 
Temag Client 1 Temag 
Temag 
Chart 





The software module is the core of the program. It runs the experiment by linking the 
player program with the results recording program by means of an SQL database, and 
also records the decisions taken by the players. The programming language used to 
develop the software is `objective C' language. This' has characteristics which make it 
particularly suited to constructing programs which communicate via networks. 
Once launched, the program server connects with the SQL database server in order to 
check that it is working properly. At this point the program is ready to accept the user's 
data relative to the experimental situation by means of special display. The experiment 
can be conducted simultaneously on several groups of subjects. This feature of the 
software means that the experiment can be conducted using computers located in 
different rooms, for example in two computer classrooms. At the beginning of the 
experiment, the database used by TEMAG to distribute information contains only some 
of the information communicated to the subjects round by round. The rest is gathered 
from the players' behaviour during the previous round, and is therefore constructed 
using real data. 
Once the initial window has been compiled, the server shows the experiment 
monitoring window, which shows: the number of players, the current round, the income 
and tax yield of the last round. In the lower part of the window is a graph showing the 
average amount of tax paid in the various rounds. At this point the client programs start 
and communicate their presence and that they are working properly to the server. The 
latter updates its internal structure, which keeps track of the connections and, by 
incrementing the active clients counter, informs the experimenter of the event. When the 
number of active clients reaches the value previously introduced in the settings window, 
the server starts the experiment, distributing the information from the first round to all 
the clients that have notified that they are in operation, and informs the experimenter by 
means of a special dialog box. 
The server then waits for communication by the clients of the amount of tax paid, 
once all the information has been collected and recorded in the database, and distributes 
the information on the second round. The two previous steps are then repeated until the 
number of rounds specified in the experimental conditions has been reached. 
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On start-up, after communicating information on its status to the server, the client 
waits for the start message. When it receives the signal, the client shows the user's code 
(necessary to ensure anonymity). If the subject has been checked by the tax authorities 
and identified as an evader, the client will display the fine that will be subtracted from 
the player's aggregate income. At the end of the game the subject is informed of this by 
a special message. 
6.7 Appendix A7: Mann-Whitney test statistics 
Tab A7.1 Mann-Whitney test Cat. 1TE1P 
Standard exp. - Gamble exp. 
Cluster 4 E- 4 Cluster 1+6 
Test Statisticß 
AVGEVA DEVSTEVA MULTA NUEVA NUMULT REDCUM RSO 
mann- i ey 
Wilcoxon W 187,000 209,000 243,000 174,500 163,000 171,500 135,000 
Z -3,011 -2,037 -, 532 -, 244 -1,714 -, 376 -1,994 Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
, 003 , 042 , 595 , 807 , 087 , 707 , 046 Exact Sig. [2"(1-tailed 
Sig. )] 002a 043 6168 811' , 4711 711 048 
°" Not corrected for ties. 
b" Grouping Variable: EXP 
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Tab A7.2 Mann - Whitney test Cat. MPSE 
Standard exp. ---- Gamble exp. 
Cluster 2 E- -> Cluster 5+7 
Test Statistics' 
AVGEVA DEVSTEVA MULTA NUEVA NUMULT REDCUM RSQ 
Mann- ney 17,0007 
Wilcoxon W 21,000 34,000 39,000 37,000 37,000 37,000 38,000 
Z -2,887 -, 802 , 
000 -, 321 -, 331 -, 320 -, 160 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) , 004 , 
423 1,000 , 748 , 741 , 749 , 873 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed 002 8 , 485 1,0008 , 8188 , 818a , 8188 , 9378 Sig. )] 
a" Not corrected for ties. 
b. Grouping Variable: EXP 
Tab A73 Mann - Whitney test Cat. 1E1P 
Standard exp. ---- Gamble exp. 
Cluster 1F4 Cluster 4 
Test Statistics 
AVGEVA DEVSTEVA MULTA NUEVA NUMULT REDCUM RSQ 
ann- i eY 
Wilcoxon W 6,000 6,000 11,000 18,500 12,000 19,000 15,000 
Z -2,236 -2,236 -. 745 -1,200 -, 512 -1,043 -2,236 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) , 025 , 025 , 456 . 230 . 608 . 297 , 025 Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed 
0368 036a 571' 250' 786 ' 393a 036 ' Sig. )] , , , , , , , 
a" Not corrected for ties. 
b" Grouping Variable: EXP 
181 
Tab A7.4 Mann - Whitney test Cat. MESP 
Standard exp. -- Gamble exp. 
Cluster 6+3+5+ 7E- -> Cluster 2+3 
Test Statistic 
AVGEVA DEVSTEVA MULTA NUEVA NUMULT REDCUM RSQ 
mann- i ney , 
Wilcoxon W 22,000 25,000 15,000 13,500 15,000 13,000 6,000 
Z -2,066 -1,291 , 
000 -, 389 . 000 -, 516 -2,324 










Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed 048 , 262 1,000 , 714 1 000a 714" 0248 Sig. )] . , , , 
a- Not corrected for ties. 
b- Grouping Variable: EXP 
Tab A7.5 Mann - Whitney test Cat. 1TE1P 
Standard exp. ---- Redistribution exp. 
Cluster 4F 4 Cluster 3 
Test Statistic* 
NUEVA AVGEVA DEVSTEVA REDCUM MULTA NUMULT RSQ 
ann- i ey 
, Wiilcoxon W 49,500 28,000 63,000 89,000 31,000 70,000 100,000 
Z -1,737 -3,550 -, 592 -2,620 -3,298 , 000 -1,690 Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
, 082 , 000 . 554 , 009 , 001 1,000 . 091 Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed 
o3 000' 5928 007' 000' 1 000' 100 Sig. )] , , , , , , 
a" Not corrected for ties. 
b" Grouping Variable: EXP 
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Tab A7.6 Mann - Whitney test Cat. n1PSE 
Standard exp. - Redistribution exp. 
Cluster 2F ->Cluster 4 
Test Statistics 
NUEVA AVGEVA DEVSTEVA REDCUM MULTA NUMULT RSQ 
ann- i ey , 
Wilcoxon W 26.500 15.000 27,000 30,000 34,000 33,000 24,000 
Z -1.755 -2.739 -, 549 -1,095 -, 366 -. 582 -1,095 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) , 
079 . 




, 561 . 
273 
Exact Sig. [2'(1-tailed 
. 082' 
004a , 6628 , 3298 , 7928 , 6628 , 329a Sig. )] 
a" Not corrected for ties. 
b" Grouping Variable: EXP 
Tab A7.6 Mann - Whitney test Cat. MPSE 
Standard exp. ---- Redistribution exp. 
Cluster 2F 4 Cluster 5 
Test Statistic* 
NUEVA AVGEVA DEVSTEVA REDCUM MULTA NUMULT RSQ 
ann- i ey , 
Wilcoxon W 19.500 10,000 10,000 24,000 12,000 20,500 21,000 
Z -. 538 -2,558 -2,558 -1,919 -2,138 -, 332 -2,558 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) . 591 , 011 . 011 , 055 . 032 , 740 , 011 
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed 6108 . 010a 




, 762' '010 Sig. )] , 
a" Not corrected for ties. 
b" Grouping Variable: EXP 
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Tab A7.7 Mann - Whitney test Cat. 
Standard exp. -- Redistribution exp. 
Cluster 1 E- 4 Cluster 2 
Test Statistic 
NUEVA AVGEVA DEVSTEVA REDCUM MULTA NUMULT RSQ 
Mann- i ey u TOT 
Wilcoxon W 18.000 10.000 23.000 15.000 20.000 15.500 17.500 
Z -. 490 -2.449 -. 490 -1.225 -1.230 -1.173 -. 615 














Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed 
. 730 . 0168 . 7308 . 28(? . 286 2868 556 Sig. )) . . 
a" Not corrected for ties. 
b" Grouping Variable: EXP 
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